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Trade Engine Theory— Second Gear—Case of Sri Lanka

J. W. WICKRAMASINGHE

Abstract

In this article Feder (1983) model which examined the impact of export growth, in particular, the external effects of export growth on economic development, by using cross-sectional data, has been modified to use time-series data of Sri Lanka. The results show a dismal picture. The factor productivity difference between export and non-export sectors was only 28 per cent, slightly more than half the average for the developing countries and a third of the average for the semi-industrialised countries. The total effect of transferring resources to export sector has been only 22 per cent of which only 10 per cent has come from intersectoral external effect and the contribution by externality effect to GDP growth has been the lowest, 15 per cent. Non-export sector has contributed 63 per cent for the GDP growth rate leaving only 37 per cent for the export sector.

INTRODUCTION

Resource allocation in developing countries is normally treated as sub-optimal as it is not made on a rational basis between the two divergent sectors, export and non-export sectors. Despite the higher productivity of factors of production in the export sector than that in the non-export sector, (Keesing 1966; Donges and Heinz 1984) the resource allocation has not gone to the extent of making marginal productivity/price ratio of factors of production the same in both these sectors. Rather marginal productivity/price ratio in the export sector is higher. This situation suggests that both productivity and output could be increased by transferring resources into the export sector.

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Some of the earlier models of economic development of these countries dealt with the transfer of factors from non-export sector to export sector as a means of development, projecting that such transfers would result, not only in increased productivity of such factors of production but also increased aggregate output (Kravis 1970; Myint 1971; Streeten 1973). Accordingly, exports along with capital and labour, can be considered as casual factors of national income determination in developing countries.

This in other words, demonstrates the second gear of the trade engine theory which explains that growth of a developing country is conditioned by its ability to export. (Two Gap Model of Chenery and his associates). However, the relationship between export expansion and economic growth and the mechanism through which such a relationship works, are not well established by these models. Hence, until recently no general consensus has emerged on this subject. For instance, Krueger (1980) is sceptical on the role export can play in promoting economic growth.

However, considerable statistical evidence has been presented by others to show the importance of export promotion and export expansion in economic growth. Jay (1973), Michaely (1970), Balassa (1978), Tyler (1981) and Feder (1983) are some such studies. There is a difference between the earlier mentioned models and that of Feder. Feder incorporated the external effects of the export expansion into the model which the earlier models had not done. However, these studies are based on cross country data which links export expansion and economic growth in developing countries.

Feder (1983) examined this problem by using a growth model applying data from 52 developing countries and showed that exports too is a significant factor in determining national income not only in developing countries but also in both semi-industrialised and industrialised countries.

The main focus of this study is on an examination of potential non-optimality of resource allocation between export and non-export sectors in Sri Lanka, by applying a modified version of Feder (1983) model to time series data over a third of a century. The Sri Lankan economy is viewed as consisting of two distinct sectors, one producing exports and the other producing for the domestic market. Accordingly, neo-classical aggregate national production function, which deals with one sector, is not appropriate for this analysis. Contrarily, each sector's output is treated as a function of

factors allocated to that sector in a previous period, and the output of non-export sector is considered to be dependent on the volume of exports produced. This is contrasting from the earlier models which ignored the time lag between inputs and output.

The export sector while contributing directly to the national income by being a part of it, also enhances the latter by generating externalities which improves productivity of factors of production in the non-export sector. Following Feder (1983) the externalities generated by the export sector can be incorporated as :

$$N = F(K_n, L_n, X) \quad 1$$

$$X = G(K_x, L_x) \quad 2$$

where, N , is non exports, X , exports, K_n, K_x and L_n, L_x , respective capital stocks and labour forces.

Let us suppose that ratio of respective marginal productivities of factors of production in the two sectors deviate from unity by a factor α , i.e.,

$$(G_K/F_K) = (G_L/F_L) = 1 + \alpha \quad 3$$

In the absence of externalities generating from the export sector, i.e., $\alpha = 0$, would reflect the conventional optimal resource allocation. However, due to numerous reasons, inclusive of low capital / labour ratio, which are well known, marginal productivity is likely to be lower in the non-export sector, which means, $\alpha > 0$. The productivity differentials which are due to externalities, are not included in α , as they will be identified separately.

Differentiation of (1) and (2) yields,

$$N = F_K \cdot I_n + F_L \cdot L_n + F_X \cdot X \quad 4$$

$$X = G_K \cdot I_x + G_L \cdot L_x \quad 5$$

where, I_n , and I_x , are respective sectoral gross investment, and L_n, L_x , are respective sectoral changes in the labour force and F_X , describes the marginal externality effect of exports on the output of non-exports.

Denoting GDP by Y , we have,

$$Y = N + X \quad 6$$

Using (3) — (5) in (6) yields,

$$Y = F_K \cdot I_n + F_L \cdot L_n + F_X \cdot X + (1 + \alpha) F_K \cdot I_x + (1 + \alpha) F_L \cdot L_x$$

$$= F_k (I_n + I_x) + F_l (L_n + L_x) + F_x X + (F_k I_x + F_l L_x) \quad 7$$

where, $I = (I_n + I_x)$ and $L = (L_n + L_x)$.

$$F_k I_x + F_l L_x = 1/(1 + \alpha) (G_k I_x + G_l L_x) = X/(1 + \alpha) \quad 8$$

Using this result in (7) yields,

$$Y = F_k I + F_l L + (1/(1 + \alpha) F_x) X \quad 9$$

Feder (1983) following arguments presented by Bruno (1968) assumed that the marginal productivity in a given sector has a linear relationship with the average output per labour, say

$$F_l = \alpha (Y/L)$$

and also $F_k = \alpha$

Then dividing (9) through by Y

$$Y/Y = \alpha (I/Y) + (L/L) + (1/(1 + \alpha) + F_x) (X/Y) \quad 10$$

Here in this equation (10), I/Y according to Feder, is the investment share. Its value depends on two factors, marginal productivity of investment, F_k , and the rate of growth of investment, I/L . The marginal productivity of investment, F_k is assumed to be fixed, in the Feder model. That means the changes in investment share is a function of the changes in the rate of change of investment. Hence, I/L can be substituted for I/Y . Here in this study I/L is used instead of I/Y .

Now identification of the specific inter-sectoral externality effect could be made by adopting a plausible specification for the term F_k . Suppose that exports affect the production of non-exports with constant elasticity, i.e.,

$$N = F (K_n, L_n, X) = X^\alpha (K_n, L_n)$$

where α is a parameter. Now $N/X = F_x = (N/X)$ (10) now can be rewritten as,

$$Y/Y = (I/L) + (L/L) + 1/(1 + \alpha) + N/X \cdot X/X \cdot X/Y \quad 11$$

But

$$N/X = (N/Y)/(X/Y) = \{1 - (X/Y)\}/(X/Y) = 1/(X/Y) - 1$$

I/Y is determined by I/L as $F_k = \alpha$

Using these results (11) can now be rearranged as,

$$Y/Y = (I/L) + L/L + \{1/(1 + \alpha) - 1\} X/X \cdot X/Y \quad 12$$

$$\text{i.e., } Y/Y = (I/I) + (L/L) + (X/X \cdot X/Y) \quad 13$$

$$\text{where, } \quad = \frac{\quad}{1 +} + F_x$$

The conventional model could be derived by assuming that F_x and $/(1 +) = 0$, hence, the model reduces to

$$Y/Y = (I/I) + (L/L) + (X/X)$$

Let us define TMPK_k and TMPL_x as total increments to GDP resulting from marginal increasing in capital and labour respectively, allocated to the export sector. They can be described as social marginal productivities of two factors. They now can be presented as, $\text{TMPK}_x = X_k + N_x X_k$ and $\text{TMPL}_x = X_l + N_x X_l$. It can be shown that,

$$r = \frac{\quad}{1 +} + N_x = \frac{\text{TMPK}_x - N_k}{X_k} = \frac{\text{TMPL}_x - N_l}{X_l} \quad 15$$

which shows the relative efficiency of the export sector. Now it is clear that the equation (15) shows that the growth in GDP is a combination of contribution of accumulation of factors of production and gains brought about by shifting resources from the non-export sector to the export sector. Now r has to be decomposed into its two component parts, differential marginal productivities of factors in the two sectors, and the intersectoral externality term, F_x . This could be done only if plausible specification for the F_x term is made. Let us follow Feder and assume that exports affect the production of non-exports with constant elasticity, i.e.,

$$N = F(K_n, L_n, X) = X^\alpha (K_n, L_n)$$

where α a parameter, then,

$$N / X = F_x = \alpha (N/X) \quad 16$$

$$\text{But } \phi, N/X = \phi = \frac{N/Y}{X/Y_w} = \frac{[1-(X/Y)]}{X/Y} = \frac{\quad}{X/Y}$$

$$Y/Y = (I/I) + (L/L) + (X/X \cdot X/Y) + (X/X) \quad 16a$$

It is well known that the use of time series data entails special type of problems which the cross sectional data do not have, particularly, the problem

of autocorrelation. Another problem that is associated with time series data in developing countries is that in certain years the values of GDP and exports rise up owing to administratively determined exchange rate. Lack of a proper index to convert values in market prices to real values is also a serious problem. Feder (1983) model has been built to suit cross sectional data. When time series data are used in this model two serious problems have to be resolved. Emergence of a singular matrix as dependant variable and one of the independent variables are a constant divided by GDP, the same denominator. There is autocorrelation problem as well as multicollinearity problem. On the other hand the impact of resource allocation to any sector could be observed only after some time lag. In the case of exports the external effect would be effective only after sometime. Hence, Feder model has been modified in order to accommodate these features. In this study capital and labour are used with one period lag values. It is also assumed that the external effect of the export expansion on the non-export sector works within the same period.

The rationale of resource allocation is that in a developing country priority in resource allocation is given to the export sector and the non-export sector gets the residue. (Non-export sector is the residual sector). There is a time lag between resource allocation and resulting output in the export sector. In this study one period time lag is assumed. By definition output in the non-export sector is determined by the output of the exports sector and the external effects too are assumed to be operative with one time period lag. Hence, equilibrium is achieved only in the next period. Hence, (6) becomes:

$$Y_t = N_t + X_t \quad 17$$

$$(1) \text{ becomes } N_t = F(K_{nt-1}, L_{nt-1}, X_{t-1}) \quad 18$$

$$\text{and (2) becomes } X_t = X_{t-1} = G(K_{xt-1}, L_{xt-1}) \quad 19$$

where, α is a constant.

In effect, what is shown here is that output of both exports and non-exports is determined by the resource allocation in the period $t-1$, i.e., with one period time lag

And hence (12) now becomes

$$Y/Y = (I/I_{t-1}) + (L/L_{t-1}) + \{ (1 + \alpha) - \alpha \} \{ (X_t / X_{t-1}) (X_t/Y) \} + X/X_{t-1} \quad 20$$

$$\text{i.e., } Y/Y = (I/I_{t-1}) + (L/L_{t-1}) + (X_t / X_{t-1} \cdot X_t/Y) = (X_t/X_{t-1}) \quad 21$$

Here either X_t or X_{t-1} can be used interchangeably. Hence, X_{t-1} was used instead of X_t in the denominator of the first element in the third variable, in order to avoid the model becoming a near singular matrix.

Where,
$$= \frac{\quad}{1 - \quad} = Fx$$

SOCIAL MARGINAL PRODUCT OF INVESTMENT IN EXPORTS

The point estimate for \quad can be used to obtain further information on social marginal productivity of capital in export (TMPK_x).

$$\text{TMPK}_x = F_k (1 + F_x) / (1 - \quad + F_x) \quad 22$$

Substituting the values obtained from the results of our analysis (Table 2) in (16) TMPK_x can be estimated thus,

$$r(x) = f / 1 + f + \sigma \cdot 1 - 1/x/x$$

where x is the export share in GDP, and hence (22) can be rewritten

$$\text{TMPK}_x = F_k (1 + \quad - x/x) \cdot (1 + \quad) \quad 23$$

Using the parameters estimated below (Table 2) in (23) the social marginal product of investment in exports can be estimated for each year. Results are presented in Table 4.

The time series data obtained from Sri Lanka will be used in (21) to estimate the export income link in Sri Lanka. Data is given in Table 2.

EMPIRICAL DATA — SRI LANKA

During the colonial period, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) depended heavily on international trade. Export sector itself accounted for more than half of the national income. The fluctuations in export revenue created a constraint on domestic economic policies.

This economic structure continued with hardly any change, even after independence. Sri Lanka was an open economy since independence up till about 1960. Table 1 shows the international sector, i.e., export and import sectors together, in 1959 it was 65 per cent of the GDP and has been falling since then. It reached the lowest percentage of 31 per cent in 1971. Up to 1971 import has been falling faster than exports as a percentage of GDP and

thereafter, import share has been lying higher than that of exports. All these were the result of import substitution industrialisation policies.

However, in 1974 and 1975 imports increased, dramatically, in particular, import of military hardware, owing to the 1971 insurrection. The first oil crisis showed its effect on import bill after 1973. After 1976 imports were accounting for much higher percentage of GDP than exports; and since 1979 the former has been almost double the value of the latter, an outcome of import liberalisation strategy. During the early part the bulk of exports consisted of primary commodities and were subjected to severe fluctuations. The turn about of exports came only in 1973 and continued till 1978. Thereafter the movement of exports as a share of GDP was erratic with a declining trend. The average annual growth rate of GDP during the full period was just over 4 per cent, but the growth rate in total exports was slightly more than that figure, i.e., 4.2 per cent per annum.

RESULTS

The results obtained by applying the model described above are presented in Table 2. Total of 35 observations from 1955 to 1989 were taken. The common problem in the time series data, auto-correlation affected the results. However, when auto-regressive variable, i.e., one period lagged value of the dependent variable is included into the model as a variable, the auto-correlation problem got marginalised. Wd. Stat. is 1.76 which lies at the margin of the positive auto-correlation range.

Multicollinearity was not a serious problem in the results. When only one independent variable, lagged investment is regressed on income growth the coefficient is significant and $R^2 = 0.945$. The R^2 increased to 0.952 when the second variable, export share multiplied by the export growth was included. The second variable too is significant. The value of R^2 further increased to 0.968 when the variable export growth was included. That variable too is significant.

However, labour was dropped. The employment data in Sri Lanka is notoriously defective. No continuous employment data are available. On the other hand, labour except highly skilled personnel will not be a constraint, even for another quarter of a century in Sri Lanka. GDP has been determined by the availability of capital and other factors rather than on the availability of

TABLE I
Export and Import Shares in GDP and the International Sector
in Sri Lanka

OBS	SEXSH	IMPSH	INTER
1953	0.341307	NA	NA
1954	0.380781	0.294084	0.674865
1955	0.354591	0.266802	0.621383
1956	0.515469	0.334520	0.849989
1957	0.322748	0.346280	0.669028
1958	0.310667	0.311789	0.622456
1959	0.302900	0.346101	0.649000
1960	0.171171	0.273839	0.445010
1961	0.170544	0.237164	0.407709
1962	0.167708	0.224086	0.391794
1963	0.155953	0.193815	0.349769
1964	0.159553	0.238597	0.398136
1965	0.162096	0.173938	0.336034
1966	0.172814	0.231882	0.404696
1967	0.188583	0.185054	0.373637
1968	0.165893	0.193921	0.359814
1969	0.148913	0.208185	0.357098
1970	0.154319	0.185410	0.339729
1971	0.152245	0.154996	0.307241
1972	0.168775	0.155447	0.324221
1973	0.202760	0.151837	0.354597
1974	0.174426	0.195149	0.369575
1975	0.216788	0.204895	0.421683
1976	0.253451	0.165485	0.418936
1977	0.242257	0.172890	0.415147
1978	0.225734	0.363494	0.589228
1979	0.235987	0.453643	0.689631
1980	0.250064	0.549525	0.799589
1981	0.292282	0.447789	0.740071
1982	0.324600	0.401559	0.726159
1983	0.274166	0.378775	0.652941
1984	0.328137	0.341593	0.669730
1985	0.244107	0.302098	0.546205
1986	0.208127	0.313243	0.521370
1987	0.244084	0.354548	0.598632
1988	0.230593	0.345526	0.576119
1989	0.220979	NA	NA

Source : Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

unskilled labour. Hence, the omission of labour may not affect our results significantly.

The results are shown in Table 2. They are spectacular. Those coefficients show the impact of each of the explanatory variables on the income growth rate. Accordingly, the export share has the strongest impact of 19 per cent. All the others have low impact on the income growth. However, the total effect of the transfer of resources to the export sector is 21 per cent, of which only 10 per cent has come from external effects. Indeed the external effect of exports is very marginal. The factors of production in the export sector have 28 per cent higher productivity than their counterparts in the non-export sector ($\beta = 0.28$). This is quite low compared to the average of 50 per cent composed for 75 developing countries, and according to Feder (1983) this value for semi-industrialised countries was 0.75. However, this value compares with that of the developed countries. There, of course, the structure is different; both sectors are more or less equally efficient at a higher level.

However, what is seen in Sri Lanka is that both sectors are equally inefficient at a low level. This may be owing to problems connected with inefficient management, lack of capital and use of low technology, inadequately trained labour. Even up to this day foreign private investment has been a low percentage of the total investment in the country and the bulk of foreign investment is in low tech garment industries.

On the other hand, some of the foreign investment that has come here caters for the domestic market. What is required in the export sector is foreign investment which brings in advanced technology. The intersectoral externality parameter (β) is only 0.027, indeed a very low value, nearly 3 per cent. This reflects the weak export structure in Sri Lanka, particularly lack of backward linkage as the export activities in the early post independence period were restricted to a plantation enclave and in the later period to a peripheral garment and petroleum product industries.

These results depict an interesting reality of the Sri Lankan economy. The productivity difference between the export and non-export sectors is not significantly large. It is thought provoking. How feasible is the present strategy of export promotion as a means of economic development. The investment in either of the sectors would make its contribution more or less at the same intensity. The difference of productivity between factors of

TABLE 2

Variable	Coefficient
Constant	9.062D-07 (9.22)
Lagged Investment ()	0.0441 (10.48)
Export Share ()	0.1915 (2.592)
Export Growth ()	0.0271 (4.0156)
Lagged Income Growth	- 0.5041 (- 3.1557)
Wd. Stat. 1.76	

$$- \quad - \quad = \quad = 0.1915$$

1 +

hence,

$$= 0.28$$

Source : Author's Calculation.

TABLE 3

Variable (1)	Average (2)	Coefficient (3)	Contribution (2) x (3) Percentage	As percentage of GDP growth
Constant			9.062D-05	
Exports ()	4.31D-07	0.491	0.660	15
Exports Share	6.53D-07	0.044	0.997	21
$\frac{f}{1+f} - \sigma$				
Investment (a)	1.76D-06	0.027	2.700	63
GDP Growth			4.59	100

Source : Author's Calculation.

production in the export sector and non export sector is 28 per cent. This is not quite satisfactory according to NICs standards. What Sri Lanka should attempt at is to achieve a rapid spurt in productivity in the export sector.

The linkages between the new export industries and the domestic sectors, (or externality effect of the export sector, is less than 3 per cent), are almost non-existent. The structural changes which have taken place recently, have been restricted to the peripheral sectors of the economy. What this low value suggests is that the more urgent pre-requisite of export promotion is an attempt to improve the productivity of the export sector and to widening of the base, reaching more important sectors whose 'spread effect' is strong.

The decomposition of the average growth rate into its contributory parts is presented in Table 3. Investment accounts for the bulk of the growth impulses. Investment here is assumed to be that in the non-export sector. It has contributed 63 per cent to the total GDP growth. This value is 43 per cent higher than what was estimated for the semi-industrialised countries by Feder. This suggests that the bulk of the contribution to the GDP growth has come from the non-export sector. (However, the value of the coefficient compares with that of other studies of developing countries which made use of the conventional models). The externality effect of exports has the lowest rate of contribution of 15 per cent towards GDP growth rate. The productivity difference have accounted for only 22 per cent. Hence, some total of the additional contribution made by the export sector to GDP growth rate is only 37 per cent. But this value compares favourably with the results obtained by Feder (1983) with regard to semi-industrialised countries which had 32 per cent and much higher than the averages for the developing countries of 27 per cent. The reason for the semi-industrialised countries also to have similar values is that the export share in GDP in these countries is quite large.

These results indicate an interesting phenomenon. The factor productivity difference between export sector and non-export sector in Sri Lanka is not quite large, difference is only 28 per cent, little more than half of the average for the developing countries and slightly more than a third of semi-industrialised countries.

It is high time that a serious reconsideration of the priorities in the export based strategy of development be made. The incentives for export expansion would be meaningless and would not make a strong impact on the economy

even if exports were to grow quite rapidly, as both external effect and the factor productivity difference in the export sector is quite low. It is necessary that measures to increase productivity in the export sector be given priority if we are to continue with the present strategy of heavy concentration on exports for economic growth.

TABLE 4
Export Share in GDP and Social Marginal Product of Investment
(TMPK_x) in Export Sector in Sri Lanka, 1953-1989

OBS	SEXSH	TMPK
1953	0.341307	0.111892
1954	0.380781	0.094282
1955	0.354591	0.105528
1956	0.515469	0.054493
1957	0.322748	0.121660
1958	0.310667	0.128646
1959	0.302900	0.133431
1960	0.171171	0.281979
1961	0.170544	0.280734
1962	0.167708	0.281979
1963	0.155959	0.313785
1964	0.159553	0.305429
1965	0.162096	0.299698
1966	0.172814	0.277515
1967	0.188583	0.249462
1968	0.165893	0.291511
1969	0.148913	0.331363
1970	0.154319	0.317724
1971	0.152245	0.322842
1972	0.168775	0.285544
1973	0.202760	0.227965
1974	0.174426	0.274414
1975	0.216788	0.209462
1976	0.253451	0.170776
1977	0.242257	0.181346
1978	0.225734	0.198863
1979	0.235987	0.187704
1980	0.250064	0.173874
1981	0.292282	0.140384
1982	0.324600	0.120635
1983	0.274166	0.153492
1984	0.328137	0.118710
1985	0.244107	0.179532
1986	0.208127	0.220592
1987	0.244084	0.179554
1988	0.230593	0.193451
1989	0.220979	0.201389

Source : Authors Calculations.

The fairly rapid growth in exports over the past decade or so has not been able to generate equally rapid growth in GDP despite the fact that exports having recorded nearly a quarter of the GDP. The secret is that both factor productivities and external effect of exports have been quite weak.

CONCLUDING NOTE

Increasing consensus emerges on the importance of export growth for economic development of the developing countries. The contribution of the export sector comes from two areas; higher productivity in factors of production in that sector and the external effect it generates to the non-export sector. Earlier studies have shown that the average productivity of the factors of production in the export sector in the developing countries is about 50 per cent higher than that in the non-export sector. The external effect too has been an important factor contributing about 19 per cent.

However, in Sri Lanka the factor productivity difference was only 28 per cent, which is slightly more than half of the average for the developing countries. The external effect is just a meager 3 per cent. This suggests that priorities in export growth has to be reoriented to encourage productivity in the export sector.

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Education and the National Integration

C. L. SHARMA

Abstract

Most societies of the world today are plagued with the fissiparous tendencies and centrifugal forces. National integration emanates from the cultivation of positive qualities of love, devotion, and sacrifice for the country. Home, religious groups, ethnic groups, language groups, cultural groups, and civil and social organizations can make important contributions towards promoting national integration. But the role of education is pivotal because it has the potential for liberating the human mind from the shackles of bigotry, prejudices, and ignorance, and is capable for developing the faculty of reasoning, discernment, and judgment for national integration. Nonetheless, its value as an instrument of national integration would be circumscribed by the attitudes of the minority groups that feel alienated and strive for secession.

Introduction

Before the potential of education can be harnessed for the development of national integration, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon of nationalism. In common parlance, nationalism is an emotionally charged loyalty to one's native land; but it can also encompass other groups, agencies, institutions, or organizations. It is a passionate sentiment that inspires individuals to feel intense loyalty to their country; yet, at the same time, it attracts them to feel emotionally attached to their people, culture, religion, language, or region. With discreet balance, it is usually a source of national unity and harmony, but when it is vitiated by distorted priorities, it can be a cause of national disintegration and societal chaos. Its munificent and sublime character generates a spirit of sacrifice, unity, fraternity, and accommodation; whereas its vicious and invidious nature manifests itself in intolerance, exclusiveness, divisiveness, and conflict. When the authority of the state is flouted by other agencies, institutions, or organizations, the unity of the nation

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and the well-being of the society are at stake. Hence, an awesome challenge to the nations of the world is to instil in their citizens judicious ordering of loyalties so that they may not get deflected under the onslaught of divisive and centrifugal forces.

National integration emanates from the cultivation of positive qualities of love, devotion, and sacrifice for the country. It is discernible in the behavior of the people when they subordinate their linguistic, religious, ethnic, cultural, regional, or class differences to their loyalty to the nation. It is reflected in their unreserved commitment to the territorial integrity of the state, in their feeling of pride for their country, in their faith in the fundamental community of interests, and in their intense desire to live together as a nation.

For the national integration to emerge, there needs to be political, economic, and social justice in the society. Politically, all the citizens should have an equal role in the formation of the government, and should be equal in the eyes of law. The economic system should provide equal opportunity to all the citizens to improve their quality of life, and the state should be committed to minimizing their deprivations. Further, social justice should be ensured to all the individuals and groups in the society, regardless of their status in life. The state should adopt measures that should develop pride in the individuals toward their country, e.g., by emphasizing its heritage, its intellectual triumphs, its scientific achievements, its cultural accomplishments, and its ethnic diversity.

The attainment of national integration is a formidable challenge confronted by most pluralistic societies of today. It needs to be tackled on several fronts, including education. National integration is the basic need for the development of a prosperous society; and education can make an effective contribution for achieving this objective. The other agents whose support is essential for this task are some religious groups, ethnic groups, language groups, cultural groups, and civic and social organizations. However, the role of education as an instrument of national integration occupies pivotal place because it has the potential for liberating the human mind from the shackles of bigotry, prejudices, and ignorance, and for cultivating the faculty of reasoning, discernment, and judgment which are essential for nation integrity. It also has the capability of influencing larger numbers of people for longer periods of time. Education should, therefore, aim at developing a deep sense

of citizenship, a feeling of national unity, and a commitment of service to the country, transcending sectional and regional loyalties.

Organization and Administration of Education

It should be the deliberate policy of the educational system to promote national integration; and its organization and administration should reflect that policy. State should provide equal educational opportunity to all of its citizens without any discrimination on the bases of religion, language, ethnicity, sex, class, or place or residence. All minorities should have the right to establish and manage educational institution of their choice. They should have the freedom to practice, preserve, and promote their own language, religion, and culture. However, they should refrain from engaging in any activity detrimental to the unity and integrity of the state.

The state should provide a common educational system for all children that would act as a leveling agent and as an instrument of assimilation. It should be well-financed and should maintain high academic standards so as to discourage the emergence of a parallel, private, discriminatory educational system. It should minimize the role of family income in the acquisition of education; and its graduates should be equal, if not superior, in competence to those of the private institutions. The high quality of public educational institutions would effectively obviate the need for the existence of denominational and private educational institutions which, for the most part in the Third World countries, tend to engender elitism, generate divisiveness, obstruct assimilation, and impede national integration.

Language Policy for National Integration

The language of instruction is an important factor in the promotion of national integration. Mother tongue has a strong emotional appeal to the people, and they feel passionately attached to it. They would like to use it, study it, spread it, and preserve it. Hence, in a multi-lingual society, the language of instruction constitutes a very sensitive and volatile issue. Usually, people would learn another language readily when some material gain is likely to accrue from its knowledge. In the absence of such an incentive, the requirement of the study of another language would be viewed as an imposition, and would be fiercely resisted. Opposition to the study of another language would stem from two main sources :-(1) Intense loyalty to the mother tongue, and (2) the relegation of the mother tongue to a subordinate position.

In addition, the requirement of the study of more than one language consumes excessive time, dissipates inordinate amount of the learner's energy, imposes an academic burden on the learner, and intrudes into the domain of other subjects of study. The multi-lingual societies are confronted with an almost irresolvable dilemma. If the majority language is instituted as the language of instructions, the linguistic minorities feel slighted and alienated. On the other hand, if the minorities use their own languages as the media of instructions, the communication link is broken, and the centrifugal forces are set in motion. Hence, for the multi-lingual societies, the language issue would always remain explosive and would hinder the attainment of national integration. It would take peoples of extraordinary sagacity, magnanimity, maturity, and spirit of accommodation to strive for an amicable solution of the language issue in the interest of national unity and integrity. So far, the Swiss are probably the only people who have earned this great honour.

Training of Teachers

In educational institutions, teachers are the most important agents to bring about national integration. They have the potential for exercising enormous influence on the students. Hence, the teacher training institutions should select only those candidates for the programme who have an unflinching faith in the unity of the country and who are infused with an indomitable spirit of nationalism. They should be committed to promoting national integration and should be knowledgeable about the ways and means of attaining it. The teacher training institutions should be the fountainheads of national spirit. In addition to the pedagogical courses, the programme should include instructional materials and activities that should emphasize respect for minority religions, minority languages, regional diversity, cultural differences, and ethnic dissimilarities. The teacher training institutions should be microcosms of the nation, should stress unity in diversity, and should be saturated with the spirit of nationalism in which the student-teachers would be immersed. In addition to being professionally competent, the teachers should exhibit a behaviour, both inside and outside the classroom, that is exemplary of a patriotic citizen. They should practice equality, justice, and fairness in their interpersonal relations, and work toward the unity of the country. They should counteract the centrifugal tendencies in the students and combat the divisive forces in the society. They should inspire the students to think in terms of the nation as a whole and work toward communal harmony. The activities of the

teacher training institutions should be designed to produce competent educators, patriotic citizens, and zealous agents of national integration.

Instructional Materials

Instructional materials (syllabi, curricula, and text - books) should be produced that would promote national unity, develop national identity, foster rationality, cultivate tolerance, and instill a sense of social justice, equality and fraternity and emphasis national philosophy. Books should contain information about the cultures, traditions, customs, usages, and ways of life prevalent in different regions and among diverse societal groups. These should be translated in all the languages of the country, should be easily accessible to the people, and should constitute prescribed readings in all the educational institutions. Also, biographies of eminent personalities of the nation should be prepared and should form required readings in all schools. Further, standard works of advanced nature in history, culture, religion, and other important aspects of the society should be produced that would serve as reference materials throughout the country. Finally, general interest books should be prepared for the masses that would provide information about different aspects of the country in a simple, readable format with suitable diagrams and illustrations. Differentiation should be made in the preparation of the books and reading materials in view of the readers of varied age groups (e.g., children, youth, and adults). The contents of the subjects like history, geography, civics, and literature are particularly suitable for promoting national integration. Hence, their potential should be fully utilized.

The themes that contribute to national unity should be included in the books, reading materials, audio-video tapes, and films. The important ones would pertain to the following : cultural heritage, history, geography, lives of great men and women, accounts of outstanding events, festivals, folk-tales, the various peoples of the country, government, constitution, sports and games of regional and national interests, the role of science and technology in national development, themes to develop respect for all religious and societal groups, accomplishments and problems of the nation, topics to develop scientific outlook, fight bigotry, eradicate prejudice, and cultivate national and international understanding.

Suggested Measures for National Integration

1. Education—formal, informal, or non-formal—is a life-long process. Therefore, efforts to promote national unity should be integrated into the educative process at all stages of schooling.
2. While educational institutions are in a unique position to contribute to national integration, the potential of non-educational institutions and organizations should not be underestimated. In fact, the former have a slim chance of success without the active cooperation of the latter. Hence, educators would assiduously strive to enlist their support in the cause of national integration.
3. Education should counteract the appeal to sectarianism by emphasizing tolerance, cooperation, interdependence, human values, and social justice.
4. Educational programmes should seek to cultivate national consciousness by exalting the lives of national heroes, and by organizing festivals, sports, dramas, and activities that promote communal harmony. The activities would include hoisting national flag, singing national anthem, appreciating the uniqueness of the country, and highlighting the contributions of each region and each societal group.
5. Adult education should be an integral part of the national education programme to enable people to control their prejudices, to create an enlightened environment in the home and the community, and to raise children as patriotic citizens of the country.
6. Education should aim to cultivate in the students the ability to think critically and to act rationally so that they can analyze the issues dispassionately, fight bigotry, control prejudices, and make mature decisions.
7. Development of national integration is the collective responsibility of the total educational system, beginning with the primary school through the university. Each stage of schooling should improvise activities that would have a cumulative and reinforcing effect. In addition, other societal institutions and organizations should

supplement and complement the educational measures for national integration.

8. Educational institutions of all types, from the primary to the university, should provide training in the functioning of democracy with equality, fairness, and justice for all. They should be self-governing institutions, with such instruments as students' parliament, cabinet, and court.
9. Activities like sports, games, dramas, debates, exhibitions, and conferences bring diverse students closer and tend to form abiding bonds among them, regardless of religious, linguistic, regional, ethnic, cultural, or class differences. Hence, such activities should be organized on a regular basis.
10. Camps for teachers and students should be organized on a regional and national basis. This would provide opportunity to persons of different backgrounds to live together, even though for shorter periods, and would create a climate for mutual understanding and amity. Educational tours and excursions to different parts of the country would produce similar beneficial results.
11. Measures should be taken to help the people of a pluralistic society to become multi-lingual. This would facilitate exchange of communication, increase mobility, enhance mutual understanding, and promote national integration.
12. The universities should acquire a national character by admitting students and recruiting teachers from different parts of the country. Also, exchange of students and teachers should be planned on a regular basis. Such activities would provide opportunities for commingling of people.
13. Organization of teachers and students should be closely monitored in order to protect them from the detrimental influence of the divisive forces. Also, adult organizations and youth groups should be guided to play a positive role in promoting national unity.
14. In a pluralistic society, the study of the various religions as academic subjects should be an important component of the educational programmes in schools. This would enable the students

- to understand the tenets of the different religions dispassionately, develop appreciation for them, fight sectarianism, and resist indoctrination.
15. Productive labour in the form of community and national service should be required of all students, and should form an integral part of educational programmes at all stages of schooling. This would reduce class differentiation, develop respects for manual work, and provide opportunities for close interpersonal relationships.
 16. Books, magazines, newspapers, and electronic media containing derogatory or disparaging materials about minority groups should be prescribed.
 17. In a pluralistic society, the greatest peril to national integration stems from home where the child is exposed to bigotry, prejudice, and discrimination with the assistance of parents. The divisive forces manifest themselves in the values, beliefs, and attitudes of parents, and influence the child through the slow, deliberate, imperceptible process of socialization. Hence, the institution of education must prepare the parents to fight secretarian propaganda, rabid ethnic appeals, regional secessionist designs, and other subversive machinations. A patriotic, nationalistic, enlightened home is the most dependable bulwark against the forces of national disintegration.

Conclusion

Virtually all pluralistic societies of the world are tormented by the spectre of national disintegration. The factors that have accentuated this pervasive phenomenon include (i) the rising nationalistic sentiments of the minorities (ii) the increasingly permissive and tolerant international climate, (iii) the rapid means of global communication and transportation, (iv) the growing sensitivity of the governments to world opinion, and (v) the politics of state terrorism and destabilization. The religious, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, class, and regional differences, heretofore more or less accommodated, have been exacerbated by the self-seeking, opportunistic, narrow-minded demagogues obsessed with personal aggrandizement. The spirit of toleration and cooperation has been subordinated to the passion for self-assertion and arrogance. The baser elements of human nature have unabashedly asserted themselves.

Newly independent states tend to be more aggressive. In some states, the majority community becomes arrogant and strikes at the very basic beliefs of the minority communities. They think that all the value should prevail and the minority should only gasp at the back and call of their dictatorial attitude. This is where the reform is required. Expecting the minority of any type and shade to get extinct after destroying the symbols of their devotion and love and belief is somewhat new and no civilized people would appreciate such a trend. The best and most trusted principle for the national integration is to live and let live and in this lies the best hope for any national state to maintain its integrity. For this the, cruel, militant and inhuman trend of the majority community must be curbed.

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The Nuclear Shadow over South Asia

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In the vulnerable world of today, persistent change in shaping and reshaping mutual attitudes and relations between nations is the only undisputed fact for maintaining a regional or global balance of power. New geo-political realities engender new imperatives and challenges, not only for policy makers but also for the common man everywhere. In the South Asian context the situation is not different. A change, keeping in view one or the other interrelated issues of peace, defence and security, have become vital considerations for a better tomorrow. A realistic evaluation would require an objective definition of what is South Asia. The concept is comparatively of a recent origin, with South Asia as a new centre of global power. South Asia is regionally demarcated in terms of South East Asia and Indian sub-continent appearing on the periphery. In context of US strategic postures in 1970's Pakistan was included as part of South West Asia which was shrunk to include India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. These are distorted perceptions and are not conducive to rational understanding of issues. To have a realistic and objective assessment of issues of defence and security, South Asia roughly, should include areas between Japan, Turkey, Maldives and Indonesia. South Asia objectively defined, contains nuclear weapons, arsenals and accompanying infrastructures of four powers — Soviet Union, China, Israel, India and now a fifth country Pakistan is striving to join the select group of nuclear powers although it has so far maintained that its acquisition

of nuclear technology is for peaceful purpose. While considering the issue of regional security in South Asia, the existence of nuclear weapons and its use is important and realistic to note.

The peace of the region lies in an equation between India and Pakistan. Here an attempt is made to review the policy concerns and attitudes of these two states in face of a changing regional scenario where fundamental changes in recent years have created challenges and direct threats to the two countries with Pakistan in particular. India and Pakistan being neighbours share strong cultural ties on the one hand and a history of mutual suspicion, fear, divergence and hostility, on the other.

Despite the presence of many other states in the region, world attention is focussed primarily on these two states which possess a strategic position and a potential role to play. Defence and security policies of both the countries are likely to have significant effects on power equation in the region and the role played by both will have broader security dimensions of states in the region. Despite their constraints, the use of nuclear force will undoubtedly be a decisive factor in holding the balance of power to any one's favour or disadvantage. The most important factor currently faced by the South Asian nations is nuclear proliferation and its impact on security environment.¹ Even people want to get over the feelings of frustration and deadlock with a sense of change and expectation. Both the countries have a different response in this regard.

Indian fears and complexes are seemingly centered on the following issues :

1. Pakistan's apparent attempt to obtain nuclear capability.
2. Pakistan's possible nuclear cooperation with China.
3. There seems to be a new doctrine, the Indira doctrine, asserting India's right to interfere and claim what can be called hegemony over South Asia—a doctrine of regional security reflecting elite opinion, guided by political commentators. By this it is meant that :
 - (a) India will not accept any external intervention in South Asia with anti-Indian implications.
 - (b) She would not tolerate any regional country calling for external assistance with an anti-Indian bias.

- (c) Any South Asian state requiring to solve internal problems must first ask for assistance from regional countries including India and a posture different to this would be considered anti-Indian. Thus :

Any state with challenging potential is deemed an erst-while enemy of India. Since Pakistan seems to be the only challenger to Indian hegemony over South Asia and perhaps the only obstacle on her path to glory. With this India has left no opportunity to vilify Pakistan—stories of an Islamic Bomb.

4. Size and geographic position of India can be a compulsion affecting Indian policy to thrust its position and propel on the world stage, particularly in the Indian Ocean strategy.²
5. The urge to glory from Hindu heritage remains prevalent in Indian minds.
6. Multiple internal problems of administration, law and order, political dishonesty and corruption, all these have weakened India's faith in herself.

On May 18, 1974 India exploded a 10 Kiloton nuclear device in Rajasthan which is situated about 90 miles from the Pakistani border. This explosion has far reaching political, economic and strategic ramifications in South Asia. The Indian power elite expressed satisfaction over the success of the test which improved its war potential and its position as a regional power. On the other hand, the world in general and Pakistan in particular, were apprehensive of the Indian designs. It surprised the world public opinion that in spite of severe economic difficulties and restraints India had opted to go nuclear. The expenses incurred to implement such a policy were unjustified by a country which could not meet the basic necessities of its people. The Government of Pakistan expressed grave concern and defined the Indian move as a blackmail and an attempt to establish India's political and economic hegemony in the region. A leading English daily commenting on the Indian nuclear explosion wrote : "The explosion in Rajasthan spells fresh perils not only for Pakistan, which has thrice been a victim of Indian aggression, but also for other nations lying in the danger zone. . . what is at stake is our national honour and existence as a self respecting people."³

The Indian leadership has tried to camouflage the nuclear explosion with claims that they would not use the newly acquired capability for defence purposes. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that it was an extension of India's nuclear research work and the desire to keep abreast of developments in the field of science and technology.⁴ She did not view it as strengthening Indian military might, creating fear in the region or enhancing prestige and status of India.⁵ Such explanations remain unsatisfactory as the line separating nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes and for manufacturing weapons is so thin that it cannot serve to guarantee against the misuse of such a potential. Nuclear energy has been misused by others and it was certain that India would also follow the same path.

As observed we assess some fundamental motives coupled with fears and complexes which motivated India to take such a stance.

1. The Threat Perception

It is acknowledged that this factor has been most dominant behind Indian policy makers. A militarily stronger Pakistan is seen by India as a threat to her and due to this a state of tension has always existed in India's relations with Pakistan. What constitutes a threat? A threat is created when a conflict of interest between two powers and a group of powers, can not be resolved by peaceful means. These conflicting interests may be political, economic or strategic.⁶

India's threat environment encompasses Pakistan, China and the presence of extra regional powers in water contiguous to its coasts.⁷ New Delhi considers Pakistan to be an active and immediate security problem. While China is her strategic concern. China, though a nuclear power in the region has not tried to assert its dominant position and neither used the nuclear threat to make smaller states uncomfortable and her threat to India seems more psychological than real. However, in recent years Sino-Indian tensions have lessened by diplomatic interaction and that leaves Pakistan to be dealt with in the traditional threat spectrum.

India's massive military potential together with nuclear powered weaponry has served to accelerate bilateral tensions. The arms modernization programme is far more extensive than that needed to defeat Pakistan or counter a conventional Chinese attack; this may be designed to provide a military under-pinning for elevation of status on the international community.⁸

2. Role Conscious Tendency

Indian thinkers have lately proposed that since India is superior the responsibility of looking after and protecting the states of the region should be left to her. Pandit Nehru claimed that a new India had a role to play in the world because she was a successor to the British India and inheritor of British greatness. Her craving for a limelight has led her to view everything in the 'BIG' perspective.

3. Bomb Lobby

From the beginning India's scientific leadership has guided a nuclear programme under the directions of its political leadership. An active lobby of defence strategists, politicians, scientists, bureaucrats and publicists have openly promoted a nuclear weapons programme.

There was a general feeling in Pakistan that the nuclear explosion was not a solution to the problems of South Asian countries. On the one hand, the Indian nuclear programme was bound to cause anxiety in Pakistan because her primary security concern has been India and the situation was further complicated by the Indian nuclear explosion; and on the other hand, it accelerated Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear technology while Western pressures and Loinist vitrification campaigns, strengthened her determination to accord full support to her nuclear programme. The explosion also upset the process of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan initiated by the Simla Accord in 1972. It was quite disturbing for the political elites of Pakistan that despite deplorable conditions of the masses, India could divert her meager resources from economic development to the acquisition of nuclear capability. Instead of providing food to the millions of hungry South Asians it picked up the nuclear option. This was an encouragement to other non-nuclear powers to attempt to enter the nuclear club and accelerate the arms race in the region.

The Indian leadership reiterated from time to time that they had no intention of producing nuclear weapons. It was said in a communique issued by the Indian Atomic Energy Commission that the explosion had been undertaken to keep India abreast of nuclear technology; particularly, its possible uses in mining and earth moving operations and rejected the charge that the explosion was a prelude to making bombs.⁹ It was difficult to accept this explanation because the peaceful use of atomic energy did not necessarily

involve explosions. Such explosions are carried out for the sole purpose of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Moreover, India refused to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect her atomic reactors. Pakistan had additional reasons to reject the Indian claims in view of a long history of mutual distrust and unfriendly relations. India looked upon Pakistan as a major diplomatic antagonist and a troublesome neighbour while Pakistan was convinced that India was out either to undo Pakistan or make her subservient to India.¹⁰

For analytical convenience one can divide considerations for nations contemplating a nuclear future into four broad categories : Military security; political prestige and influence; economic gains; and domestic pressures and compulsions.¹¹ With Pakistan all these seem to fit in most properly. Pakistan's reported initiation of a nuclear programme could be a fairly attractive proposition bringing in political and economic dividends. Politically Pakistan would be the first Muslim nuclear weapons state thus increasing her prestige in the Islamic bloc and the third world which could undermine her neighbours conventional military superiority and propel Islamabad into a position of leadership in the Islamic bloc because Pakistan is regarded relatively advanced in term of technology when compared with Muslim states in the Middle East, despite their enormous oil wealth and drive towards modernization and industrialization.

Economic dimensions of Pakistan's nuclear programme are enormous. Having a poor energy base and growing demand for energy, acquisition of nuclear energy would certainly reduce her dependency on external sources of fuel. She is already feeling the pinch of an increasing demand for energy from the industrial sector and she had to make a choice which seems to have been thrust upon her because of incumbent inequities of the operative world economic order.

Pakistan's nuclear programme dates back from about 1955 when a committee of distinguished scientists drafted a comprehensive nuclear energy programme. Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission was created in 1956. A small 125 M.W. Plant at Karachi (KANUPP) became operational in 1972 with the help of Canada. Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) in Islamabad also has a small US supplied 5 MW Research Reactor in the early 1960's — both are under international safeguards.¹²

Pakistan has a programme of constructing enriched uranium fueled power plant on Indus River at Chasma subject to obtaining finances and a willing supplier.

Besides political and economic gains, political opinion from extreme left to fundamentalist right has supported the nuclear programme urging disregard of foreign pressures influencing Pakistan's nuclear policies. All successive governments from Bhutto to Zia, to Junejo, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif have supported the initiation of a nuclear programme despite disagreement on national issue.

The programme certainly blurred during the years from 1958-69 when the country was under the Martial Law. Z. A. Bhutto dominated the nuclear decision making process as Foreign Minister, Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources and Minister Incharge of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission in that period.¹³ After becoming Prime Minister, Bhutto became the master of the nuclear programme and created a new ministry of science, technology and production. He in his first news conference after the Indian explosion said that it was not easy to use nuclear weapons in the present day world. These were "primarily for political blackmail and coercion." He declared that Pakistan would never change her foreign policy or compromise her basic national interests in the face of nuclear blackmail.¹⁴

This stance soon triggered off the speculations of an Islamic Bomb. Apart from being opposed to Zionism and considering Israel a potent challenge to the Muslim nations with continuous flow of Western arms into Israel, Pakistan has a number of incentives to induce research into an Arab-Islamic Bomb, like :

- (a) Pakistan has the most skilled manpower in nuclear technology among the Muslim nations.
- (b) Her industrial infrastructure is more advanced as compared to the other Muslim nations.
- (c) The military leadership Pakistan has assumed among Arab countries makes it trust worthy to deliver the nuclear weapon for the Islamic World.
- (d) Being a child of Islam, Pakistan is no suspect in the Muslim World.¹⁵

Bhutto coined the term Islamic Bomb maintaining that all civilizations except Islamic ones have nuclear weapons. Although not authenticated from

official sources the West kept on alledging of continued secret cooperation between Libya and Pakistan. Debates in this connection raged between 1979-80, but the subject still remains at best speculative filled with suspicions on Pakistan's nuclear shopping in countries like Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA and Switzerland, as well as Libya's attempt to buy a nuclear reactor from China and the Soviet Union, warm relationship between Col. Gaddafi and Bhutto, Pakistan's refusal to sign the 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty and International Conference on defense of the Muslim world in London 1979 proposing to establish the Islamic Institute of Defense Technology, Islamic Bank for strategic minerals and Defense Institutions of each country which familiarize themselves with Islamic concept of warfare.

Zia's Government continued the nuclear programme envisaged by his predecessor, used identical arguments in its support not changing the attitude towards the non-proliferation treaty.

Bhutto is credited with coining the phrase 'Islamic Bomb', but the Western Lobby has given it a sinister bias. Pakistan's nuclear programme is geared to meet its energy requirements and time and again its leaders have emphasized its peaceful outlook but all to an unbelievable world. When rationalized by careful examination, Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy suggests that it has quite often shown an acceptance of DNPT and full scope safeguards conditional to the acceptance of these measures by India.¹⁶

India is working on its non-safeguarded research reactors for the last two decades, having even exploded its nuclear device with all output of these reactors being Plutonium; all of it is weapon grade if not weapon quality. With six research reactors, four power reactors and four processing plants, most of these operating for many years, its inventory of weapons grade fissile material should be many times more than that of Pakistan.¹⁷ Still India refuses for an international inspection posing Pakistan to be a security threat to her. Which seems far from being a rational approach. Having a thirteen years head start in the nuclear race, India is undoubtedly miles ahead of Pakistan in nuclear technology. On the other hand, Pakistan having special relationship with Persian Gulf-Red Sea region can have ample instrumentalities to play a leading role in the region even without nuclear weapons. Statements of Dr. A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's Nuclear Physicist, lends some credibility to the assumption, however the present rudimentary industrial infrastructure does not meet the

requisite standards to set up an enrichment facility. Even with necessary know how the decision to explode a bomb would not be easy. Gen. Zia had repeatedly offered mutual inspection arrangements to satisfy India and reached one agreement with Rajiv Gandhi—not to conduct a preemptive strike on each others nuclear facilities which was an assurance to reduce tension. Not only this, Pakistan also proposed to UN General Assembly to a nuclear weapons free-zone for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and securing safeguards for the non-nuclear nations.¹⁸ This move coincided with a proposal by Iran to declare the Middle East as nuclear free - zone. A Pakistan resolution, adopted by the First Committee (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on November 20, 1974 demanded the following :

- (a) The concept of nuclear weapon free-zone should be accepted for South Asia.
- (b) The countries concerned, should consult each other as soon as possible to decide about the steps to give practical shape to the declaration.
- (c) The Secretary General should invite the countries of the region to begin consultation.
- (d) The General Assembly should lay down appropriate guidelines to facilitate talks and to give them a sense of direction.

Despite all assurances, India or even the US has not given up doubts but remained convinced by "strong circumstantial evidence that Pakistan continues to pursue the nuclear option on high priority basis."¹⁹

Subramanyam in his article "Indra Ghandi's Quest for Security", *Strategic Analysis*, July 1987, maintains that evidence has been mounting specially in the past four years that Pakistan's dedicated nuclear weapons programme was progressively moving closer to actual capability and by the end of 1986, it was certain that it had achieved that capability. Events and evidence forthcoming during 1987 only confirm that Pakistan now is a nuclear weapon power and even President Zia has been quoted by *TIME*, March 30, 1987 as having stated that it is so.

The Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was equally serious in taking the challenge of pursuing an independent nuclear energy course. After the US Aid was suspended to Pakistan on October 1, 1990 when President Bush failed to certify that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons, a

Congressional panel would take up the Bush Administration's request for economic and military aid for Pakistan in 1992. Although Pakistan has continuously maintained that its nuclear programme is for non-military purpose. Pakistan seems to have developed technical know how to run nuclear power plants safely in the face of unsurmountable odds according to Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.²⁰

Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman PAEC told *JANG* correspondent that Pakistan has installed its own mini reactor which has started functioning on experimental basis—installed in Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology near Islamabad—which is a difficult job but the objective is peaceful.

CONCLUSION

Peace is a matter of constant effort and eternal vigilance. It demands a price which can be in the form of self-constraints from nations which value peace and independence. Regarding dangers to peace in reference to South Asia such an approach is expected from India and Pakistan, because no other third power in the region poses a threat or a security problem. Therefore, both must begin the journey to peace slowly and step by step, proceeding without taking undue risks, without leaving things to the element of chance and expecting not more than is fair and necessary. The Super Powers too should play their cards properly and should agree to provide positive guarantees against a nuclear attack or even a perceived nuclear blackmail.

Nuclear proliferation is a symptom and not a cause of international tension. It is not necessarily dangerous or destabilising as generally outlined by many observers. Rather a slow paced acquisition of nuclear weapons may prove a healthy trend in the international system.²¹

Pakistan's nuclear programme, though primarily of a civil nature is keeping its nuclear options open and can move towards a nuclear weapon capability primarily due to mistrust and fear from India. Her nuclear programme is delayed. Guarantees by nuclear powers including India can help to remove apprehensions generated specially after the Indian nuclear explosion. An analysis of policy options of both states is essential. Rigid posture can be disruptive. Instead of behaving like two bulls trying to push each other with strength and energy they should review the situation rationally.

Indian being more powerful and advanced should show a more positive approach instead of siding with the West and Jewish lobby and giving Islamic characterization to Pakistan's nuclear programme. Theoretically, it may be possible to force India to abandon her nuclear weapon programme and revert herself to the non-nuclear status, but given the domestic and international political realities it seems almost impossible.

The enormous amount of talent in the two South Asian states should be utilized. India is one of the leading industrial nations on earth while Pakistan is technologically the most advanced and most skilled Muslim country in the world. India is ahead of Pakistan in reprocessing technology while Pakistan has an edge in uranium enrichment.²² If we could pool our resources, put our shoulders to the task and pull in the same direction there is no limit to what we can achieve.

Pakistan has stepped up her campaign to bring nuclear facilities in South Asia under some kind of observation, inspection or safeguards. She has presented many proposals including a nuclear free zone in South Asia. She has often proposed nuclear cooperation with India, but the Indian Government, instead of feeling irritated and trying to brow beat Pakistan into submission should play her role effectively in the region and work with Pakistan and not against Pakistan. Otherwise Pakistan will have no choice but to try to achieve nuclear deterrence and we know that achieving a nuclear deterrence is not making just a few bombs. Acquisition of nuclear armaments has to go on and with the delivery systems, space armaments, electronic infrastructure, etc., perhaps by the end of the century both India and Pakistan may have achieved a balance of nuclear terror.

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The Gulf Crisis and the Political Parties of Pakistan

AYAZ MUHAMMAD

The people of Pakistan have sentimental and deep rooted fraternal relations with the Muslims of the Middle East. They strongly believe in the concept of Muslim *Ummah*, its integrity and solidarity. If any part of the Muslim *Ummah* is in trouble the Muslims of Pakistan feel equally disturbed. And how can they keep themselves aloof from the miseries of their brethren Muslims? It is quite in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Prophet of Islam : "Muslims are like a single organism and if any organ feels injured, the whole organism undergoes the agony."¹ It is the spiritual force of Islam and not the material gains which unites the Muslims of Pakistan with their brethren in any part of the world.

Emotional attachment of Muslims towards their co-religionists in the other parts of the world have been expressed time and again. At the time when crisis in the Balkan states erupted, Muslims of the sub-continent were under the sway of British imperialism. The British Government was fighting against Balkan states. To express their solidarity and support for the cause of Turkish Muslims, the Muslims of the sub-continent launched strong protests against the evil and nefarious design of the British Imperialism in the Balkan states. Their support did not confine to the verbal utterances, they even sent material and medical aid to the Turkish Muslims.

When Pakistan emerged as an independent state on the world map, the leadership of the newly born state adopted a foreign policy based on historical background and in tune with the religious sentiments of the people of Pakistan.

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Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, proclaimed in an unequivocal voice that his nation's foreign policy was a natural product of her past. Liaquat underlined that Pakistanis regarded the Muslims of other countries of the world "as our brethren and when we were a subject people, we regarded the distress of Muslim countries as our own." "Even today", he went on to say : "we are bound by those natural postulates of Islamic fraternity which were formulated for our guidance, thirteen hundred years ago (when Islam was founded)."²

These ideas found expression in 1956 when despite the cold and negative behaviour of the Egyptian leadership towards Pakistani problems, Pakistani people, extended their support to their Muslim brethren in the Suez Canal Crises. No doubt the Pakistani Government at that time was in the hands of Western minded people which did not reflect the real sentiments of the people. President, Sikandar Mirza, "whose constant companions in the evenings were the British High Commissioner, Sir Alexander Symon, and the US Ambassador Horace Hildereth. Sikandar Mirza's son was married to the latter's daughter, an early bond of our 'old alliance' with America."³ The Government was not directly elected and was facing Economic as well as Political Crisis. In this situation, it took steps which were not in tune with the real public opinion.

They came out in streets, arranged public meetings and took out processions and shouted slogans in favour of Egypt. Jamat-i-Islami, Azad Pakistan Party, Islam League, Jamiyat-i-Ulemai Pakistan, Khilafat Rabbani Party, Pakistan Canatantrarisal, Pakistan Muslim League, Pakistan Socialist Party, Sind Awami Front and United Progressives Party launched movement for Muslim *Ummah*.⁴

Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman called for a 'Suez Day' to be observed throughout East Pakistan. Similarly the people in the West Pakistan were equally showing their disapproval of the governmental attitude. In Lahore a public meeting was attended by some 300,000 persons, the biggest since independence, which protested against "Pakistan's lukewarm support for the Egyptian cause." Protest meetings ending in riots were held all over Karachi and other provincial towns in both wings of the country:⁵

This sense of oneness had always been an integral part of the Muslim thinking since the days of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him). There have been occasions when the Muslims were divided politically, but the Unity of *Ummah*

always remained firmly embedded in their subconscious. This had been shown by them whenever any one of them was in trouble, particularly facing non-Muslim aggression. In the modern period Jamal-ud-Din Afghani was the first eminent leader to remind the Muslims that in their unity lay their Salvation. Since then several attempts have been made to bring the Muslim world closer.⁶

The Gulf Crisis once again made Muslim Unity a burning topic in Pakistan. Kuwait Issue was to some extent different than other issues. In this case one Muslim country (Iraq) launched a military aggression against a small neighbouring Muslim country and annexed it.

The Political Parties shared the views of the Public and Press that Saddam was beguiled and the Iraqi action was the result of a conspiracy of the U.S.A. and her allies to get military control over oil and strategically important areas, especially at the time when U.S.S.R. was not in a position to interfere and international environment was in their favour. In these circumstances Pakistani leaders tried to persuade Saddam to call his forces back from Kuwait. They also tried to make him realise that his action was based on injustice, against international law and moral and ethical values. It was an act of jeopardizing international peace, disturbing economic order and endangering the interest of Muslim *Ummah* as well as that of his own nation.

At the same time they criticised the presence of America and Western forces in the Gulf area. Some other sections of society were also equally vocal against the Iraqi aggression and American involvement.

Students belonging to Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba and other students groups held anti-U.S. demonstrations throughout the country.⁷ The members of District and High Courts Bar Associations staged a demonstration against the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and Israel's presence in Palestine.⁸

No doubt the situation in the Gulf was quite different than that of Suez Crisis. In the case of Suez Crisis, there was Anglo-French naked aggression against the Muslim Egypt. But in the fresh crisis a Muslim country was confronted with a Muslim country's aggression which was fully backed by the U.S.A. and her Western allies. Some other Muslim countries entered into an alliance, apparently, to support the victim.

In this complex situation Pakistani Political Parties were divided into three main group :

1. One group viewed that the occupation and annexation of Kuwait was a break of peace. The freedom of Kuwait was to be restored at any cost. They supported Security Council's resolution and sided with America and her allies to achieve this target. They were unhappy at the destruction of a Muslim country.
2. The second group condemned Iraqi action in Kuwait but at the same time it also strongly condemned the American and European military presence in the Area. Their presence was considered unlawful intervention and aggression in the region. They also thought that the presence of Western forces in the region was for more dangerous than Saddam's unjust, careless and miscalculated movement. It was suspected by the political leaders that Allied forces' ulterior motive was the destruction of military power of a Muslim state and strengthening of Israel and that their real intention was to get control over the wealth of natural resources of the Muslim world.
3. Third group opined that the annexation of Kuwait through Iraq was not a problem. At times they tried to justify the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. According to them the presence of U.S.A. and her Allied forces in Gulf area was a major threat to the Muslim *Ummah* and to international peace.

Nawaz Sharif the leader of the first group hoped that a peaceful solution to the Gulf problem could be found through the full implementation of the resolution of the Security Council. We believe that the resolution of the sovereign independent and non-aligned status of Kuwait will be a clear sign that the international community is determined to uphold the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and no use of force in the conduct of inter state relations. He continued to say that the security of the Gulf was solely the responsibility of regional countries.⁹

He defended the Pakistani stand for dispatching a contingent of troops to Saudi Arabia and underlined Pakistan's special and close fraternal ties with her. "Our contingent in Saudi Arabia is under Saudi command and is a symbol of our determination to oppose aggression and the use of force in the conduct of international relations,"¹⁰ he maintained. He floated 6-point formula to resolve the Gulf crisis :

1. Declaration of general cease-fire on the basis that Iraq will also announce withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait.
2. Soon after the cease-fire, all the foreign forces will leave the Gulf and the security of the Gulf should be looked after by the countries themselves.
3. An emergency meeting of the O.I.C. should be called to consider all aspects of the Gulf crisis and to chalk out an agreed strategy.
4. In the crisis area a Pan-Islamic force should be deployed.
5. Implementation of U.N. resolution should not be confined to Kuwait only but its resolution on Kashmir and Palestine should also be extended.
6. Until the cease-fire is effective, all the Holy Shrines in Saudi Arabia and Iraq should be declared peace zones so that there is no risk of their sacrilege.¹¹

Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Peoples Party of Pakistan, supported the policy of the Government of sending the armed forces to Saudi Arabia and she offered three suggestions to the Government to solve the problem :

1. The summoning of an emergency meeting of O.I.C.
2. The countries in the region, i.e., Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Egypt and the United States, among others, should come together and find a political solution to the deadlock.
3. The parliamentary group of the I. J. I. and P.D.A. should visit the Gulf before it was too late.¹²

After the eruption of war she made it clear that "people in Pakistan support the United Nations resolution. They want the Iraqi to get out of Kuwait. There is no dispute on that. "She reiterated her stand about Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia saying that there was no dispute on Pakistani troops being sent for the defence of Saudi Arabia.¹³

It is interesting to note that both the antagonistic leaders, the leader of the ruling party and the leader of the opposition were in first group having same opinion and it is also interesting to state that several party workers and the members of governmental alliance held opposite views as to what the government thought.

The second group consisting of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Amir Jamaat-i-Islami, termed the Gulf war a conflict between Muslim and Western ideologies which aimed at grabbing the resources of Muslim *Ummah*. While addressing the participants of JI's training camp, he termed the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait a part of the nefarious designs of the U.S.A. and its allies who through a well planned conspiracy wanted to deprive Muslims of their resources.¹⁴ He bitterly criticised the resolution of Security Council which allowed the United States and its allies to use force against Iraq. This decision, he opined, had further deteriorated the Gulf situation.

He said that U.N.O. had lost its credibility in the world for its double standards. He proposed a four-point formula for resolving the Gulf crisis and to prevent war in the region :

1. War of words against each other be stopped forthwith and war - like situation should not be aggravated through aggressive diplomacy
2. Iraq should pullout its troops from Kuwait forthwith and settle the dispute with Kuwait through negotiations.
3. United States and Western troops should be called back from Gulf and forces of Islamic countries be deployed for the security of the Arab countries.
4. Meeting of Arab League or Islamic Conference be convened to resolve the crisis. He said that China, Germany, France, Sweden and Norway should intervene to find a peaceful solution of the crisis. He made it clear that Islamic world would not forgive Unites States if it attempted to impose war on them.¹⁵

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, a leader of the third group, also criticised the presence of American and other European troops in Saudi Arabia which he termed an occupied territory. He exhorted the Muslims all over the world to unite for the withdrawal of these troops from the Holy land. He said that America and Israel could never be the friends of Muslims. He also said that the multi-national forces had not come to Gulf to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation but to protect Israel against the possible Iraqi attack. He also alleged that the peace mission was in support of the Zionist and American interests in the Gulf.¹⁶

Addressing a rally the P.P.P. Vice-President Sheikh Muhammad Rashid and other leaders of the third group said that Pakistani troops should be called

back from Saudi Arabia and peaceful measures be adopted for overcoming the Gulf crisis.¹⁷ Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, the Head of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, stated after returning from an Islamic Conference in Baghdad, that he would raise 25,000 *Mujahideen* as a strong force to take part in the *Jihad* (Holy War) on the side of Iraq.

He said the issue of the Kuwait was of secondary importance. He even went to the extent to say that Kuwait was a part of Iraq.¹⁸

Asghar Khan, an important leader of the third group, declared that America had committed aggression against Iraq. He said that the foreign policy of Pakistan regarding the Gulf was totally a failure, because people were supporting Saddam while rulers were on the side of the U.S.A. He demanded that the Pakistan Government should openly support Saddam Hussain.¹⁹

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan said that All-Parties Conference had unanimously expressed solidarity with the Iraqi people facing U.S. and her allies aggression.²⁰

Three politico-religious parties J.U.I., J.U.P. and T.N.F.J. had told President Ishaq Khan that all the *Ulema* of the three schools of thought bitterly condemned the attack of American forces on Iraq. They said that all the forces attacking Iraq were criminals. They urged the world conscience to conduct trial in World Court against America and its allies for their crimes in Iraq.²¹

Despite their different stand points the three groups were unanimous on the following few points :

1. Establishment of combined Muslim Military force to cope with the crises of present dimension.
2. Mobilization of the organization of Islamic Conference.
3. Destruction of Iraq is the loss of Muslim *Ummah*.
4. American and Allied forces should go back after or before the accomplishment of the task of pulling out Iraqi forces from Kuwait assigned to them by Security Council.
5. U.S. is disturbing balance of power in the area by giving unlimited modern weapons to Israel.

Qazi Hussain Ahmed was perhaps the first Political leader who took initiative to prevent war. He, with the collaboration of leaders of other Muslim

countries to convene a conference and led a deputation to concerned countries to persuade them to avoid war, but in vain.²²

Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, launched a campaign in search of peace. He, along with his companions, visited Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia and exchanged ideas with the leaders of these countries to accelerate efforts to stop war. It was appreciable initiative toward peace. But opposition parties as well as the members of the ruling I.J.I alliance criticised his peace mission saying that he had become a party to the conflict by sending 12,000 troops in the battle field. On this issue Government was put under strong pressure of public opinion which forced her to issue a diplomatic statement to cool down the people.

Pakistani nation appeared to be divided on the Gulf war. The conflict created deep division among the people which is still continuing. The sympathy for Iraq and Kuwait had co-existed. But the steps taken by the Americans and its Allies have met disapproval generally. The Government, however, took a policy which is found more appropriate, yet the public sentiments against the American and Allies have been fully expressed.

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Jami'at-al-'Ulama'-i-Hind's Response to the Pakistan Demand

PARVEEN ROZINA

The Jami'at-al-'Ulama'-i-Hind, a religio-political organization of South Asian *Ulama* appeared on the political scene of India in 1919.¹ It was the *Khilafat* issue that made the *Ulama* appear as a distinct political class.

The JUH leadership was dominated chiefly by the *Ulama* of Darul-Ulum Deoband, who were orthodox in their religious doctrine and medieval in their political outlook. The JUH objectives were to :²

- (a) resist the pressures likely to effect Islam, centres of Islam (Arabian Island and the Centre of Caliphate), Islamic rights and Muslim Nationalism;
- (b) defend religious rights and secure religious and other demands of Muslims in the country;
- (c) bring the *Ulama* on a common platform;
- (d) bring about moral and social reformation of the Muslims;
- (e) establish and maintain peace and harmony with the non-Muslim fellow countrymen to the extent permitted by the *Shari'at-i-Islamiyah*;
- (f) struggle for religious freedom and the freedom of the country in accordance with the *Shariah*;

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- (g) establish religious courts to meet the religious needs of the community;
- (h) preach Islam in and outside India;
- (i) establish and strengthen relations of Islamic brotherhood and unity with the Muslims of foreign countries.

These objectives were based on one central idea, i.e., the duty of the *Ulama* to lead the Muslims as the guardians and protectors of the Islamic *Shariah* as the successors of the Holy Prophet.³

There is no doubt that the Muslim League and the JUH both were working for the betterment of Muslim India, yet there was no understanding between the two. JUH in vehement opposition to the Muslim League's concept of 'two-nation theory, and the idea of Pakistan, was firm in its opinion that the League leadership was incapable of bringing an Islamic State into being. Since they were staunch nationalists, the only political party they could come to terms with was Indian National Congress. That is why the JUH cooperated with the Congress in an unreserved manner whenever Congress's policies reflected its nationalist character. Since a detailed discussion of these points is beyond the scope of this study, attention will be focussed on the JUH's opposition to the idea of Pakistan alone. It may be remembered that the All-India Muslim League gradually embraced the concept of Muslim nationalism and two-nation theory, while the JUH declared 'composite nationalism' as its creed.

The All-India Muslim League announced its ideal of Muslim nationalism in its historic session at Lahore on March 22-23, 1940. It demanded that the Muslim majority areas in the North-Western and North-Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.⁴ In view of the significance of this demand the relevant sections of the Resolution are quoted as under :⁵

Resolved that it is the considered view of the session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and

Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specially provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities, for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This session further authorizes the working committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally, by the respective regions, of all powers, such as defence, external affairs, communication, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary.

The proposal for the partition of India as outlined in the Resolution was based on the theory that there were two major nations in the South Asian sub-continent and that each nation had a right to a homeland of its own for its free and unhampered development.

Even as early as 1940 Maulana Muhammad Sajjad of Bihar, an important figure of the JUH, commenting on the Lahore Resolution, remarked that there was nothing in it that could give any satisfaction to the Muslims living in the Hindu majority provinces; the Resolution was mainly related to the Muslims of those areas where they were already in a majority. He had recorded his astonishment at the suggestion that the strength of the Muslim provinces would be a guarantee for the safeguards of the Muslims living in the Hindu-majority provinces.⁶ The same year Maulana Madani characterized the Pakistan movement as the "death knell for the Muslims of the areas where they were in a minority."⁷

The first reaction that the Lahore Resolution evoked in the non-League circles was represented in the Resolutions of the multi-party Azad Muslim Conference sponsored by the JUH at Delhi in April 1940.⁸ This conference voiced its opposition to the division of India although at the same time reiterated its deep concern for the religious and cultural safeguards of the

Muslim community in any future constitutional set-up. Among the resolutions passed the following is relevant :⁹

India will have geographical and political boundaries as a whole and as such is the common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of its resources; from that point of view every Muslim is an Indian. . . . The Indian Muslim, by virtue of these rights and responsibilities, is unquestionably an Indian national and in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of every Indian national in every sphere of governmental, economic and other national activities and in public services. For that very reason Muslims are equally responsible as any other Indian for striving and making sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a self-evident proposition, the truth of which no right-thinking Muslim will question. This Conference declares unequivocally and with all emphasis at its command that the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along with protection of their religious and communal rights, and that they are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. Inspired by this aim they have in the past made great sacrifices and are ever ready to make greater sacrifices.

This Conference appointed a Board consisting of twenty-seven members. It was to recommend to the next session of the Conference, within two months, the ways and means of securing a permanent national settlement of the communal question. The matters referred to the Board were : (i) The protection of Muslim culture, personal law and religious rights; (ii) Safeguarding of the political rights of the Muslims; (iii) Making of the future constitution of India non-unitary and federal in character, with absolutely essential and unavoidable powers vested in the Federal Government; and (iv) The provision of safeguards for the economic, social and cultural rights of Muslims and for their due share in public services.¹⁰

The report of the Board envisaged in the third resolution never appeared. Although no reasons were given, it was perhaps due to the *Satyagrah* launched by the Congress in 1940, the Cripps Mission and the 'Quit India' movement of 1942, followed by a general arrest of nationalist leaders that the recommendations could not be formulated.¹¹ However, the JUH came out with its own decision in 1942, known as the JUH's Formula regarding the solution of the constitutional dilemma of India. Its provisions were as follows :¹²

1. Our object is complete independence.
2. In a free India, Muslims and their religion and culture will be free. They will not accept a constitution which does not approve of these freedoms.
3. We stand for the fullest and unrestricted autonomy of the provinces. The Centre will enjoy only those powers which the provinces, of their own accord, hand over to it and which equally concern all the provinces.
4. It is our considered opinion that a federation of autonomous provinces of India is essential. But a federation in which ninety million Muslims with a distinct culture of their own are left on the mercy of a numerical majority, will, in no case, be acceptable to them; the Centre is to be formed on such principles that give a clear guarantee to the Muslims with regard to their religious, cultural and political freedom.

Besides, four members of the JUH, Maulana Kifayat Allah, Maulana Ahmed Saeed, Maulana Hifzur Rahman and Maulana Abdul Haleem Siddique, issued a joint press statement¹³ regarding the united struggle for the freedom of India by all the progressive forces in which they urged the British to leave India after handing over all powers to the Indians.¹⁴ In view of the changed situation, the Congress also passed a resolution on August 5, 1942 in favour of a loose federation with the residuary powers resting in the various units.¹⁵

However, the main point of difference between the League and the JUH centred round the geographical and political unity of India. The League's demand was based mainly on two propositions : (1) Fear of Hindu domination in a federally united India, no matter how loose the proposed federation might be; and (2) Muslims' ambition to carve out a destiny of their own according to their religious and cultural ethos. The League argued that the Muslims of India had taken to this drastic measure to solve the communal problem. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared in 1942 :¹⁶

Muslim India is fighting and struggling for survival and for its right to self-determination, whereas the Congress and other Hindu organisations are speeding to assume supremacy and domination over the Muslims as an All-India minority by establishing one central government over the

whole of India, and thus to dominate and control even those zones where the Muslims are in a solid majority. . .

The League, under his leadership, stood for 'free India and free Islam.'¹⁷ The JUH refused to share the views and sentiments expressed by the League and its leaders. The JUH doubted even the credentials of the League leaders for representing Indian Muslims as they were educated in secular western traditions have no imprint of Islam in their private lives and they were exploiting the fair name of religion for their worldly gains. It never conceded the doctrine of two nations as propounded by the League. Since its very inception it stood for a 'United Indian Nationalism.'

The JUH also suspected the British design and believed that it was behind the League's demand. Its plea was that the British were responsible for the untold misery and degradation of the Muslims for more than a hundred years. It was the British Government that had seriously damaged the vital interests of the Muslims by destroying their educational institutions and deliberately keeping them politically and economically backward.¹⁸ Now why this change of heart on their part and why their deep concern for the well-being of the Muslim minority? It could not understand the anxiety of the British Government as expressed by the Secretary of State for India Mr. Amery, in 1940, in the following words :¹⁹

It is true that they (the Congress) are numerically the largest single party in British India. But their claim. . . to speak for India is utterly denied by very important elements in India's complex national life. These and other elements assert their right to be regarded not as mere numerical minorities but as separate constituent factors in any future Indian policy, entitled to be treated as such in any discussions for the shaping of India's future constitution.

The foremost among these elements stands the great Muslim community, of ninety million strong and constitutes a majority both in the North-Western and North-Eastern India, but scattered as a minority over the whole sub-continent. In religious and social outlook, in historic tradition and culture, the difference between them and their Hindu follow-countrymen goes as deep as, if not deeper than, any similar difference in Europe. That need not and does not prevent pleasant social intercourse of fruitful political co-operation. It has not, in fact, prevented individual Muslims taking an active part in the work of the Congress Party. But, as a body,

the Muslims have stood aloof. Their quarrel with the scheme of the existing Act is not that it fails to give that clear majority rule which the Congress asks for, but that it would give too great powers to a Hindu majority at the Centre. They will have nothing to do with a constitution framed by a constituent assembly elected by a majority vote in geographical constituencies. They claim the right in any constitutional discussions to be regarded as an entity and are determined only to accept a constitution whose actual structure will secure their position as an entity against the operations of a mere numerical majority.

The JUH based its suspicion on two grounds. Firstly, with the gradual strengthening of India's national movement grew the British anxiety to devise ways and means to divide and weaken the Indian people and create opportunities for foreign political interference and economic penetration. The JUH leaders were apprehensive of these consequences. Moreover, according to them, what would happen "in case of breach of any of the mandatory safeguards?" Would Pakistan intervene, by show of force, to save the Muslims from the tyranny and oppression of the Hindu? Was this possible at any rate under the present circumstances?²¹

Secondly, the JUH leadership opposed the Pakistan demand because, they believed, it would create difficulties in the missionary activities of the Muslims. It was one of the objectives of the JUH to propagate and spread Islam through peaceful missionary work. The atmosphere of antagonism that surrounded the Indian politics in the wake of growing popularity of the League's demand for a separate homeland, the JUH *Ulama* thought, would hamper the progress of Islam and put great obstacles in the way of missionary work. Their contention was that Islam was a proselytizing religion and needed an atmosphere of peace and harmony for its propagation. Even as early as 1931 Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, writing to Maulana Abdul Bari Nadwi on this important point and explaining the Brahmanical hatred against Islam because of the latter's message of equality and fraternity as a counter measure to defend the closed Hindu society from succumbing to the all-embracing teachings of the Prophet of Islam, stated :²²

In short mutual relationships result in the removal of mutual hatred and bring people to the fold of Islam, while mutual hatred results in stubbornness, in an overlooking of their's good points and constitutes an impediment in the progress of Islam. And Islam being a missionary

religion, it is its duty, so far as possible, to absorb others in itself, not to reject them. This is why we should not hate our neighbouring peoples even if they hate us; if they call us unclean and impure we should not do so; if they regard us as untouchables, we should not behave in such a way; and if they tyrannize over us, we should not be tyrannical and unjust towards them. Islam is a compassionate father and a kind mother. It is a well-wishing consul, a religion that attracts people and a sympathiser of humanity. . . . If some worldly kings have done any injustice or tyranny, it is they who are responsible for it, for Islam does not tolerate any of this.

We find the same theme in his speech delivered in Delhi on September 19, 1945, and addressed particularly to the *Ulama* on the occasion of the formation of the Azad Muslim Parliamentary Board to fight the last constitutional battle against the demand for Pakistan in the general elections of 1945-46. He is reported to have said :²³

At the termination of the Muslim rule there were about 25 million Muslims in India. Within a period of less than a century their number increased up to 100 million. The missionary work of the *Ulama* has a great share in this increase. Compassion and kindness, justice and equity, mutual good relationships and service to mankind — these are the fundamental principles, when acted upon, have led to the progress of Islam.

The great object of an over-all spread of Islam in the whole of India cannot be realized by appealing to passions of hatred and antagonism. It is the non-Muslims who are the field of action for the *tabligh* of Islam and form the raw material for this splendid activity. Today, by propagating hatred towards the Hindus, this field is being closed and this material wasted. It is contrary to the universal message of our great Prophet (Peace be upon Him).

Our object is to bridge the gulf of hatred which is being created by the protagonists of the scheme of Pakistan; we are opposed to the idea of limiting the right of missionary activities of Islam within any particular area. The Muslims have got a right in all the nooks and corners of India by virtue of the great struggle and grand sacrifices of their ancestors in this country. Now it is our duty to maintain that claim and try to widen its scope, instead of giving it up.

The JUH was convinced that the western-educated League leadership was exploiting the name of Islam for the worldly gain of the Muslim vested interests which, knowing fully well that the ignorant Muslim masses could only be won over by appealing to their religious emotions, had given the slogan that in a united India Islam would be in danger.

After the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution, the All-India Muslim League gained strength rapidly. This was proved in the bye-elections to the provincial and central legislatures, where the League candidates won in all the Muslim constituencies with an overwhelming majority. The JUH soon realized that its constitutional formula would not satisfy a majority of the Muslims. Therefore, on January 31, 1945, the Executive Committee added an 'interpretation' to the formula which provided that JUH was not ready to sacrifice the religious, political and cultural rights of the Muslims. It stood for a federal system of government which was in the larger interests of the Indians, particularly the Muslims, but its formation was subject to the acceptance of the principle of self-determination for the provinces. The federal government should be so constituted that the non-Muslim majority would not suppress the Muslims.²⁴ In the interpretation of Clause No.4 of the 1942 JUH Formula, the Executive Committee proposed that :²⁵

1. The proportion of seats in the central legislature should be 45 per cent each for Hindus and Muslims and 10 per cent for other minorities.
2. A bill would not be introduced or passed if two-third Muslim members of the central legislature decided that it was against their religion or political freedom or would have adverse effect on their culture and civilization.
3. A Supreme Court may be set up with equal number of Muslim and non-Muslim Judges. They should be appointed by a committee comprising equal number from the Muslim and non-Muslim majority provinces. The Supreme Court will have its original jurisdiction in a dispute between centre and provinces, inter-provincial issues or among different nationalities in the country. In case two-third Muslim members in the Central Legislature opposed a bill, it would be referred to the Supreme Court for decision.

4. Any other issue could be referred to the Supreme Court for adjudication, if mutually agreed to by the parties.

Neither the Congress nor the Muslim League commented on the proposal.

As the JUH moved nearer to the Congress, those *Ulama* who disagreed with this policy felt the need to counter it more effectively. They openly declared that it was not valid on religious grounds to support the Congress and add to its strength against the All-India Muslim League.²⁶ A move was set afoot to organize a party of these anti-JUH *Ulama*, and the Muslim League lent them the necessary encouragement. The sponsors included *Mashaikh* and *Ulama* of the *Ahl-i-Hadith* and those of Deoband and Farangi Mahal.²⁷ Prominent among the *Ulama* who held such views were Maulana Azad Subhani, Maulana Raghīb Ahsan, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani, Maulana Shaiq Ahmad Usmani, Editor of the daily *Asr-i-Jadid*, Abdul Jabbar Wāheedi, Sayyid Muhammad Usman and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, Office Secretary of the All-India Muslim League.²⁸ The unifying factor for these *Ulama* was the personality of Allama Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, who had already been making unfruitful efforts to unite the various Muslim political parties. He was also assisting the Quaid-i-Azam in his efforts to forge unity and cooperation among Muslim parties. Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari was the Muslim League emissary who urged the religious leaders to organise a separate party.²⁹ It was decided to establish an All-India Jami'at-i-Islam and on October 26, 1945, a four-day conference of pro-Muslim League *Ulama* was called in Calcutta for this purpose. The Bengal Provincial Muslim League leaders such as Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy helped in organizing it. Two leading Muslim businessmen bore the expenses.³⁰ Allama Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, who was to preside over the Conference, could not attend due to illness, and in his absence, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani presided over the Conference. A special message by the Allama, sent through Maulana Zahur Ahmad, was read out by Maulana Muhammad Mateen Khatib. It proved to be an epoch-making split in the JUH.

The aim of the JUH was that the people of India be given complete freedom and all the provinces be made autonomous. Moreover, there should be a Central Federation in the country. The party in its Executive Committee made this demand in 1926.³¹ It reiterated its demand in 1931 known as JUH's Formula which ran as follows :³²

- (i) Culture, language, script, occupation, religious education, preaching, institutions, beliefs performances, places of worship, *awqaf* of different communities of India would be free. The government will not interfere in them.
- (ii) A special provision would be made in the basic constitution for the protection of Muslim personal law and a surety would be given in this regard that the legislature and the government would not interfere in it and these acts would be laid down in the foot notes as example of the personal law. (Orders of *nikah*, divorce, recalling a divorced wife, probation after dissolution of marriage, option after maturity, separation of spouses, release of marriage from husband, maintenance of wife, guardianship of children, guardianship of *nikah* and property, will, *waqf*, inheritance, enshroading and burial, sacrifice).
- (iii) Muslim *Qazis* would be appointed for deciding such cases of Muslims where decision of a Muslim Judge is necessary and those *Qazis* would be given full powers.
- (iv) A supreme court, consisting of members of different communities, would be constituted for hearing and deciding complaints regarding the safeguard of political and other rights of minorities in the Provincial and Federal Assemblies. Its decisions would be enforced by the Federal Government.
- (v) The form of government in NWFP, Baluchistan and other newly-constituted provinces would be the same as in other provinces.
- (vi) Sindh would be given status of a regular province and her administration would be run in such a way that her income would suffice its expenditure.
- (vii) All adults would be given right to vote and in no case any such method would be tolerated through which any community is deprived of its right to vote according to its proportion of population.
- (viii) Joint electorate would be the mode of elections.
- (ix) No reservation of seats would be made in Punjab and Bengal for any community and if any minority community stressed for reservation then all the communities would get the reservation of seats according to their proportion of population. In the same way seats for minorities would be

reserved in the legislative assemblies of other provinces as well as the federation and they would have the right to contest for additional seats.

- (x) The form of government would be federal. All provinces would be completely autonomous. Federal legislature would be given only those rights that are equally concerned with the whole of India. The provinces would have unallotted subjects except in case all provinces unanimously accept that unallotted subjects be given to the federal legislature.
- (xi) Appointments to vacancies would be made through a neutral public services commission who would ensure, after keeping a minimum standard of merit, that any community is not deprived of its share according to its proportion of population. No particular community would have monopoly over subordinate services. All communities would get their due share.
- (xii) The representation of minorities in the ministries of federal and provincial governments would be settled through mutual understanding.
- (xiii) No change, amendment or addition in the basic articles of the constitution would be made until and unless all the federal units approve it.
- (xiv) These articles are interconnected with each other and if any article would not be accepted, the entire formula would be dropped.

These demands were repeated by the JUH in 1942 as mentioned earlier. Later, in 1946 these demands were again put forward.³³ But the JUH opposed any move to leave the Muslim numerical minority at the mercy of Hindu numerical majority and emphasised the fact that the Muslims would be free in matters of religion, politics, culture and personal laws. It also demanded the following ratio of members in the Central Legislature :³⁴

Hindu	45
Muslim	45
Other Minorities	10
Total	100

The concept of uniting the provinces under the control of a strong federation and then simultaneously keeping their autonomy also in tact, was a wrong concept. It can rightly be asserted that the total number of federating provinces of the sub-continent was 12 out of which only 5 provinces were of Muslim majority and the remaining 7 had Hindu majority. If the scheme of the

JUH was accepted as such then formation of federation would be conditional : that only those laws would be enacted in the provinces which would be acceptable to all of them; in that case the 2 (Hindu) provinces would have approved only those laws that were beneficial to the majority whereas the rest of 5 provinces also had Hindu population ranging from 40 to 45 per cent except NWFP and Baluchistan. In that case the Hindus would have secured seats in the democratic institutions, i.e., legislative assemblies according to their population strength and they were bound to support, in the event of elections, only that aspect of a law which was in their interests and which ensured safeguards of their rights. In these circumstances also, the 'autonomy' of provinces was difficult, if not impossible, to be retained. Therefore, even in such a situation the existence of self-government was difficult, if not impossible. Despite the above, it is a vital fact that it was also in the minds of the *Ulama* that if they supported the Pakistan demand and a state was established by separating a few provinces then they would have to bid farewell forever to the religious schools, worship places, *auqaf*, sacred places, movable and immovable property, agriculture, trade and handicraft of the Muslims which were present in every city, town and village of the sub-continent. In this way, after the migration of the Muslims to Pakistan, even the survival of all these monuments would be endangered. Arguing against the establishment of Pakistan, Maulana Azad stated :³⁵

Due to lack of geographical contiguity of the North Western and Eastern borders of Pakistan it is unthinkable that these two parts will remain united. . . . To keep the Islamic states united merely on the basis of Islam is considered declaring war against history because except in the early period of Islam all Islamic states, even the Arab states could not remain united merely on the basis of religion till today.

A group of *Ulama*, including some *Ulama* of Deoband, supported the policies of the Muslim League and its demand for Pakistan. Their argument was that it was imperative for the Muslims to have a separate state to protect their civilization, culture, social system, economy, trade and industry. In their opinion, the establishment of Pakistan was needed to enforce an Islamic system and Quranic way of life. This group of *Ulama*, therefore, not only verbally endorsed and supported Pakistan but during the Central and Provincial elections toured the provinces and explained to the Muslims the importance of their votes. There is no doubt that the clear success of the Muslim League in

the 1946 elections was also the result of the valuable service of the former members of the JUH.³⁶

The JUH convened a four-day conference participated by All-India Muslim Majlis, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, All-India Momin Conference, Kudai Khidmatgars, Independence Party of Bihar, and Krishak Parja Party at the residence of Nawab Qadeer-ud-Din.³⁷ More than fifty members of these parties as well as about hundred members of the JUH participated in this meeting. Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani was elected President of this Azad Muslim Parliamentary Board,³⁸ who in his address to the Muslim Parliamentary Board, observed that the noble object of the expansion of Islam in the whole of India could not be fully realized by merely showing resentment against the British. In fact, he said, non-Muslim communities provided a vast field for the preaching of Islam, and the Pakistan scheme, which had created animosity towards Hindus, would close this field. He contended that the right of preaching of Islam should not be limited to a particular area. The Muslims had acquired this and other rights on each and every corner of India because of the struggle and sacrifices of their forefathers. Those rights, he urged, should be retained and expanded.³⁹ During the election campaign, Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani personally toured Bengal and Bihar. He faced strong opposition during this tour at many places. But he faced these difficulties with courage.

Immediately there arrived the Cabinet Mission in India and started meeting the leaders of all the political Parties. The JUH President along with three other leaders met the Cabinet Mission members and put before them the JUH Formula.⁴⁰ The Cabinet Mission, however, failed to bring about a consensus among the major parties and finally gave its own Plan.

Both the Congress and the Muslim League at first accepted the Mission's Plan. But the League withdrew its support of the Plan in view of the statements of Jawahar Lal Nehru about certain vital provisions of the Plan and resorted to 'Direct Action.' Therefore, the League abstained from joining the Interim Government. The Congress approached the Nationalist Muslims without consulting the JUH. The JUH resented this attitude and on September 21, 1946, in a meeting of its executive committee criticised it. In this lengthy resolution the JUH noted with satisfaction the British Government's declaration about India's independence and transfer of power to the Indians. It deplored the Muslim League's policies which had deprived the Muslims from

getting their due share in national affairs. It also protested against the unfair treatment meted out to the nationalist Muslims by the Congress in the selection of Muslim members of the Interim Government and the allocation of important portfolios among them. In the end, the Congress High Command was urged to take remedial measures to make the Interim Government more useful and representative.⁴¹

The new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, after lengthy negotiations with the major parties, prepared a Partition Plan which, after approval by the British Government, was announced on June 3, 1947. The June 3rd Plan was accepted by the Congress as well as the Muslim League.⁴²

On May 10, 1947, the JUH working committee in its meeting held at Lucknow, had expressed its disapproval of the idea of partition of the sub-continent. When a resolution recommending conditional acceptance of the June 3rd Plan came before the Congress Working Committee, Maulana Azad supported it as the only solution of the continuing state of uncertainty, but reiterated that the Congress still believed in the concept of united India. However, the JUH leader, Maulana Hifz-ur-Rehman, who was a member of the Congress Working Committee, firmly opposing the resolution, declared that acceptance of the Partition Plan meant rejection of the entire struggle and history of the Congress.⁴³ The JUH Working Committee, in a separate meeting on June 24, 1947, rejected the Partition Plan.⁴⁴ However, the party had no force or intention to resist the Plan and the sub-continent was divided into two independent states, India and Pakistan.

Concluding the discussion of JUH's opposition to the struggle for a separate homeland for the South Asian Muslims it can be said that it lay in its traditional idea of Islam, and the belief that the Western Educated League Leadership did not want to establish an Islamic state in the sub-continent. In view of these JUH leaders had sufficient reason to be alarmed at the future fate of Islam in the proposed 'Islamic State' of Pakistan. Moreover, it was quite clear from the very inception of the scheme of partition that it was not going to solve all the problems of the Muslims. What would be the fate of millions of Muslims left behind in 'Hindu' India? Would Islam be banished from the areas where the Muslims were in a minority? What would happen to the Muslim culture which flourished in Delhi, Lucknow, Patna and Hyderabad. These were the questions which JUH asked but got no satisfactory answers. JUH had themselves publicly proclaimed that they considered Muslims' religious

freedom to keep their own distinctive culture to be more important than Muslims' political freedom.⁴⁵ Then there was the question of leadership. The *Ulama* thought that it was only they who could give, with a sound knowledge of al-Quran and Sunnah the right kind of lead to the Muslims. According to JUH the League leadership was poorly equipped with Islamic teachings.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Western Educated Muslims treated them as entirely ignorant of the requirements of the modern complex life; hence incapable of giving a correct lead to the Muslims which in their view only they could provide.

The State of Pakistan is a fact and an event in the modern history with hardly any parallel. The Muslims, when they constituted majority, are free and shaped their destiny as they liked. Even those who opposed the creation of Pakistan came round and accepted the idea honestly and agreed that for the Muslims who constituted majority in certain provinces this was the best solution.

For those who are left behind in India, it was the duty of the majority community to convince them that the life and property of the minority is safe and that the minority could live in place and prosperity in new independent India. But India has miserably failed to uphold those ideas and political philosophy which the Congress and other leaders preached before independence.

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Students' Violence in Pakistan : A Schematic Analysis

ARSHAD SYED KARIM

Determinants of Violence

Violence in a society stems from frustration among oppressed people and forms the basis of revolutionary change. Its prime objective is to oppose and to overthrow the ruling or the oppressing class. Revolution brings about an abrupt and spontaneous current that sweeps away political institutions, social structures, and policies of the government and generates new values. Revolution with these characteristics have been categorized with different names. They are called revolt, coup, struggle for freedom, and war of liberation.

Revolutions are generally staged against the social structures which have been imposed upon the people against their will to exploit them. Its major aims are to force changes in their moral, social, religious and economic norms. The climate conducive to violence and revolutionary acts are created by frustration and anguish felt by the people against the prevailing uncertain conditions and instability of a government. In a society, those who are poor, insecure and depressed usually remain indifferent to their environment and spend their life quietly, whereas there are some who sharply react and resort to violence as a course to shape a living of their own liking. On the other hand, there is always a select group of people who are economically well off and enjoy a favoured position. They oppose the process of revolutionary change materially and physically because they feel threatened and believe that any change in the existing conditions will adversely affect them. This counter-revolutionary behaviour provides further an impetus to the revolutionary forces.

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The revolutionary process may be fast or slow depending upon human behaviour and reaction to new changes. People interpret these changes in social and economic terms which ultimately leads to revolution. Psychologically, customs, traditions and old social values keep a man at bay and indifferent but new changes affecting their social and economic norms lead them to violence. Because of this the success of a change depends upon sentiments and expectation of the people which ultimately shapes the social crisis and manifest itself in violence and agitation. It is implied that a political crisis emerges from economic reasons.

Violence in psyche of students is a reaction of unrest among them and is reflected in arson, destruction, commotion and carnage. Such situations arise when the frustration among the students reaches the boiling point. The unrest and anger among the students are the outcome of social inequalities and economic deprivation, these in turn incite them to violence.

Revolutions occur in a political society because of two reasons. Primarily when the demos feel that their interests clash with the ruling class. Secondly, when commoners and the ruling class both desire to accommodate themselves with the new changes in the value-system. Thus revolution as a whole springs from violence and also from ideological changes in the leadership. Psychologically speaking students have expectations from the power holders. When it does not come up to their expectation they react sharply opening with violence which leads to a revolution. The tempo of revolutionary process and degree of violence mainly depends upon the dedication and zeal of the students to achieve their goals. Specially such precedents can be treated where the ideological force fail to fulfil the expectations in turn leads to agitation and violence.

Violence in Global Politics

The growing tendency of violence in the contemporary global politics have widely influenced the national political environment, including the students and educational institutions. As a matter of fact violence is a natural instinct in men. It is expressed in different forms in different environments. Violence and the prevailing course of action are important chapter for study of politics as these may play an important role in the formation of groups with mutual interest among students and the nation as a whole. Among students

violence has been and is being used as a process to press their demands and to force those in a position to accept their demands.

Historically speaking, political crisis has always been initiated by a particular class of people in a society. But in the modern global politics its range has very much widened. It engulfs not only poor, illiterate and labour classes of the society, but has also spread into the young educated middle class as well as the educational institutions. It is prevailing in most of the countries of the world, particularly those which have been under the colonial rule and are still undergoing the process of development and experiencing continued political crisis and instability. Such conditions are the root cause of violence in developing societies. As a result of which masses feel completely pre-occupied by a sense of frustration. Young educated class and students are a part of this frustrated class and psychologically speaking their depression has induced them to violence, anger and agitation as is evident from their demonstrations in the educational institutions.

Power Struggle in Pakistan

Pakistan is one of those countries which has passed through turmoils and offered sacrifices in its quest for freedom. The emergence of Pakistan itself is based on the feeling of frustration and subjection of Muslims at the hands of the British and the expected bondage of the Hindus. To achieve freedom the Muslims had to struggle for over hundred years on all levels, such as ideological, social and political, and thereby achieving Pakistan in 1947 as an independent sovereign state. The new country faced the problems of organizational instability. Prior to the inception of Pakistan, there was a little concept of political society among the Muslims of the sub-continent. After the creation of Pakistan, political institution of vital importance was formed to harmonise religion with politics so as to establish a comprehensive socio-political system leading to a complete Islamic political society. the Objectives Resolution was the first step towards such a goal. But unfortunately, in the new born state, different ideological forces ranging from conservatism to liberalism and radicalism came in direct conflict with one another creating a complex situation in the socio-political environments of the country. The fundamental problem of the new state was economic in nature because Pakistan comprises those parts of the sub-continent which were economically backward. Thus a state of frustration was present from the very beginning which created more instable conditions by political complexity on the one hand, and

bureaucratic control of the country on the other. When political institution became weak, the poor and feeble leadership falls into fragmentation and metamorphosis of political parties which further disintegrate into unorganised groups. The bureaucracy takes advantage of this chaotic situation and strengthens itself. The educated middle class because of its education and a higher sense of awareness feels the pinch of a strong bureaucracy and promptly takes cognizance of the wrongs of the bureaucracy. It immediately reacts to it in form of anger. Hence the greatest opposition faced by the bureaucracy comes from this class. It is also true that if power is concentrated in one group of people, the other group either allies with it or severely struggles to snatch power from it for the attainment of its objectives. This happened with the middle class in Pakistan which took a strong position against the bureaucracy. They attributed the total responsibility of instability in the country to the bureaucracy. Consequently hatred mounted against it. The students organised themselves in the educational institutions to oppose the ruling bureaucracy. In this way the student community entered politics and started their struggle for their rights and the protection of their interest which manifested in the forms of demonstrations and 'slogans.' The Student Unions played a pivotal role in giving momentum to student politics.

The Ayub Era

Values based on human psychology tried to win the students through coercion. It resulted in severe uprising and violence in them. If the values are achieved against the wishes of the students and obstructions are placed in the way of achievement of their aspiration, it stiffens the attitude of students. From this it transpires that the more there are opposition and obstructions in their way the more stiff their attitude will be. It can be concluded that in the psychological process the injured feelings leads to violence. Culture and traditions are those parts of the human psychology which can take people to extremism and ultimately they seek the help of politics. The students community had their debut in politics during the Ayub era but it felt that strong power of bureaucracy stood in its way to attain its objective. By this time, bureaucracy had engulfed all the sphere of life. Engineers, doctors, scientists were seriously felt the stronghold of bureaucracy. It was felt by the young generation that after the completion of its education, it would have to work under a strong bureaucracy. During the last days of President Ayub Khan, students community started protests, agitations and strikes against the

bureaucracy which were often assumed the form of violence. This was introduction of violence among the students as a tool in their hands for achieving of their goals.

In Pakistani culture affiliation always plays an important role, especially in urban society. At that time Mr. Z. A. Bhutto appeared as a new leader and was alluring the students towards his radical ideas. Bhutto was comparatively young and westernised and had an impressive personality. Under his tutelage students' agitation was fierce and violent that it toppled the strong Ayub regime. The bulk of urban population, full of hope and expectations, rallied round the students who under the influence of Bhutto's radical ideology. Leaned heavily on leftism in his thinking and politics which enthused students and induced them to violent agitation in West Pakistan. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman in the Eastern Wing rallied the students around his philosophy. Evidently, both these leaders were responsible for infusing violence and agitation among the students. It is a psychological phenomenon that when justice, equality and accountability are not exercised through law a sense of dismay, frustration and ultimately violence takes over the reign of the events.

This development can easily be noticed in the developing countries under the military rule wherever they tried to introduce new reforms. This was apparent in Ayub era. Consequently Bhutto tried to influence and activate the students. This may be discerned from the incidence of firings on students of Polytechnic Institute at Rawalpindi, where one student died and Bhutto joined the funeral congregation. In this way he invited the students in the arena of practical politics of Pakistan. On the other hand, he bestowed freedom to students and induced them to join his party. The same path was, adopted in East Pakistan by Mujeeb-ur-Rehman. Both these leaders established a Student's Cell within their Parties. During the downfall of Ayub Khan, students entered internal politics of Pakistan. At that time student community was deeply influenced by the ideologies of these two leaders that they not only enjoyed students' favour, the students wholly supported and worked for the achievement of ideological and political goals of these leaders. Consequently, violence entered in educational institutions and was the main cause of frequent closure of educational institutions. The students' pressure and opposition frustrated the ruling class and their frustration and impotence led students to the path of revolution. Consequently, the Ayub regime was toppled.

The Bhutto Era

In the process of rule if the expectations and legitimate aspirations of the people are neglected and an unjust policy is adopted, it creates a sense of frustration and hopelessness among people which eventually leads to revolution. Such a precedence can be seen during the Bhutto regime when the pre-election commitments to the people were not fulfilled, rather the hands of psychopants were strengthened in an unfair and unjust manner. This resulted in a sharp and violent reaction against Bhutto. Such a situation materialized when displeasure and difference between the people's elected representatives and the government widened the gulf between them. This ultimately resulted in a confrontation between PNA and Bhutto.

In the political society an unjust and unequal distribution of opportunities also lead to violence. This is particularly true when people are denied opportunities to fulfil their aspirations. The resultant frustration among them manifest itself into violence, especially in the young generation. Later on these young men and women with degrees in their hands fail in securing jobs, they feel desperated and dejected which turns to frustration and ultimately incites them to violence when they find that those in favour of the ruling class are unjustly provided lucrative jobs. In Pakistan the responsibility of bringing the students into politics lies on Bhutto, in West Pakistan, and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, in East Pakistan. After the fall of East Pakistan, in the early days of Bhutto students politics took a new turn. Since Pakistan's inception students were grouped on ideological basis. These rival student groups came into direct confrontation with the newly emerging group of students inspired by Bhutto. A constant conflicting condition among students became the hallmark during Bhutto's regime. Other political parties also organized students groups in the educational institutions. Consequently, ideological conflict became an order of the day.

The Zia-ul-Haque Era

Students being very often sentimental are easily induced to violent agitation. Therefore, at the start of opposition and demonstrations against Bhutto, students took to streets and gradually brought masses in to their support. Bhutto faction of students also came forward to resist the antagonists of Bhutto which culminated into open clashes. During the same time a political alliance by the name of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), based in Karachi,

was formed. The PNA alongwith the student groups got deeply involved in the street politics against the Bhutto regime. These student political groups were militant wings of national and regional political parties in Pakistan. Even in the post-Bhutto period, the mainstream of politics in Pakistan was controlled by the students. After Bhutto the political activities in Pakistan took a new turn. The Martial Law imposed by General Zia-ul-Haque right from the beginning was a crippled one. In its initial stage it was not even felt that a military rule has replaced the civilian government in the country. Amazingly, later on this lame military rule itself turned into the civilian rule. This provided opportunity to students to continue their political activities with usual freedom. During the period that Mr. Bhutto was behind the bars, while his party almost disintegrated, its student faction survived and became the chief opposition party. They were in the forefront not only opposing the government but were also out for revenge. Consequently, a new wave of violence erupted. The People's Student Federation (PSF), as they were known, had seen their best days under the Bhutto regime as they had dominated the politics of Pakistan under the protection of the People's Party. The scene now changed and their opponents were much pleased in this reversal of situation in the country. At this juncture of the political situation influx of arms accused from across the borders which were made available to students in the educational institutions through political parties.

The deadly and sophisticated arms at their disposal affected the magnitude of students' violence. The result was bloodshed and carnage in educational institutions. In order to keep the students away from politics a ban was imposed on the Student Unions. It was expected that student groups without any organization would disintegrate. But it never happened. Rather the violence became order of the day. Consequently, time and again the colleges and universities were forced to be closed which indicated the violent tendencies among the students' communities. Further, violence had different meanings in theory and in practice. Theoretically speaking violence is induced through frustration and despair, and uncertainty of future rising out of psychological, social and political reasons. Moreover, there are different causes of the violence. Psyche of individuals may desist a person from violence so as to avoid a situation of confrontation in the society as a whole. For that reason, the moderates in a society try to keep themselves aloof from violence and similar revolutionary activities. But at the same time, the extremists adopt

rigid revolutionary posture which makes violence inevitable and, therefore, unavoidable since extremists believe in revolutionary change through violence in their desire to achieve power. On the other hand, the moderates believe in evolutionary change and preach peace and stability.

Violence and revolution are complimentary to each other. It is part of human psychology, and, therefore, can not be ignored. Man though by nature desires peace and tranquility. His psyche motivated by his greedy nature may induce him to violence. Thus violence becomes an important ingredient of human life.

Multi-Dimensions of Students' Union

One of the most devious cause of the deterioration of education standard in Pakistan is the student unrest in academic institutions. This unrest is complex in nature. It has social, political, economic and ideological overtones. Practically it is predominantly occupied by social problems as it owes its origin to its culture. Pakistani political culture is complex in the composition of our society. It comprises three dimensions : cultural pluralism; rural-urban diversity and mass-elite distinction. They jointly or separately influence political activities of our society. Through this a political wave springs that gives birth to violence. Generally younger generation is comparatively more influenced by cultural values than the older one and thus it becomes the first victim of the wave emerging violence. The students from the bulk of younger generations and they come in the forefront if the violent activity of political nature. They get influenced by their young passion and get divorced from rational thinking. They wish to groom their future but their young mind is set to violence because of their scattered thoughts filled by political leaning of unrest and demonstration.

In the educational institutions they feel frustrated and depressed. As a result, seeking of knowledge becomes a mere formality for them. They receive higher education in the form of degrees and diplomas but in the real sense they have not received proper education. It indicates that socio-political training leaves from deficiency which leads them to violence. There is also a gap between the teacher-students relationship. This relationship may be helpful in getting students groomed in the academic environment. Pakistani is a young nation. Half a century is not enough for a nation to reach the height of development. However, in this modern world there are examples of nations

who have developed themselves in a short span of time starting from ruins left behind by the World War. They have not only achieved political stability, but have also made socio-economic progress. Pakistani nation adheres to a belief which by ideology is a complex code of life. It adorns us ethical values and with such cultural values that shape our national integration. With such ideological background, Pakistani nation can grow into a strong national bound with integrated force. This is possible if we isolate students from the political activities and lean them away from the culture of arms and weapons. Unfortunately, our students have been taught that the basis of ideology is a socio-economic order rather than the ideological beliefs. In fact, socio-economic emancipation is attained through political freedom and political freedom is achieved through moral liberty. And moral freedom is attained through belief and deeds. If this principle is established in the minds of younger generation, there is a hope that our students would look towards the proper education and get rid of violence.

Recently the Supreme Court of Pakistan has in its decision imposed a ban on students' indulgence in politics. This is happy sign of bringing some hope for a peaceful future for our new generation. But, unfortunately, there still exists a certain class of people who are questioning the Court's decision on constitutional grounds. One should not start a controversy about such details on this issue because one thing is certain that every Pakistani has welcomed the verdict of the Court. Enough is enough. If something is not done now it will be too late for the future.

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Facts about the State of Hyderabad

M. ZAHID KHAN LODHI

The Act of Independence 1947 provided for "the termination of the suzerainty of the Crown"¹ over the Princely States. All treaties, agreements and functions exercisable by His Majesty with regard to States and their rulers were to lapse from 15th August, 1947. The Act also provided that the existing arrangements between the Government of India and the Princely States were to continue pending the detailed negotiations between the States and the new dominions—Pakistan and Bharat.

While the British Plan left the position of Princely States completely undefined, the expatriate British officers headed by Mountbatten who were employed by Bharat after the independence, played a significant and crucial role in bringing the accession of most of these States with Bharat. Mountbatten, in particular, exerted every pressure, employed fair and foul means and never hesitated to use naked aggression against the rulers of such States who did not yield to his pressure-tactics. Obviously the rulers were stunned who were his former friends a few days back.

Hyderabad was one of those ill-fated States against which Bharat, under the direction of Mounbatten had not only used military force but bombarded its territory as well. At least four of its major and populous cities—Aurangabad, Bidar, Raichur and Warangal were bombarded by Indian Air Force which was also commanded by a British officer. Still it was termed by Bharat as a 'Police Action.' If small and petty States were not spared by Bharat, how could it tolerate the independence of a big State like Hyderabad.

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Hyderabad was one of the 565 Indian States which existed before the independence. Economically, it was the richest state with an area of 82,692 square miles. Its ruler was a Muslim whose subjects were between 17 and 18 millions. Bharat was determined to occupy Hyderabad by force. On June 11, 1948, Nehru declared at Naini Tal that talk of an independent and sovereign Hyderabad was absurd.²

On the other hand, the ruler, the Nizam VII, Mir Osman Ali Khan wanted the State to be independent. He, therefore, addressed a letter to the British King and Prime Minister on September 8, 1947 reminding them of his ancestors and his own loyalty to the British. "The privilege that I and my ancestors had for associating with the British Empire for about a century and a half, I still firmly believe that your Government through the good offices of Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General, can exert sufficient moral and material influence to bring about an honourable and amicable settlement between the Dominion of India and Hyderabad without impairing the dignity of my house and my people and without putting my State to material disadvantage."³

The Nizam argued that in the absence of such settlement, I foresee a great deal of internal and external disorders, bloodshed and chaos such as now prevalent in the East and West Punjab and other parts of India and which can indeed even now be avoided in Hyderabad.⁴

The Nizam appealed to the British Government to intervene but the British adopted a lukewarm attitude and refused to mediate between the Nizam and the Indian Government. Prime Minister Attlee told Nizam :

I do not think my Government is in a position to tender advice to the Indian Government or to your Exalted Highness as to the precise constitutional relationship. . . . I believe it to be the case that the Indian Government have agreed that Lord Mountbatten as Governor-General should continue to play a part in the negotiations between India and Hyderabad.⁵

Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that Hyderabad was entitled to UN membership : "that, out of 54 members of the UN, 39 have smaller population, 20 smaller territory and 15 smaller revenue."⁶ On August 21, 1948 Hyderabad first brought the dispute between India and Hyderabad before the Security Council under Article 35, Paragraph 2 of the Charter⁷—as

the Indian Government despite its Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad on November 29, 1947, had continued :

... the economic blockade which had started prior to that date . . . with increasing intensity 'and included' even such items as medicine, chlorine 'for purifying' water' and other basic essentials. . . . It has also been indicated that the 'blockade' may soon be followed by military invasion.⁸

Though India had entered into Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad yet it was not observed by the former. The Prime Minister of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali pointed out :

This Standstill Agreement, however, unfortunately, never came to be observed in spirit or letter by the Indian Union. . . . I hope this matter will receive the British Government's and in particular Mr. Attlee's and your (Bevin's) sympathetic and immediate consideration.⁹

Mounbatten tried his utmost through Walter Monckton, the Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam, to merge the State of Hyderabad with the Indian Union. He himself confessed before a crowded audience in London on June 29, 1948 that : "We have had long discussions on how to fit this great State, with its 17,000,000 population, into the picture. . . . It was heart breaking to Sir Walter Monckton, and to myself that the proposals we jointly worked out were not accepted."¹⁰

The Nizam, on the other hand, levelled charges against Mounbatten and the Indian Government that they 'failed to supply arms and ammunition' which was urgently needed for the internal security of Hyderabad as they should have under the Standstill Agreement : that when Hyderabad tried to import arms and ammunition from 'other sources', the Indian Government stopped it : that the Indian Government 'did nothing to prevent border raids' in spite of the repeated representations : that the Indian Government sent their soldiers in 'mufti' to create trouble inside Hyderabad : that the 'economic blockade' of the State since August 15, was 'intensified.' The Nizam also accused Britain of 'sacrificing bribed friends because they had too little nuisance value.'¹¹

Realising that his repeated requests to the British Government had borne no fruit, the Nizam turned towards America and requested President Truman to 'mediate' and use his 'good offices' to settle the dispute between Hyderabad and India. Unluckily, the response from this quarter, too, was not encouraging as the President replied that the extension of 'good offices' was usually

successful only when requested by both parties. But since America had not heard from India on the matter, so he could not comply with the request.¹²

An empirical investigation of the present study based on data collected from original and archival material suggests that neither Britain nor America helped the Nizam in any way, rather both the major powers encouraged Bharat to devour this large Princely State.

In the meanwhile India created trouble in Hyderabad. Pakistanis believe that an organized campaign of border incidents and raids was started by India. Subversive activities were encouraged within Hyderabad. Considering the sad demise of the Quaid-i-Azam as the most appropriate occasion, Indian armed forces invaded Hyderabad on 13 September which India called a 'police action.' In the Security Council, American Representative, Mr. Jessup, stated that his country viewed with "deep regret resort to force for the adjustment of a difference." He further added that the Indian "use of force does not alter legal rights. I believe that we would all be unanimous on this point."¹³

Mr. Arce of Argentina pointed out paradoxical stand of the Indian Government by "upholding one theory regarding Junagarh with one part of the library and the opposite theory on Kashmir with the other part of the library."¹⁴ Hyderabad's case still lies on the agenda of the Security Council as a helpless State. Although, the Nizam wanted to be independent and had neither declared the accession of his State with India nor Pakistan, yet he had displayed leaning attitude towards Pakistan. He sent his Prime Minister Mir Laik Ali, to Pakistan but, unfortunately, the Quaid-i-Azam on account of his illness was unable to meet him. After India's occupation of Hyderabad through its armed forces Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan and his cabinet wanted to know what action Pakistan could take, to assist Hyderabad.

The Commander-in-Chief committee (consisting of the Chiefs of all armed forces of Pakistan—General Gracey of Army, Perry-Keene of Air Force and Jefford of Navy) which was all British concluded that it was all impracticable. That we could take no action and Hyderabad could expect no military support from Pakistan;¹⁵ as it was a 'land-locked State'¹⁶ in the South of India.

India suppressed the Muslim minority of Hyderabad with an iron hand, persecuted them and perpetrated horrors against them.¹⁷ So the expatriate British officers of Bharat headed by Mountbatten played a significant role for

the conquest of Hyderabad by rendering their maximum support. Hence they yielded to the pressure of Hindu leaders against all cannons of International Law.

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Foreign Policy of Pakistan with Super Powers during Prime Minister Liaquat's Era

M. IQBAL CHAWLA

There are no lasting friends and eternal enemies. Durable relations are based on certain interests of the nation. For Pakistan what is of paramount importance is its requirements of security, political independence, territorial integrity, social and political development and establishing of peace and fraternity with other nations.

In 1947, Pakistan was divided into its west and east wings. Its western part is adjacent to India, China, Afghanistan and Iran and the eastern part was contiguous to India, Burma and Bay of Bengal. The geography of Pakistan determined its strategic area.¹

The genesis of two-nation theory stressed that the Muslims of India were a separate nation. Unlike the other nations which came to India the Muslims maintained their religion and separate entity. On the one hand Hindus viewed the Muslims with contempt and on the other desired to absorb them in their system. Teemed with *Shudhi* and *Sangathan* philosophies,² Nehru Report 1928 and Congress Ministries (1937-39) did unveil Hindu's biogated nature of the Congress.

The Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity³ Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was convinced that the Muslims should have their homeland as proposed by Allama Iqbal in 1930⁴ in the Muslim League Annual Session, as the only solution to the Muslim sufferings. In the face of extreme Hindu and British opposition, Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947.

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India kept alive the propaganda of re-uniting the two countries. In his message on independence day August 15, 1947 the Deputy Prime Minister of India Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel expressed hope and confidence that "sooner or later we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country."⁵ Considering Pakistan a political aberration, the Indian leaders left no stone unturned to undo its existence. Undoing of Pakistan was the chief principle of India's foreign policy. Genocidal acts of the Hindus and Sikhs in East Punjab and in other areas of India forced Muslims to take asylum in Pakistan. The largest migration⁶ the world ever witnessed caused on newly born underdeveloped state. The Indian Government displayed reluctance to hand over agreed share, such as military equipment, water resources and other.⁷ India grabbed Kashmir essentially a Muslim state under a Hindu Raja. It was a fatal blow to Pakistan and became the bone of contention between the two countries ever since.⁸

The father of the nation, the first Governor General of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1947-48) guided the foreign policy of Pakistan.⁹ He desired to build cordial relations with Britain and with India and also work with the rest of the world for maintaining peace and security in the world.

After the demise of Quaid-i-Azam, the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (1947-51) succeeded him.¹⁰ He did as much as he could in the field of foreign affairs. But most of it was left to the others as he was occupied with many other pressing problems.

From the ashes of the World War Second a new World Order 'bipolarism' was born. Surprisingly both allies in the Britain Camp against Germany and its allies in the First and Second World Wars, USSR and USA became rival forces in their scramble for the sphere of influence in the Third World countries soon after the War.

The cold war divided the world into two hostile Socialist and Capitalist Camps. Washington's main desire was to contain the Communism while Moscow adopted a policy to put to an end the Capitalism.

Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics attributed the creation of Pakistan to the British policy of 'divide and rule.'¹¹ Besides state born with Islamic ideology was also unwelcome to Russia.¹² American realism was not that favourable. It first tried to avoid division of sub-continent by influencing Britain.¹³ It considered India as a powerful ally of American against

communism. When the Americans were informed about the existence of heterogeneous elements in the sub-continent having divergent political aspirations, they suggested rather pressed upon London to make "India one Indian Federation."¹⁴

Pakistan was shocked at Washington's policy as it had already persuaded Britain for giving a fair chance to Junagarh, Hyderabad and Kashmir states to accede voluntarily either to India or Pakistan.¹⁵ Washington's leaning towards India in early 1949 was shown when President Mr. H. S. Truman invited Indian Prime Minister Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru to visit the United States. The reaction of the Soviet Government was that which Americans could have not expected. The Stalin's Government immediately invited Pakistan's Prime Minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan as a state guest to visit Soviet Union when he was on his official visit in Tehran in mid May 1949. The official invitation was extended on June 2, 1949. According to Sherin Tahir Kheli in his book *Soviet Moves in Asia* :

Owing to war with India in 1948, Pakistan got importance in the Soviet Union's eyes. It was Soviet Union not the United States which exploited this importance. Since India could not be weaned from the West probably Pakistan a lesser favourite of West could be brought closer. In this spirit Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was invited by Stalin.¹⁶

Access to warm water¹⁷ through Pakistan was a very old Russian dream and to seek a balance¹⁸ in South East Asia might have influenced Soviet considerations when invitation was extended.

In Pakistan invitation was received with mixed feelings. M. A. Isphani Pakistan's Ambassador to America when he came to know about this development wrote a letter¹⁹ to the Prime Minister. He requested Liaquat Ali Khan not to miss the golden chance to forge friendly relation with Moscow. He informed the Prime Minister that Washington had not given due importance to Pakistan. The daily *Dawn* reported :

Our relations with the West are already established. When our leader goes to Moscow as the state guest of USSR relations of friendly understanding and cooperation will doubtless be established also with great social power to the good of not only Pakistan but of all mankind.²⁰

It was a widespread propaganda at that time that communism was a menace to Islam and to the ideology of Pakistan. The daily *Dawn* writes on this issue :

Invitation from USSR and acceptance of Pakistan have proved that the people of the USSR and Pakistan give due respect to one another in spite of their ideological differences.²¹

Russia is on our side was a headline in most of the newspapers.²² People generally were almost hysterical with delight.²³

The date of Liaquat Ali Khan's visit was fixed on August 20, 1949.²⁴ It was postponed to November 7, 1949 at the request of Soviet Government. Before Liaquat's tour, Russian Government wanted to exchange Ambassadors. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan (1947-56) did not consider the requirements essential but the Soviets were firm, by the time Pakistan finally appointed her first Ambassador to Moscow the Soviet had started showing coolness. They approved the credentials of Pakistan's Ambassador yet they showed no interest regarding the appointment of their envoy. By the middle of November Liaquat's visit to Moscow was becoming more and more unlikely.²⁵

The western lobby in Pakistan urged the American Government to invite Pakistan's Prime Minister for official visit to United States.²⁶ The President of America H. S. Truman then extended in December 1949 invitation to the Prime Minister of Pakistan to come to America as state guest in May, 1950. Setting aside USSR offer this invitation was accepted and materialised in 1950.

A number of factors were responsible for the acceptance of American invitation.

1. A large majority of Pakistan political and bureaucratic elites was pro-West.²⁷ These were:
 - (i) Political elites occupying high governmental and party posts.
 - (ii) Bureaucratic elites consisting of top civil servants and high acheron of the military establishment.
 - (iii) The Industrial elites controlling the major parts of Pakistan's economy.
 - (iv) All these sections of political elites were against Liaquat's visit to USSR and they stood in favour of the Prime Minister's visit to America.
 - (v) Inexperience politicians were made helpless against experienced bureaucracy.²⁸

2. Pakistan was a potential unit of Commonwealth.²⁹ Britain hardly endorsed its tilt away from the west. London used many agencies to force Liaquat Ali Khan to give up the idea of going to Moscow. On the other hand it urged Washington to invite the Prime Minister of Pakistan.³⁰
3. To a large extent Pakistan's economy was dependent on the trade with the western nations. It was assumed that USSR could hardly provide economic or technical aid to Pakistan. The least sufferer in the war was the USA. Relatively richer than USSR and capable of providing economic aid to needy countries was indicated by the Truman's Doctrine.³¹ Pakistan a backward country needed immediate economic assistance. It was natural that Pakistan should prefer a country with rich resources and generous heart.
4. The myth of Ghaffar Khan pertaining to the creation of Pakhtunistan³² by putting together some areas of Afganistan and Pakistan, had the full political support of the communist government of the Soviet Union. Besides, communist government demanded a sub-branch of Embassy in Peshawar. This created fear in Pakistan about its security and integrity.
5. Moscow demanded for setting up Embassy as pre-requisite to Prime Minister's visit, a heavy burden on Pakistan's poor economy. It tried to avoid it. Much time was wasted in such unnecessary formalities. It provided ample time to Western lobby in Pakistan to work against this visit to Russia.³³
6. As a communist country, Soviet Union undertook to eliminate religion which Carl Marx says an 'opium' and hinderance to the growth and welfare of mankind.³⁴ Russia entrusted jobs to KGB to secretly spread communism. Muslim leaders were critical of the Russian communism and its policies against religion. Russian even desired to achieve these objectives through revolution in other states.³⁵ This might have influenced the thought process of Liaquat Ali Khan.³⁶
7. It was not surprising to note that the Soviet invitation sent to Mr. Liaquat was in reaction to Truman's invitation to Mr. Nehru, in his tour of America reiterated India's commitment to the concept of

non-alignment in the world politics. This policy of Mr. Nehru made the Russians to re-think and very likely the attitude changed towards Pakistan and the invitation that was extended to Mr. Liaquat.

It is most interesting to find out that why did the United States of America invite Liaquat Ali Khan. Why was not Mr. Nehru invited first?

As Pakistan's Prime Minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan viewing its geopolitical importance described Pakistan "the heart of Asia."³⁷ It could serve a strong hold of America against communism in South Asia. Washington could also regulate its far eastern policy through it. Nehru's pledge to be non-aligned also created vacuum that might be filled with, through smaller in size, a country like Pakistan.

Due to the role American played in creation and establishment of Israel, at least its respect in the eyes of the Islamic World particularly in the Arab countries was lowered. Any effort to bring these Arab states into an alliance with America was turned down with contempt. Pakistan as an Islamic country sided the Islamic World on its problems. Friendship with Pakistan was likely to allure the Muslim World to come closer to America.

Chines factor could be considered as yet an other reason behind this invitation. Pakistan developed good relations with China soon after 1949. Communist China was close to the Soviet Union. This was feared that Soviet Union, China and Pakistan might enter into an alliance. To make this move was surely to pose a big challenge to the American interest in this part of the world. America, therefore, moved fast to bring Pakistan in the orbit of the Western policy.

Pakistan's Prime Minister toured America in 1950. America's President H. S. Truman accorded him a red carpet welcome on his arrival in Washington on May 3, 1950. During his stay in the United States he delivered forceful speeches at various places. He placed special emphasis on the geopolitical importance of Pakistan and its ideology, culture, political and economic policy was also delineated. He expressed Pakistan's view point on contemporary issues.³⁸

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan declared his visit a success but subsequent events showed that it was only a limited success. He achieved his objectives to the extent that Pakistan was given a new consideration in America. America

understood Pakistan's point of view on many issues, regional as well as on the world issues.

Truman's Doctrine helped Greece and Turkey to fight hunger and poverty. Pakistan expected similar treatment. Encouragement was expressed but Liaquat Ali Khan made it known that Pakistan had not been given the expected aid :

Pakistan was receiving no aid from America and then there was no question of subservient foreign policy of Pakistan.³⁹

India through a policy of treachery got hold of Kashmir. In order to delay the matter, it took the issue to the United Nations. The two resolutions which directed the ending of the war and establishment of cease-fire line and the holding of the plebiscite remained unimplemented till this day. It has been the general feeling in Pakistan that the Kashmiris had not been able to get their right of self-determination, to join either India or Pakistan because the West was unable to exercise enough influence and pressure on India.

Liaquat Ali Khan criticised USA policy on Kashmir :

We Pakistanis are convinced that where American interests are engaged action follows shortly after.⁴⁰

In this morass of helplessness Liaquat Ali Khan threatened war with India if USA and UNO failed to solve the issue by October 17, 1951.⁴¹

Liaquat Ali Khan also wanted to reorganise and arm Pakistan's army with sophisticated weapons from America in order to safeguard its frontiers from possible Indian aggression. Liaquat Ali Khan correctly read the mind of India as Pakistan had to face this threat for three time of which one proved deadly as the state was dismembered in 1971.

Pakistan was beset with many problems, at home and abroad. The period of Quaid-i-Millat Khan Liaquat Ali Khan was unimportant if viewed from the fact that Kashmir problem remained unresolved. Pakistan was unable to strike a note by which the West could have given Pakistan a status of most favoured State. On the Afghan front, the relations were not that happy. Foreign aid from other states of the West was not offered liberally. But it goes to the credit of Liaquat Ali Khan that he created a great deal of good-will in the West without making any firm commitment to the West. Muslim World also was given an image that Pakistan stood for the unity of the Islamic World. With

China it made a good start and was able to lay down a firm foundation for close and cordial relations. The option to have good relations with Russia was also kept open. Russia was not offended. In sum, the foreign policy of Khan Liaquat Ali Khan was given a direction which served the best interest of Pakistan. Even India today is wooing the Americans after the collapse of Russia. Pakistan's foreign policy was provided firm foundation which stood the test of the time for a long while.

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Mian Muhammad Shafi : An Analytical Study of his Activities and Achievements (1869-1932)

SYED ASIF ALI RIZVI

Organizations, institutions and traditions have a big share in the development of a society. These factors are indebted to men of exceptional abilities for their establishment and growth. Mian Muhammad Shafi is one of these great names whose history-making efforts brought the backward province of the Punjab on the road to progress. He established the Punjab Provincial Muslim League (PPML) whose support provided Pakistan movement a great strength when it was at a critical juncture. Secondly, he continuously stressed for the grant of the right of separate electorate for the Muslims of Indo-Pak sub-continent. He used all possible means, got the help of national and foreigner influential personalities, political parties, powerful media and effective press for attaining this objective. When it was attained, the creation of Pakistan became possible.

Arain Biradery is the third major community of the Punjab. It is said that this class migrated from Arabia to India in the eleventh century A.D. Before the foundation of the Shalimar Garden, Ishaq Pur was the headquarter of one of the branches of this *Biradery*. When fifth Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan (1628-58) selected this place for Shalimar Garden, he gave them two Free-Revenue villages. The Garden was given in charge of the patron of the family, Mian Muhammad Yousuf (d. 1669) called Mehr Mehuga.¹ The decision was retained by the Sikh and the British regimes. A mile onward from Shalimar

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Garden, a new village Baghbanpura was founded on Grand Trunk Road. It was the native town of Mian family.²

Mian Channan Din his great father, was a great poet of Arabic, Persian and Urdu and he was a renowned religious scholar. He was also known as a preacher of education. All these qualities were inherited by his grandson Mian Din Muhammad whose religious integrity was unique. He was even relied upon by the non-Muslims.³ Mian Muhammad Shafi was an illustrious son.

He was born at Baghbanpura on March 10, 1869, studied in the village school up to the Middle standard, passed Matriculation examination from the Rang Mahal Mission High School, Lahore and joined Forman Christian College where he used to write articles in English and send these to the newspapers.⁴ At the age of seventeen in 1886, he had been married to Shah Din's sister (1869-1918), who died a couple of months before his arrival from England. After his F.A. Examination he went to England to do Bar-at-Law in August 1889 where he took keen interest in the Anjuman-e-Islamia and was soon elected its President.⁵ In 1890 he was also the President at the Royal Levy.⁶ He also took interest in the British Parliamentary elections of 1892 and spoke at many election meetings. In a mock parliament which he joined, called the London Paddington Parliament, he was elected Secretary of State for India.⁷ During this period he also wrote an article for the *London Observer* suggesting the formation of a political organisation for the Muslims of India to be named Muslim League.⁸ There he joined many societies and in 1890 he was elected President of the Anjuman-e-Islamia London.⁹ He returned home in 1892 and started legal practice in Hoshiarpur on the advice of his uncle Nizamuddin, the then a District Judge at Jullundur. After six years he came to Lahore in 1898.¹⁰ After two years, he was married to another cousin, a daughter of Nizamuddin named Amir-un-Nisa. Within a short time of his arrival at the capital, he made a name for himself and became an important figure in public affairs. He joined Anjuman-e-Himayat-i-Islam, Lahore (Estd. 1884) and the Muslim Education Conference of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1818-1898). It was owing to the great services of the family that he gained eminent position in the sphere of political and social life of the Province. He became active member of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's group.¹¹

He played a prominent role in Sir Syed Ahmad's Movement for educational progress, social reform campaign and the general progress of the Muslims. Simla Deputation of 1906 has great historical significance in the

modern history of the Muslim Community of the sub-continent. Out of 35, eight¹² of the members of the Delegation belonged to the Punjab. Mian Muhammad Shafi was not only one of the members of the Delegation but he played a prominent role, especially in drafting its agenda.¹³

After analysing the Hindu-Muslim conflict, Mian Muhammad Shafi emphasized the formation of an independent and exclusively Muslim political organisation. He wrote a number of articles in 1901 in *Observer* in support of his contention.¹⁴ He spoke in favour of this issue. At a public function before the League was set up, he analysed the political situation in the Province. He said that although the Muslims had made some advancement but the progress was unsatisfactory, especially in the field of education when compared to the Hindus. The ignorance of the Muslims had led them to neglect trade. Unwise wastage of their economic resources was also due to their educational backwardness. In these conditions, his view was that the Muslims should have political organization.¹⁵ His thoughts were shared by the Muslim leaders all over India and as a result, on All-India level, first Muslim organization, All-India Muslim League, was founded on the occasion of the Annual Session of the Muslim Education Conference at Dacca on December 30, 1906.¹⁶ He participated in the Karachi Session of December 20, 1907 of the League where the party constitution was passed.

In accordance with the instructions of the Central League, he organised the Provincial branch of the League in the Punjab on November 30, 1907 even before the adoption of the AIML constitution.

The first meeting was held at his residence and presided over by the Shah Din and convened by Mian Muhammad Shafi.¹⁷ Shafi claimed in his speech that this organization was most representative association of the Muslim community of the Province.¹⁸ Mian Muhammad Shafi was the skipper of this team. He played an eminent part in the said meeting. But an important aspect was that Fazal-i-Hussain (1877—1936) and his group neither attended this meeting nor did they send any message, because he organised a separate political organisation with the same name—Muslim League, even before the creation of the new League.¹⁹ Fazal-i-Hussain and his group continued to call their organisation with the same name. Both groups claimed that their representative organizations were the real provincial branch of the AIML and representatives of the Muslim Punjab. Despite serious efforts, differences between the two could not be resolved and the matter was deferred to the

AIML party meeting to be held at Aligarh in 1908. Before the commencement of the Session, Fazal-i-Hussain wrote to the Secretary of the AIML for the affiliation of his body.²⁰ At the Aligarh Session held on March 17-18 at the residence of Muhammad Muzzamil Ullah Khan, the issue of the affiliation of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League came up for discussion.²¹ Shafi was greatly respected on account of his long services and old affiliations with the leadership of the AIML. He and his friends were also closely connected with the Aligarh Movement through the All-India Muslim Educational Conference. Moreover Shafi League claimed to be more representative as it had established its branches in the eleven districts of the Province.²² As such Mian Fazal-i-Hussain had to dissolve his organisation. He agreed to serve as Joint Secretary of the newly affiliated Punjab Branch whose President was Shah Din and General Secretary was Mian Shafi.²³

On return from Aligarh, Mian Shafi struggled to broaden the base of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League (PPML). He toured all over the Punjab to establish branches in various districts. The result was quite positive. He circulated a report among various office-bearers of the organisation in 1908 informing that beside the increase in the district branches to sixteen, ten persons were added as members of the Executive Committee and another fifteen persons were put in the central association.²⁴ By May 1909 the number of League branches had arisen to nineteen.²⁵

Due to Shafi's sincere, devoted and untiring efforts PPML played an active role in all spheres of life. The PPML demanded separate representation for the Muslims in the Municipal and District Boards and Government services, representation in the Universities and Text Books Committee. The Muslim League desired that its opinion should be respected in matters such as legislation relating to the Land Settlement, right of the pre-emption and Muslim *Auqaf*, the poor state of Kashmiri Muslims, separation of Judiciary from the Executive and Muslim representation on the Viceroy's Executive Council.²⁶ He took keen interest in the Punjabi-Urdu controversy and set up a permanent committee under Secretaryship of Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1875—1938) for the protection of Urdu.²⁷

Issue of Separate Electorate

Indeed all these activities were very commendable but his efforts for securing separate electorate for his community were unforgettable. In the

summer of 1908 he received a telegramme from the Government of India inviting him to Simla for the consultation on the mode of representation. Only four Muslim leaders, including Muhammad Shafi were invited from all over India. All the other three leaders agreed to accept joint electorates for Civic and Legislative bodies in the proposed reform, but Muhammad Shafi refused to accept the idea without any hesitation.²⁸ On his return home, he wrote to a large number of Muslim leaders, including Agha Khan (1877—1957) and Syed Ameer Ali (1849—1928) in England, asking them to work hard to prevent the Hindu pressure on the British Government to agree to joint electorates. A large number of resolutions passed by the District and Provincial branches of the Provincial League in support of the separate electorates, according to his instructions and hundred of telegrammes and letters sent to Viceroy, to the Cabinet Ministers in London and to prominent members of different political parties in Great Britain. Every Muslim Organisation was approached, public meetings were conducted. Articles were written in newspapers and local and foreign well reputed periodicals. As such this issue, which was taken up by Mian Shafi initially, became a demand of the Muslim community of the whole India and consequently the Muslims succeeded in gaining the right of separate electorate which became the solid basis of the creation of Pakistan. It was admitted that the Punjab politicians like Muhammad Shafi and Shah Din contributed a great deal to get the Muslim demands reflected in the Minto-Morley Reform of 1909.²⁹ Indeed, he became an obstacle for every efforts in favour of joint electorates for the representation of the Muslims.

In 1913 Mian Shafi was invited to preside over the annual session of the AIML at Lucknow. It was done in recognition of his services to the cause of the Muslims. AIML adopted a historic creed³⁰ under the courageous leadership of Shafi in the said session.

His Opposition in the Party

Meanwhile the Punjab Provincial Muslim League moved a resolution against Sharif of Macca for his revolt against the Sultan of Turkey. Shafi tried his best to prevent the resolution but did not succeed and as such he was strongly opposed by the Provincial League :

An open letter to Mian Muhammad Shafi appeared in the *Zamindar* attacking the policy and working of the Provincial League. When the policy of the All-India Muslim League took another turn towards the left,

the cleavage between the two became too obvious to be ignored. The *Observer* and the *Zamindar* criticised him for his loyalty to the British Government at all costs.³¹

The Quaid-i-Azam (1876—1948) who joined the League in 1913, known as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, sought to devise ways and means for the growth of inter-communal harmony. Muslim opinion, during the Annual Session of the AIML in 1913, was divided on this point. Maulana Mohammad Ali (1878-1931), Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), Fazal-i-Hussain (1876—1948) and Abul Kalam Azad (1888—1958) wanted to cooperate with the Indian National Congress while the second group which included Muhammad Shafi, Maulvi Rafi-ud-Din (1865—1954), Abdul Aziz (1872—1970) and Syed Raza Ali stood for the preservation of Muslim rights, pure and simple, without alienating the sympathies of the British Government.³²

Those who stood for the Hindu-Muslim unity, held a meeting in the Barkat Ali Muhammadon Hall Lahore in January 1916, and denounced Shafi's leadership and announced the formation of a new Punjab Muslim League.³³ Shafi organised a separate meeting and asserted that their Punjab Muslim League was the real and sole representative of the Muslims of the Punjab. The conflict was taken to the Central Party which demanded explanation from the Shafi-led Punjab Muslim League on some charges.³⁴

An enquiry was held into these allegations. Shafi refuted these allegations and issued counter charges against the parent body for unconstitutional act. The issue came up before the League Session of December 28, 1916. The AIML disaffiliated the old Provincial League and removed Shafi from the Vice-President of the AIML. Meanwhile Lucknow Pact (December 1916) was signed. Shafi disagreed with the provisions of the Lucknow Pact³⁵ particularly the surrender of Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal. In August 1917, Shafi resigned from his membership of the All-India Muslim League and in cooperation with Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana (1876—1944) set up a new organisation called Punjab Muslim Association which also drew strength from some Bengali Muslims.³⁶

Shafi's resignation was an irreparable loss to the Punjab Muslim League. He was an astute politician, untiring advocate for the protection of the Muslim interests and fearless representative of the Muslims of the sub-continent.

Analysis of the tenure of League under Mian Shafi indicates that the Provincial and District branches were conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the party constitution. Important personalities and groups of the Muslim Society in the Punjab took keen interest in the activities of the organisation. The League discussed all important and current issues relating to the Muslim Community of the Punjab as well as of the whole sub-continent.³⁷

Shafi's re-joining of the League

After the resignation of Shafi, Fazal-i-Hussain also resigned from the Punjab Provincial Muslim League in October, 1920 due to the Provincial League's participation in non-cooperation programme on *Khilafat* issue.³⁸ The resignations of Shafi and Fazal were a big loss to the Punjab League and as a result League became a dead party in the Provincial politics.

However, in 1924, after its long inactiveness, the Punjab Muslim League decided to reactivate itself. Mian Shafi was elected its President. He also decided to revive the All-India Muslim League which was also inactive due to the activities of *Khilafat* Committee. Invitations were issued for its session held on May 25-26, 1924 and was presided over by Muhammad Ali Jinnah.³⁹ Important resolutions⁴⁰ were passed at this session. It was the beginning of a new phase in the Muslim struggle for the next ten years. Shafi was one of them who helped to create the fresh zeal in the Muslim League.

On March 20, 1927 thirty Muslim Leaders at a meeting in the Western Hotel Delhi put forward famous Delhi proposals.⁴¹ Mian Shafi was one of the participants.⁴² On his return to Lahore, he announced that the Muslims would not forego separate electorates.⁴³ At the same time, he differed with the policy of AIML about non-cooperation with Simon Commission.⁴⁴ He offered his cooperation with the Commission, because he wanted to utilize that opportunity for putting forward the Muslim's demands before the Commission. At that time his League was called Shafi League. On all India level, he acted as President of All-India Muslim League. The main cause of this conflict, indeed, was the mode of representation. He was not ready to forego the right of separate electorates for his community not only in Punjab but also on all India level. Ch. Khaliq-uz-Zaman, a contemporary politician wrote in his book, *Pathway to Pakistan*, that :

Sir Muhammad Shafi was a staunch supporter of separate electorates and to my mind, the only leader who throughout his career never wavered his faith in the utility of that system.⁴⁵

Both factions, the Shafi League and Jinnah League, claimed to be the real Muslim League and representative of the Indian Muslims. The gulf between the two widened with the passage of time and as a result the differences between the two could not be abridged. The Jinnah League decided to boycott the Simon Commission and attended Congress-convened Calcutta National Convention.⁴⁶ But Jinnah League could not persuade the convention to modify the Nehru Report⁴⁷ to meet the Muslim demands. In view of that political situation Shafi League sponsored an All-Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi on December 31, 1928 and in January, 1929 under the Presidentship of H. H. Agha Khan.⁴⁸ The Conference passed a comprehensive resolution. The annual session of the AIML was convened under the Presidentship of Muhammad Shafi at Lahore in 1928.⁴⁹ Soon Muhammad Shafi realized the harmful effects of the bifurcation of the AIML. So he met Quaid-i-Azam and showed his desire to rejoin the League. Quaid-i-Azam invited him whole heartedly in the meeting of the AIML Council on February 28, 1930. He was elected as the President of AIML in 1931 in the meeting of the Council of AIML on March 15, 1931.⁵⁰ It was the recognition of his great services for his nation.

Other Services

Muhammad Shafi served as a member of the Punjab Provincial and the Imperial Councils for a number of years. He was nominated to the Provincial Council for the first time in 1909. He was renominated in 1910 and again 1912. In December 1911, he was elected as a representative of the Province to the Imperial Legislative Council. In 1914 he was relected to the Council by the non-official members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Three years later, he was nominated as a representative of the Muslims of the Punjab.⁵¹ He proved himself as a bold and true representative of his people. He played a prominent role in the proceedings of both the Provincial and Imperial Councils. He held moderate and solid views and his observations were mature. His opinions were valued both by the Government and Public figures. He opposed the Government over a number of issues. He strongly criticised both the Rowlat Acts (1919) and Sir Michael O'Dwyers repressive administration in the Punjab.⁵² He was elected as President of the Punjab Chief Court Bar

Association in 1917 and was offered the Judgeship of the Madras High Court and Punjab Chief Court in 1912 and 1918 respectively. It was the recognition of his valuable services, legal skill and honesty that he was honoured by these offers.

The Muslim League was reconvened on New Year's Day in 1916 in Bombay. In the meeting a resolution was unanimously carried to appoint a special committee 'to formulate and frame a scheme of reforms' in consultation with other 'political' organisations—the two parties of Congress which would allow them to 'demand a single platform of reforms' in the name of United India.⁵³ That resolution was approved with a loud applause. As such a committee of seventy-one members of the Muslim League was appointed, representing every province of the British India and chaired by Jinnah's close friend Raja Sir Muhammad Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur, the Raja of Mehmoodabad (1879—1931). Committee members from Bombay, included Aga Khan (1877—1965) and Quaid-i-Azam; those from the Punjab were led by Mian Sir Muhammad Shafi (1869—1932) and Mian Sir Fazal-i-Hussain (1877—1936) while the Bengal contingent had A.K. Fazlul Haq (1893—1962) in its ranks.⁵⁴

Lord Reading appointed Reforms Inquiry Committee,⁵⁵ chaired by Home Member Sir Alexander Muddiman. Quaid-i-Azam served on that committee with four other Indians; Madras, Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer (1864 — 1964), President of the National Liberal Federation; Poona, Educator Dr. R.P. Paranjpye (1877—1969); Allahabad's Barrister Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875—1949); and the Punjab's Sir Muhammad Shafi, Law Member of the Government of India.⁵⁶

His Role in Round Table Conference

When the first conference opened on November 12, 1930 it was soon turned into an arena of debate on the Hindu-Muslim problem. Quaid-i-Azam directed Muhammad Shafi to assume most of the responsibility for advocating the Muslim position and negotiating with other parties. Although the Muslims had elected Aga Khan as their formal leader, but Muhammad Shafi served as un-official deputy leader.⁵⁷ The work of the Conference was assigned to sub-committees. Quaid-i-Azam and Muhammad Shafi were both members of the Committee which was meant to study federalism. In the Committee Muhammad Shafi, speaking for the Muslims, said he would participate in the

discussion but would not support the final recommendations unless the minorities issue was satisfactorily resolved. Quaid-i-Azam supported him saying that there was no use in framing a constitution which would be rejected by the seven crore Muslims of India.⁵⁸

The Second Round Table Conference began in the last week of September, 1931. Mr. Gandhi was the most notable person at the Conference. He showed great concern on the issue of minorities but he was not honest and was not prepared to go further than the Congress formula⁵⁹ adopted in Karachi. This formula and the Muslim position were poles apart. Tired of Mr. Gandhi's procrastinating tactics and his repeated insistence on the Congress formula, Muhammad Shafi, made a bid to break the impasse, and after talking to representatives of other minorities, submitted a formula to the Prime Minister on November 2, 1931. But the Hindus and the Sikhs did not agree to it. As a result all the parties gave the Prime Minister a mandate to do whatever he deemed proper as arbitrator. This proposal came from Muhammad Shafi :

1. The Muslims should be given 49 per cent of the total membership of the Punjab Legislature through Separate Electorates and there should be certain joint interests so that overall Muslims would gain 51 per cent of the membership.
2. In Bengal the Muslims should have 48 per cent in the membership through Separate Electorates and the opportunity to gain a majority through Joint Electorates for special interests.
3. In the provinces where the Muslims were in a minority their representation should continue to be that fixed in the Lucknow Pact on the basis of Separate Electorates.⁶⁰

He left London before the conclusion of the second session in response to urgent appeals from his aged mother, who was seriously ill, to her only son. He could not attend the third conference because a few weeks later it was announced that he was returning to the Viceroy's Executive Council to act for Mian Fazal-i-Hussain during his brief deputation to South Africa for revision of the agreement regarding the rights of lawfully domiciled Indians.

Services for Muslim Education

In the opinion of Mian Shafi the cause of the Muslim's backwardness was illiteracy. He mentioned it in many of his speeches. Eversince his return from England he had been taking an active part in the meetings of the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference and had presided a number of its sectional committees. In 1898 he had been elected as a Trustee of the Aligarh College. He was elected General Secretary of the Punjab branch of the All-India Muslim University Association which collected a sum exceeding three lakhs, of which he himself contributed five thousand rupees. He had also been closely associated with the Punjab University and had been nominated its Fellow in 1897 which position he continued to hold throughout his non-official career.⁶¹ Hence when the well known leaders of the Muhammadans Community of the sub-continent decided to lay the foundation stone of the Aligarh University, Mian Shafi became its strong supporter. A session of Muslim Educational Conference was held at Lahore. Mian Shafi undertook the responsibility of its organisation. Most of the leaders stayed at Shafi's residence 'Iqbal Manzil'. The ladies, on the instruction of Mian Shafi, contacted the well known ladies of the Province. Agha Khan was much impressed by the efforts of Mian Shafi. Devotion for nation, resemblance of ideas and the unusual interest in the development of education provided them political friendship. Agha Khan attached much importance to Shafi's political ideas. Both of them emphasised the pursuit of higher objectives. They were the supporter of the Muslim's right of separate electorate. Alongwith the struggle for independence they tried to defend Muslims' interests. This harmony of thoughts brought the two great men together for the historic role which they played. Owing to his services Mian Shafi was elected as the President of Bar Association in 1917.

As a member of Education in Viceroy's Executive Council, a committee was designed to inquire into the incident of Jalianwala Bagh tragedy (1919). Mian Shafi bravely alleged the British Government to be responsible for the unpleasant incident. He criticized its false policy and unwise steps. Shafi's criticism on Government proved his boldness. At that time Sir Ali Imam's (1869—1932) term in Viceroy's Executive Council had ended and he was replaced by Sir Sankaran Nayar (1857 — 1934). But his differences with the Viceroy were so deep that there were news of his resignation. Mian Shafi was a hot favourite to take his place as he was the most competent lawyer of the

North West. His anti-government statement darkened his chances of being included in the council. But the government realized the objective and human aspect of his statement, and he was taken as the member of Viceroy's Executive Council in July, 1919. As Member of Education Mian Shafi enjoyed this post for two years, during which he made constructive policies and got them implemented. Muhammad Shafi rendered a yeoman's service's to the cause of Education during his tenure as the Education Member. Amongst his services were the removal of restrictions in imparting religious education in government schools and colleges and the revision of Government's policy in favour of rapid development of Primary education. He was also responsible for putting into effect the recommendations of the Saddar Commission, as a result of which, teaching and residential Universities were established at Dacca, Rangoon, Lucknow, Aligarh, Delhi and Nagpur.⁶² Not only Muslim University Bill was presented in his tenure but also he appointed Raja Sahib Mahmoodabad (1877—1931) as the first Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh University. For the development of education, the employment of the educated youngman was very necessary. To meet this need he had to fight a battle in the council for the employment of the Indian on important posts in Education, Medical and self-government departments. He also sanctioned the approval for the scholarship for the higher education of women. In this connection first scholarship was offered to Mehmooda Begum from Central Province.

As a Councillor of the Muslim *Ummah*

Mian Shafi's services were not confined to the Muslims of India. He deeply observed the problem of the Muslim World. In the Turk-Greek dispute he openly favoured the Turks. He warned the British Government to take into account the sentiments of the Indian Muslims while taking any decision about Turkey.⁶³ It signifies Mian Shafi's attachment to the Muslim World although he was the man of the Government which was at the back of Greeks and desired nothing less than Turk's destruction.

As soon as Mian Shafi learnt President Wilson's Plan to cut away Constantinople from Turkey and to include Adrianople in Bulgaria, he became worried. He warned the Indian Government of the ensuing consequences of the proposals. It was due to his efforts that the Government of the British India forcefully opposed this proposal. It was clearly understood by the British Government that they would assume sympathetic attitude towards Turkey if

they wanted to save their rule in India. Obviously it was the fruit of Mian Shafi's consecutive meetings with the Viceroy and other European members of the Council that the proposals of the President Wilson of handing over of Constantinople to Greek was abandoned.⁶⁴

Muhammad Shafi is charged of supporting the Government against *Khilafat* Movement which was the greatest Muslim movement of the sub-continent. But actually he was not afraid of the Government. He knew very well that great Britain was not the sole authority in that respect. Its Allies and especially United States of America were to decide the future of Turkey. He held meetings with the leaders of the movement and tried to convince them not to lose the sympathies of the British Government by raising an agitation. At this stage, without any hesitation, it may be said that Shafi's decision was quite correct. The agency of the *Khilafat* was not a issue between the Muslims of the sub-continent and the Britishers. Many other powers, i.e., the Turks and the Allied forces were more closely involved. In that situation any disobedience movement was not bound to produce any result except loss of property and human life. That was why Quaid-i-Azam also kept aloof from this movement.

Mian Shafi and Ilm-ud-Din Case

The damned book *Rangila Rasool* was published⁶⁵ by Raj Pal in response to which Ilm-ud-Din murdered him. He was prosecuted and hanged. As a result the whole Lahore turned into a volcano. The Muslims decided to bury the dead body of the martyr with full honour. But the government did not want the Muslims to do so. There were great chances of an extreme violence all over India. In this situation Muhammad Shafi asked the Governor to accept the rightful demand of the Muslims otherwise there was a fear that violence might occur which could lead to the loss of life in thousands. The Governor agreed to hand over the dead body only on the guarantee of Muhammad Shafi that there would be no violence. Muhammad Shafi undertook this responsibility and the Muslims of the Punjab never dishonoured him. More than one lakh people offered *Janaza* prayer peacefully. They controlled their emotions to ensure the words of their great leader—Mian Muhammad Shafi. No doubt it was the fruit of Mian Shafi's affection for the Muslim Nation which he had made object of his life for the past forty years. This account of Shafi's activities makes it evident that he helped his nation when it was passing through the most explosive period of its history, especially in the Punjab, the Muslims were in

miserable condition although they were more than the half of the whole population of the province.

Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, in an interview, said that he was advocate of Ghazi IIm-ud-Din Shaheed. He wept during hearing, when he described the dignity of Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) and as a result the hearing was also affected and the proceedings of the court stoped.⁶⁶ He also said that Muhammad Shafi was welwisher of the poor. He provided food daily to them but it was never publicised.

In short, it may be said that Muhammad Shafi was a pioneer of Muslims awakening in the sub-continent. He was one of them who spent his life for the Muslim cause, devoted all abilities and utilized all sources for the welfare of his community. No doubt he was one of them who laid the foundation stone of the progress of the Muslims. He saw the results of the so many history-making events. His policies and steps produced ever lasting positive results for the Muslims. His name and services will gain more recognition with the passage of time as he was not only the champion of the rights of the Muslim community of India but also he was a supporter of the Muslim *Ummah* all over the world.

It may be noticed that the Muslims of India before 1947, when Pakistan was brought into existence, fought for their rights. At the same time, they kept alive their interest in the affairs of the Muslims all the world over. Mian Shafi was one of those eminent political figures who served the cause of the Muslims in India before 1947 as well as the Muslims everywhere. Such eminent persons have become a part of the Muslim history and they are remembered as such.

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2. When a Hindu moneylender of Baghbanpura was nearing death, leaving a young son behind him, he asked Din Muhammad to act as the guardian of the boy, who was inheriting a great deal of money and property. he trusted Mian Din Muhammad more than any of his well-know co-religionists and the boy was brought up like a near relation. The name of the boy was Ray Bahadur Barkat Ram.
4. *Ibid.*, p.2.

5. Ikram, S. M., *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1977, p.217.
6. Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, *op.cit.*, p.2.
7. *Ibid.*, p.3.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Muhammad Khurshid, *The Role of Unionist Party in Punjab Politics 1923—1936*, Ph. D. Thesis, (un-published), Islamia University, Bahawalpur, 1993, p.299.
10. Malik, Ikram Ali, *A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab 1799—1947*, Lahore, 1985, p.547.
11. Ahmad, M. Saleem, *All India Muslim League : From the late Nineteenth Century to 1919*, Bahawalpur, 1989, p.56.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 233. The deputation consisted of thirty-five members out of which the following belonged to the Punjab :
 Hon'ble Malik Umar Hayat Khan, CIE, Lieutenant, 19th Prince of Wales, Tiwana Lancers, Tiwana, Dist. Shahpur; Hon'ble Khan Bahadar Muhammad Shah Din Barrister-at-Law, Lahore; Khan Bahdur Khawaja Yusuf Shah, Barrister-at-Law, Amritsar; Khan Bahadar Mian Muhammad Shafi, Barrister-at-Law, Lahore; Khan Bahadar Shaikh Ghulam Sadiq, Amritsar; Maulvi Hafiz Hakim Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Hazik-ul-Mulk, Delhi; Khalifa Syed Muhammad Hussain, Mushir-ud-Daula Mumtaz-ul-Mulk, Patiala; and Abdul Majid Khan, Colonel, Foreign Minister, Patiala.
13. Syed Razi Wasti, *Lord Minto and Indian Nationalist Movement 1905—1910*, Lahore, 1964, p.69.
14. Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League*, Lahore, 1979, p.48.
15. *Paisa Akhbar*, October 23, 1906.
16. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Lahore, 1976, p.101.
17. *Freedom Movement Archives*, (FMA), Vol. 56.
18. "His claim was quite right because the first meeting of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League was attended by twenty-three delegates from Lahore and twenty-nine from the mofussil associations. Another thirteen delegates had telegraphed their support for the object of the meeting." Mati-ur-Rehman, *From Consultation to Confrontation*, London, (n.d.), p.73.
19. Azim Hussain, *Sir Fazal-i-Hussain*, Bombay, 1946, p.96.
20. Muhammad Khurshid, *op.cit.*, p.68.
21. Lal Bahadur, *op.cit.*, p.73.
22. "Mr. Shafi to Nawab Vigar-ul-Mulk, March 26, 1908," *Freedom Movement Archives*, (FMA), Vol. 56, p.5.
23. Muhammad Asif Rizvi, *Punjab Provincial Muslim League 1936-1947*, Ph.D. Thesis, (un-published), Islamia University, Bahawalpur, pp.16-17.
24. *Freedom Movement Archives*, (FMA), Vol. 56.

25. Ibid.
26. *Paiza Akhbar*, Lahore, October 15, 1909.
27. Ibid.
28. Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, *op.cit.*, p.31. Jahan Ara did not mention other three names while other contemporary sources are also silent in this matter.
29. Azim Hussain, *op.cit.*, p.98; Muhammad Khurshid, *op.cit.*, p.68.
30. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, January 3, 1913. The creed was follows :
 "Attainment, under the segis of the British Crown, of a system of self-government suitable to India, through constitutional means by brining about, amongst others, a steady reform of the existing system of administration, by promoting National Unity, by fostering public spirit among the people of India and by cooperation with other communities for the said purpose. M. Saleem Ahmad, *All India Muslim League*, Bahawalpur, 1989, p.142.
31. Azim Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 100.
32. Muhammad Khurshid, *op.cit.*, p. 69.
33. Azim Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 100.
34. The Central Party demanded explanation from the Shafi-led Punjab Muslim League on the following charges :
 1. That constitutionally no Muslim League exists in the Province of Punjab.
 2. That the existing League either does not at all represent the sentiments and aspirations of the Muslims of the Punjab or, at any rate is wholly unresponsive to the progressive instincts of the Muslims of that province.
 3. That it has openly as well as impliedly thwarted several actions and resolutions of All-India Muslim League and the development of its constitutional aims and policy.
 4. That the Punjab Muslim League^o has not only never helped towards the expansion of the All-India Muslim League by giving it new members but that on the contrary, it has checked such expansion whenever moved by the Council.
 5. That it is claimed on behalf of the new League established in the Punjab that the League represents the true interests and aspirations of the Muslim public of that province. Azim Hussain, *op.cit.*, pp. 100 - 101.
35. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power of India*, (n.d.), pp. 14 - 15.
36. Azim Hussain, *op.cit.*, p. 102.
37. Malik, Ikram Ali, *op.cit.*, pp.273 - 274.
38. Azim Hussain, *op.cit.*, p.106.
39. G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement Historic Documents*, Lahore, 1977, pp. 54 - 57.
40. *Ibid.*, pp.53 - 58.

41. *The Indian Annual Register*, Calcutta, 1st half of 1927, p.4.

42. Other prominent members were as follows :

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah; Sir Muhammad Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur Raja Sahib Mahmoodabad; Maulana Muhammad Ali; Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansair; Sir Muhammad Yaqoob; Maulvi Shafi Daoudi; Nawab Ismail Khan; Mian Shah Nawaz; Sir Abdul Rahim; Sardar Muhammad Nawaz Khan; Abdul Mateen Chowdhry; Sir Abdul Aziz; Dr. L.K. Haider; Dr. Sir Abdullah Haroon Suhrawardi; Maulvi Syed Murtaza; Syed Al-e-Nabi; Shah Muhammad Zubair. Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, *Iqbal kay Akhri Do Saal*, Lahore, 1978. p. 206. Noor wrote two other names; Mufti Kifayat Ullah and Ali Imam. Syed Noor Ahmad, *Martial Law say Martial Law tak*, Lahore, (n.d.), p. 80.

43. Carnig Baxter, *From Martial Law to Martial Law*, Lahore, 1985, p.155.

44. The Statutory Commission, commonly referred to as the Simon Commission after its Chairman, Sir John Simon, consisted of Lord Burnham, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, Edward Cadogan, Stephen Walsh, Richard Lane-Fox and C.R. Antlee. Later Walsh resigned and was replaced by Vernon Hartshorn. The Commission visited India in February-March 1928 and again in October 1928, April 1929.

Indian reaction to the appointment of the Commission was mixed. The Indian Legislative Assembly resolved to boycott it, while the Council of State decided to extend cooperation. The Congress was in favour of unqualified boycott of the Commission. But the National Liberal Federation, the Scheduled Caste Federation, the Indian Christians, the Parsees and other small minorities decided to work with it. The Muslim League was of two minds. One wing, led by Quaid-i-Azam, sided with the Congress and the other led by Sir Muhammad Shafi, opted for cooperation. One of the Commissioner, Sir Edward Cadogan, later recorded that Muslims and untouchables cooperated out of an intense suspicion of the Brahmin; Muslims, in particular were ready to cooperate in anything provided they received assurance of security from Hindu domination. Ishaq Hussain, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi, 1965, p.57.

45. Khaliq-uz-Zaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, pp. 115-116.

46. At the all parties national convention held in Calcutta, in December 1928, to consider the Nehru Report, Quaid-i-Azam proposed three main amendments; one third representation for the Muslims in the central legislature, Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal on the basis of population for ten years, and residuary powers for the provinces and not for the central government. These amendments show, writes Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, "That the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims was not in any way wide one. Yet there was no desire to bridge the same." All three amendments, when put to vote, were rejected by the Hindu majority. Muhammad Ali, *Zahoor-e-Pakistan*, Lahore, (n.d.), Karachi, p.36.

47. Hassan Riaz, *Pakistan Negotior Tha*, Karachi, (n.d.) pp.160 - 162.

48. Tufail Ahmad, *Mussalmano ka Roshan Mustaqbil*, Lahore, (n.d.), p.429.

49. Muhammad Ali op.cit., p. 365.

50. Wali Mazhar, op.cit., p. 359.

51. Malik, Ikram Ali, op.cit., p. 458.

52. Ibid.

53. Syed Sharif-ud-Din Firzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. I, Karachi, 1969, pp. 353 - 54.
54. Stanley, Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, New York, 1984, p. 40.
55. Lord Reading appointed Reforms Inquiry Committee, chaired by Home Member Sir Alexander Muddiman, Quaid-i-Azam served on that committee with four other Indians; Madras Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer (1884 — 1946), President of the National Liberal Federation; Poona Educator Dr. R. P. Paranjpye (1877 — 1959); Allahbad's Barrister Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875 — 1949); and the Punjab's Sir Muhammad Shafi, Law Member of the Government of India. The Committee soon came to be referred to among the elected members within the assembly as the Jinnah Committee. Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p.80.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 80 - 81.
57. Syed Noor Ahmad, *Iqbal kay Akhri Do Saal*, p. 127.
58. Craig Baxter, *op.cit.*, p. 91.
59. Tara Chand, *History of the Freedom Movement*, Vol. IV, (n.d.), pp. 164 - 65.
60. Craig Baxter, *op.cit.*, p.97.
61. Malik, Ikram Ali, *op.cit.*, pp. 548 - 49.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 549.
63. Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, *op.cit.*, p. 63.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Nijjar, *Punjab under the British Rule 1849 -1947*, Vol. II, p. 156. Another event which caused considerable tension in the Punjab was the cold blooded murder in broad daylight of Mohashey Rajpal, the author and publisher of the pamphlet *Rangila Rasool*.
It is a wrong statement because Rajpal was only a publisher. Baxter, *op.cit.*, p. 81 and Muhammad Ali, *op.cit.*, p. 367.
66. Waheed-ud-Din, *Anjuman*, Lahore, 1968, pp. 130 - 131.

Book Review

Prof. Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi,
Development Economics : A New Paradigm,
Sage Publishers, New Delhi, India, 1993,
Pages 208, Price Rs. 200.

Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, with his well-known innovative intellectual skills, has converted his Presidential Address at the Annual General Meeting of Pakistan Society of Development Economists into a succinct and stimulating book. With its publication Dr. Naqvi has placed students of development economics in his debt for a lucid and systematic treatment of a subject which mainstream economists regard as dying while the more knowledgeable ones, agreeing with Dr. Naqvi, see it as very much alive, though in need of revitalisation.

Development economics, as a new paradigm or a distinct sub-discipline of economics, is only half a century old. The end of Second World War saw the emergence of a new independent but underdeveloped world, with high expectations of quick prosperity. It was, however, soon discovered that mainstream economics was either neutral or unwilling to offer direct solution to the serious problems that developing economies faced, particularly the questions of alleviating widespread poverty and removing abominably high income and wealth inequalities. It is against this background that developmental themes attracted special attention of a large body of economists who not only tried to analyse such themes theoretically, with the help of existing as well as new economic postulates, but offered practical remedies to solve vital problems of under-development. In this way development economics emerged as, perhaps, the best example of how positive and normative themes could be synthesised.

However, the problems of development have proved to be too complicated and multi-dimensional to permit easy solution. Developing

countries are being weighed down by both external and internal pressures. Externally, increasing debt burdens, shrinking resource flows, deteriorating terms of trade, and rising protectionist trends are creating difficulties. Internally, demographic pressures, resource inadequacies, income inequalities, social inequities, unemployment, and downward trends in output are generating socio-economic instabilities.

Mainstream economists rely heavily on market forces for tackling the above-mentioned economic pressures. Development economists, on the other hand, lay stress on a judicious mixture of both market forces and government actions. Most developing countries, in their current distress, have turned towards market liberalisation, forgetting that their past failures and shared equally by market imperfections and government idiosyncracies. Further, even if markets become perfect, they cannot automatically lead to the alleviation of poverty. Markets are goal-neutral. On the other hand all developing countries even today talk of socio-economic goals and changes in property structure. No doubt some emergent countries around the Pacific Rim have lifted themselves up to a middle-income status but this is not due to the operation of market forces alone. A deeper look at their economic history shows that the visible hand of public sector was as much active as the invisible hand of market forces behind their success.

It is thus obvious that, as pointed out by Professor Naqvi in Chapter 7, the paradigmatic character of development economics consists of two basic elements, *its deeply ethical nature and its vision of a mixed economy*. However, a deeper digging into these elements is needed if development economists' prescriptions are to be of any use to the underdeveloped world. Professor Naqvi has himself identified many areas of weakness in the heritage of development economics. Some of these are: (i) too much growth expectation from savings rate, (ii) negligence of crucial role of technology, (iii) indifference towards human capital formation, (iv) underestimation of growth potentialities of agriculture, and (v) inadequate attention to the problems of equity and distributive justice. Professor Naqvi rightly expects development economists to pay more attention to the above problem areas and also to the questions of sectorial balance, demography, and labour markets.

One need not agree with all the conclusions drawn by Professor Naqvi but there can hardly be two opinions about the vital role of government in lifting up economically and socially those who are below or near the poverty

line. Market forces will never deliver the goods to the unprivileged classes, who still form the bulk of underdeveloped world. Education and health are among those areas where the operation of principles of pareto-optimality or profit maximisation can only play havoc with already fragile social framework.

However, the nature and character of governments in poor countries also need to be recast in functionally useful moulds. Most of such governments are corrupt, inefficient, politics-ridden and undemocratic. How can they effectively and decisively play the role which Dr. Naqvi expects from them? Like development economics there is perhaps the need for a new paradigm of *development politics*, with roots in mainstream political science. This does not mean that development economics has no case without development politics. Both are, however, closely interconnected. One has already acquired a valid territory of its own; the other has still to evolve and develop new dimensions which are well-founded in rational political analysis.

Although the entire book provides a fascinating and lively reading, its heart lies in Chapter 7, which along with the Author's crisply written Preface and Gamani Corea's lucid Foreword, covers almost all basic themes developed in the book. Professor Naqvi's style is refreshing and convincing, though at times he loves to use majestic jargons like for example, *etatisme*, *weltanschauung*, *dirigist* and *iconoclasm*. The greatest strength of the book lies in the survey of almost entire spectrum of literature dealing with development economics. From this angle, the book not only casts a highly critical and deeper look at the prevailing controversies but also contains useful ideas for those designing the course of lectures and identifying meaningful research themes in the area of development economics. It deserves to be read by a wide public, including decision-makers and professionals, for the controversial problems and policies that it does explore.

In the forthcoming decades the developing world is threatened by a large number of interconnected crises, notably population growth, unemployment and urban squalor, all of which are leading to a further widening of the gulf between the rich and the poor. If development economics has to remain in occupation of its paradigm, it will have to pay attention to them and other problems having direct bearing on human sufferings.

Waheed Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, The Nation's Voice Toward's Consolidation*, (Speeches and Statements, March 1935 — March 1940) Quaid-i-Azam Academy, Karachi, 1992, Price Rs. 750.

The role of Quaid-i-Azam in reawakening the Muslims of India and his efforts in reorganisation of the Muslim League, are vital subjects but have not been comprehended by the people abroad. Prof. C. H. Phillips observed that even in Britain the position was not any different. This volume, therefore, was planned to provide basic information on the formative phase of Pakistan's creation. The objective is to place before the reader the basic ideas in their original form with a view to illustrate the events which led the Muslim India to demand a separate homeland — Pakistan — in March 1940.

The vast material has been culled from different sources, newspapers, magazines and others. It is a work which required a great deal of labour and real devotion for presenting a correct, true and a moving picturesque based on the actual statements and speeches of Quaid-i-Azam.

The work began with the return of Quaid-i-Azam to India in 1935 from Britain. As early as that, Quaid-i-Azam boldly criticised the Secretary of State and the Governor-General as they were indifferent to the poor plight of the Indians. His services to the Muslim community concerning the Shaheed Ganj Mosque have been reproduced. These speeches and statements indicate Quaid-i-Azam's commitment to the concept of religious freedom and his stand for the right cause.

In 1935 it appears that Quaid was making his chief contribution in building the confidence among the Muslims. To begin with, he advised the Muslim students to "Acquire disciplined mind." He lamented that 80 million Muslims were asleep. In order to rekindle hope among the Muslims, he advised them to take an active part in the election of 1937. He asked the Muslim political leaders to carry his message to every home. At that time, the Muslims had fallen prey to the attractions of jobs and other allurements. The Quaid condemned these deserters from the Muslim League who were selling their loyalties for financial and other considerations. Quaid-i-Azam, therefore, emerges from this stand as one who adhered to principles firmly and abhorred those who violated these precepts.

Quaid-i-Azam soars high as a strong Muslim from this collection. He believed that Islam is a complete code of life. He was convinced that the Congress was out to establish Hindu Raj. This approach of the Congress gradually moved him towards two-nation theory which became the basis of Lahore Resolution of 1940.

Quaid-i-Azam declared openly that he was born as a Muslim and would die as a Muslim. This commitment made him to assert as early as February 1940 that the Muslims were not a minority but a nation in India. Therefore they were entitled to a separate homeland.

This is a valuable contribution and the volume contains the basic documents which are not easily accessible to even scholars. The general reader as well as the scholars are provided the necessary and vital information which indicates the different stages through which the struggle of the Muslims passed before it finally decided to put forward a demand for a separate homeland.

The purpose of the book is well served as it presents vast material to remove the misunderstanding which the Hindus created about the Muslim struggle for establishing Pakistan.

This is a commendable work. The second volume is intended to bring the historical narrative upto the creation of Pakistan. When that work will be printed it will give a fairly complete picture of political development which lasted for 12 years. The formation of idea of Pakistan and the actual struggle which ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan are the areas which merit appreciation of scholars especially from all those who are endeavouring to present the real picture of the Muslim struggle for the creation of Pakistan.

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Statements

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETS

Colombo, Sri Lanka : July 8-9, 1992

The Eleventh Session of the Council of Ministers took place in Colombo on July 8-9, 1992. The Meeting which was inaugurated at the BMICH Hall by the President of Sri Lanka, Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa, was attended by a large gathering of people from all walks of life. The President in his inaugural statement said "SAARC must overcome the unfortunate interplay of South Asian bilateral misunderstandings, and cooperation in SAARC will itself inspire confidence in bilateral relations." The Council of Ministers was preceded by the Programming Committee and Standing Committee.

Some of the important decisions taken by the Council of Ministers at this Session include :

- (a) Approval of the guidelines and procedures for adopting a more business like and functional approach in the conduct of SAARC Meetings and for rationalizing SAARC activities.
- (b) Approval of the recommendations of the Special Session of the Standing Committee regarding the guidelines and procedures for cooperation between SAARC and appropriate international and regional organisations.
- (c) Amalgamation of two Technical Committees, i.e., Telecommunications and Postal Services as a single Technical Committee on Communications from January 1, 1993.

- (d) The Committee on Environment will act as a permanent body with the status of a Technical Committee, subject to decisions pending on its future status in relation to other Technical Committees.
- (e) The Inter-Governmental Group (IGG) should proceed expeditiously to draft an agreement on a SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA).
- (f) The Committee on Economic Cooperation (CEC) at its next meeting should specify the 'appropriate steps', including the time-frame for the further improvement of transport infrastructure and transit facilities in the region, which would accelerate the growth of trade of Member States within and outside the region.
- (g) The Panel of Experts on South Asian Development Fund (SADF) to undertake a feasibility study to examine in greater depth precision and clarity, the possibilities of mobilizing global surpluses for regional development as envisage in the proposal of His Majesty the King of Bhutan.

The Council also noted that a meeting of the Speakers of Parliament of SAARC Countries had taken place in Colombo, at which a decision had been taken to establish an "Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians."

SAARC RECOGNITION TO NGOS

Colombo, Sri Lanka : July 1992

The Council of Ministers at its Eleventh Session at Colombo in July 1992 approved the guidelines and procedures recommended by the Special Session of the Standing Committee for granting recognition by SAARC to regional apex bodies.

It urged Member States to give due publicity at the national level to these guidelines and procedures and take all appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized entities using SAARC nomenclature and logo. In addition, the Council noted the decision of the Standing Committee to accord recognition to the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industries, subject to compliance by the Chamber with the guidelines and stipulated procedures within a period of

three month from the date of approval. The guidelines and procedures for SAARC recognition to NGOs are as follows :

Guidelines

- (i) The Organization seeking recognition shall consist exclusively of nationals of Member Countries and be based in the region. It should be a regional apex body with a minimum of four constituent units at the national level. These units should be of recognised national standing and be endorsed by the Ministries of Foreign/External Affairs of the Governments of their respective countries.
- (ii) The organization should be non-political and secular in character.
- (iii) The Organization shall be concerned with matters relevant to the process of promoting social, economic and cultural development of the region as envisaged in the SAARC Charter.
- (iv) The aims shall purposes of the Organisation shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the SAARC Charter.
- (v) The Organisation shall undertake to support the work of SAARC and to promote knowledge of its principles and activities.
- (vi) The Organisation shall have an established Headquarters with an Executive Officer. It shall have a constitution or similar constituent instrument, a copy of which shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of SAARC.

Procedures

- (i) The Organisation shall submit an application for recognition to the Secretary-General through the Ministry of Foreign/External Affairs of the country in which the headquarters of the Organisation is located. Such an application should be supported by the constitution or similar constituent instrument of the Organisation. The Secretary-General shall circulate the same to all Member States together with his recommendations whether the criteria set out in the guidelines have been met.

- (ii) The Committee after consideration of the applications shall take decisions thereon and report these decisions to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers for its information.

Once recognition is accorded to the Organisation, it would be authorised to use the SAARC nomenclature and the logo. They may then be permitted to present oral or written representations at appropriate levels of SAARC, upon prior arrangement with the Secretary General in consultation with the Chairman of the meeting concerned.

Recognition shall be accorded only to one apex organisation, in respect of each profession/discipline or activity.

MEETING OF EXPERTS ON SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM

Colombo, Sri Lanka : August 3-5, 1992

The Meeting of Experts to Advance Cooperation under the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka from August 3-5, 1992. The Meeting was chaired by Gen. S.C. Ranatunge, Secretary, Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka. All Member States participated in this meeting.

The Meeting noted that the Member States had already identified Focal Points and that they should nominate specific Liaison Officers as an initial step in the creation of an institutionalised structure to facilitate the effective exchange of information. The Meeting also noted that Liaison Officers should be empowered to rapidly transmit information relevant to the combating of terrorism to their counterparts in the region on a 'need to know' basis.

The suggestion to establish such a unit to assist the work of the Liaison Officers was discussed. Sri Lanka offered to host such a Unit.

The Meeting also discussed ways and means towards strengthening travel control/surveillance measures among Member States. Training in counter-terrorism within the region was also highlighted during the discussions. India offered training facilities to Member States.

GROUP OF EXPERTS ON JOINT VENTURES IN HANDICRAFTS AND COTTAGE INDUSTRIES

New Delhi, India : August 18-19, 1992

The Fifth SAARC Summit held in Male', Maldives, emphasised the need for evolving measures for establishing joint ventures in the field of cottage industries and handicrafts to set a stage for promoting collective self-reliance in the region. In pursuance of this decision, the first meeting of the Group of Experts was held in Islamabad on May 8-9, 1991, which identified broad areas of cooperation in this regard.

The Second Meeting of the Group of Experts was held in New Delhi on 18-19 August 1992 under the chairmanship of Mr. S.B. Mohapatra, leader of the Indian delegation. The Meeting was opened with a statement by Mr. S.L. Kapur, Secretary, Department at Small Scale Industries & Agro and Rural Industries, Ministry of Industry, Government of India. Dr. J.S. Juneja, Chairman, NSIC, India and Mr. R.M. Roy, Director, SAARC Secretariat also made a brief statement emphasizing the crucial importance of cottage industries and handicrafts in economic development.

The Group agreed that immediate attention should be focussed on the following important products on a priority basis (i) hand knotted carpets; (ii) handloom textile products (including embroidery); (iii) leather products including leather garments; (iv) wooden handicrafts (v) bee-keeping and honey production; (vi) pottery and ceramic products.

The Group held detailed deliberation on the following areas: (a) marketing and export promotion; (b) design development (c) procurement and supply of certain raw material (d) skill upgradation and transfer of technology and (e) entrepreneurship development. They put forward action-oriented recommendations to promote cooperation in this sector in the region. These included joint exhibition of products within and outside the region, workshops, seminars, training programmes and fellowship, etc., in the field of marketing, design development, skill upgradation and entrepreneurship development.

TC ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT**Male', Maldives : August 25-26, 1992**

The Seventh Meeting of Technical Committee on Women in Development met in Male' on 25-26 August 1992. It was inaugurated by Mr. Abdul Rasheed Hussain, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. All Member States, except Bhutan, participated. SAARC Secretariat was represented by Mr. Ahmed Saleem, Director.

In his address, Minister Rasheed said that "if women's contribution to development is paramount, then we have to very carefully analyse the women's social as well as economic status in her society, and if she does not have an equal standing in comparison to her male counterpart, then every effort must be made to provide her the potential and the opportunity needed to uplift her status." He added that for this change to occur in the women's status, SAARC governments have to commit themselves strongly to this cause. He also emphasised that Maldives was making progressive efforts in this direction.

The Committee discussed and reviewed the status of the National Plans of Action for women in Member States and noted that adequate progress had been made by most countries. It agreed that the next Chairperson of the Committee would formulate the draft format for a Regional Plan of Action on Women and circulate it to Member States for discussion during the Eighth Meeting of the Technical Committee.

The Committee also noted with satisfaction that two Member States, Maldives and Nepal, had already circulated their National Plans of Action for the observance of "1991-2000 AD as SAARC Decade of the Girl Child," and other Member States would soon circulate same. The Committee updated the calendar of activities for the year 1992 and proposed activities for 1993.

**INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP (IGG) ON
TRADE LIBERALISATION****Kathmandu, Nepal : September 8-10, 1992**

The IGG held its second meeting in Kathmandu on 8-10 September 1992 under the Chairmanship of Mr. P. R. Goutam, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, His Majesty's Government of Nepal. All Member States and a

representative of the SAARC Secretariat, Mr. R. M. Roy, Director, participated in the meeting.

The IGG discussed in great detail a draft Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), which was circulated by the host country. It also discussed the Rules of Origin as well as special measures in favour of the Least Developed Member Countries.

At the end of the deliberations, they agreed upon a framework Agreement which provides for removal of trade barriers in the region through a step-by-step approach. At the initial stage, Member States will exchange trade concessions at the tariff level on a product-by-product basis. It provides for special treatment for the least developed Contracting States and safeguard measures to protect interests of Member States in certain exceptional circumstances.

GATHERING OF YOUNG AMBASSADORS (GIRLS) OF SAARC COUNTRIES

India : 30 August to 9 September 1992

One of the activities under the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture, the gathering of the Young Ambassadors (Girls) was held in India from 30 August to 9 September 1992, with the participation of representatives from all Member States.

The objectives of the activity were (i) to bring students and teachers of SAARC Member States together to study and understand the contributions made by each country in the cultural development of the region; and (ii) to inspire in students an appreciation for the need to protect and conserve their natural and cultural property.

The programme consisting of 5/6 school girls of the age group 14-18 years from each Member State accompanied by respective teachers participated on selected cultural activities and exchange of information. The programme also included visits to important historical monuments and museums in Delhi, Agra and Jaipur and discussions on relevant subjects and cultural performances.

IGG MEETING ON TRADE LIBERALISATION

Kathmandu, Nepal : September 8-10, 1992

The second meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Trade Liberalisation (IGG) met in Kathmandu from 8-10 September 1992. Mr. P. R. Goutam, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, His Majesty's Government of Nepal was elected Chairman of the meeting.

The Council of Ministers at its Eleventh Session held in Colombo in July 1992 had earlier directed that the IGG on Trade Liberalisation should proceed expeditiously to draft an Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and submit it to the next meeting of the Committee on Economic cooperation. The main substantive agenda before the IGG was to draft an Agreement on SAPTA. Nepal had circulated a draft Agreement for consideration by IGG. After in-depth and prolonged deliberations, the Group finalized the Draft Agreement unanimously.

SAPTA is expected to be a dynamic instrument of trade liberalisation and expansion of intra-regional trade. The draft Agreement envisages exchange of trade preferences among SAARC Member States at tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff levels. At the initial stage, however, the trade concessions will be for tariff reduction on product-by-product basis. It also envisages a step-by-step approach for reduction of trade barriers among Member States.

The draft Agreement will be submitted to the Committee on Economic Cooperation for their consideration. A more decisive action, however, will be taken on this draft during the meeting.

MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN

Colombo, Sri Lanka : September 16-18, 1992

The Sixth SAARC Summit in Colombo welcomed the offer of Sri Lanka to host a Conference on Children in South Asia in 1992. In pursuance of that decision in 3-day Ministerial Conference was held in Colombo on 16-18 September, 1992 with the cooperation and support of UNICEF.

The Conference adopted a 32-clause final document called 'Colombo Resolution on Children,' which set 11 specific goals and a time frame for their

achievement. These goals ranged from primary education, child and mother health, disease control, nutrition and children's rights. This important Conference which was preceded by a Preparatory Meeting in Colombo in July this year, was inaugurated by President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka. His inaugural address was preceded by an address by Mr. James P. Grant, Executive Director of UNICEF.

High-level delegations from all member states were led by Ministers and composed of Parliamentarians, officials from different disciplines relevant to the Conference themes, NGOs and voluntary workers.

Following country statements by leader of delegations, the Plenary Session constituted Working Groups for the seven Conference themes listed below :

1. Child survival and Safe Motherhood which includes the Small Family.
2. Mother and Child Nutrition.
3. Basic Education.
4. Safe Water, Sanitation and the Environment.
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
6. *Socio-Political Strategy to achieve the Goals for Children and their development/people's participation.
7. Poverty Reduction and Economic Base for the Family. The final report of the Conference entitled "Colombo Resolution on Children" which reaffirmed the Member States commitment to the objectives and goals envisaged in their National Plans of Action (NPAs) drawn up within the over all framework of the World Declaration on Children. The Member States pledged to cooperate with each other in the region for the survival, development and protection of the South Asian Child. The Resolution also urged that the NPAs be reinforced in a regional perspective by taking into consideration a set of 12 illustrative goals in order to accelerate progress towards the achievement of the seven major as well as the supportive goals.

The Resolution which will be placed before the forthcoming Seventh Summit in Dhaka for endorsement maintains that the tasks were selected as regional concerns in order to catalyse and accelerate progress towards achievement of the welfare of children. The resolution also says the goals set are achievable and the strategies for achieving them should form an integral part of the total development strategy which, the Resolution envisages includes the devolution of power to local government bodies, increasing the proportion of resources allocated to human development, reduction of poverty and organising and empowering communities to meet basic needs.

The Conference was chaired by Mr. Bradman Weerakoon, Adviser to the Sri Lankan President on international affairs. The Secretariat was represented by Secretary General, Mr. I. H. Zaki, who delivered the vote of thanks and Mr. Humayun A. Kamal, Director.

ESCAPE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MEETS ZAKI

Kathmandu, Nepal : September 24, 1992

The Executive Secretary of ESCAPE, Mr. Rafiuddin Ahmed who was in Nepal on a four-day official visit met SAARC Secretary-General Mr. I. H. Zaki at the SAARC Secretariat on 24 September 1992 and discussed matters of mutual interest.

It may be recalled that the Standing Committee at its First Special Session in Colombo in April this year, while considering the question of cooperation between SAARC and appropriate international and regional organisations, recommended that in pursuing SAARC activities in the core economic areas, the Association should consider the benefits and advantages of enhanced cooperation with the United Nations and its bodies in any such activities as a means of supplementing regional resources.

SAARC CHAIRMAN VISITS THE SECRETARIAT

Kathmandu, Nepal : September 25, 1992

President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka, current Chairman of SAARC, accompanied by Madam Premadasa, visited the SAARC Secretariat

on September 25, 1992. The President was in Nepal on the first leg of his tour of SAARC capitals for consultation with his counterparts.

The President and Madam were received at the Secretariat by the Secretary-General, Mr. I. H. Zaki and Directors who accorded them a very warm welcome. During the visit, the President and Madam inspected the Secretariat including the Library and were introduced to the other senior members of staff.

FIRST SOUTH ASIAN FESTIVAL OF SAARC COUNTRIES

Islamabad, Pakistan : October 9-24, 1992

The leaders of SAARC countries at the Islamabad Summit welcomed the idea of holding South Asian Festivals from time to time and accepted the offer of India to host such a Festival. Accordingly, India hosted the 'First South Asian Festival of SAARC Countries' over a two-week period from 9 to 24 October 1992. The Festival was planned in the spirit of SAARC, as a people to people event, aimed at enhancing the interaction and strengthening the affinities among the peoples of SAARC countries.

It was inaugurated by Shri Narasimha Rao, Prime Minister of India on 9th October 1992 in New Delhi. The delegates from each SAARC country were led by senior Ministers from their respective Governments dealing with cultural matters. After the inaugural events in New Delhi from 9 to 11 October, about 300 participants from all Member States performed in over 30 cities across the length and breadth of India, with the closing event at Trivandrum, the capital of State of Kerala on 24 October 1992. The Vice President of India, Mr. K. R. Narayanan, was the Chief Guest at the closing event.

The Festival consisted of, inter-alia, performing arts, exhibitions of classical art, contemporary art, crafts with craftsmen in action, exhibition of children's paintings, exhibition of photographs and seminar.

It was a very successful and popular SAARC event. The Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture recommended that such festivals should not be a one time event and other Member States may host such

festivals in future, to strengthen the rich and age-old cultural links in South Asia.

TC ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Thimphu, Bhutan : October 14, 1992

The Thirteenth Meeting of the TC Telecommunications was held in Thimphu, Bhutan on October 14, 1992. The Meeting, attended by representatives of all Member States, was chaired by Mr. Tsering Dorji, Director, Department of Telecommunications, Royal Government of Bhutan. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Ms. Nima Ome, Director.

The delegates from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka presented country papers highlighting the present status of Telecommunications in their respective countries.

The Committee thereafter reviewed the progress made in the implementation of decision taken at the Twelfth Meeting of the Technical Committee. It was observed that now Burcaufax service, International Subscriber Dialing (ISD) and automatic telex services were available among all Member States. Most Member States had introduced media-independent tariff and all Member States had introduced common collection charges. Member States having direct links to each other have now started tests/measurements on regional routes and with this the quality of inter-country links has improved substantially.

VISITORS TO THE SAARC SECRETARIAT

Nepal : October 21, 1992

The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narasimha Rao, who was on a bilateral visit to Nepal, visit the SAARC Secretariat on 21 October 1992. He was welcomed by the Secretary-General, who briefed him about the on-going activities of the Association. He was accompanied by Mr. R. L. Bhatia, Minister of State for External Affairs.

A delegation of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians from all Member States visited the Secretariat on November 16, 1992. The Speakers were here

in Kathmandu in connection with the Second Meeting of the Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians.

The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Mr. A.S.M. Mostafizur Rahman, who was in Kathmandu as part of his visit to SAARC Countries to hand over the official invitation of Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia to all Heads of State or Government, visited the Secretariat in November 1992.

Lyonpo Dawa Tsering, Foreign Minister of Bhutan also visited the Secretariat in November 1992. The Minister, who is also the Chairman of South Asian Development Fund (SADF), was in Kathmandu in connection with the Third Meeting of the Fund.

TC ON TOURISM

Colombo, Sri-Lanka : October 21-23, 1992

The Second Meeting of the Technical Committee on Tourism was held in Colombo on 21-23 October 1992. All Member States participated in the meeting. The Secretariat was represented by Mr. R. M. Roy, Director. It was chaired by Mr. W. Tennekoon, Secretary, Ministry of Tourism & Rural Industrial Development, Government of Sri Lanka.

The Committee reviewed progress made in the implementation of Action Plan on tourism which was evolved during its previous meeting. It also discussed and agreed upon certain concrete measures for joint promotion of tourism in the region such as identification of target markets, preparation of tourist profiles, having joint pavilion in the international tourism fairs.

The Committee also deliberated on other important issues like transportation, infrastructure, exchange of information, joint ventures, training and agreed upon areas of cooperation for mutual benefit.

WORKSHOP ON COMMUNITY MOBILISATION AGAINST DRUG ABUSE

Islamabad, Pakistan : October 27-28, 1992

The SAARC Workshop on Community Mobilization against Drug Abuse (Islamabad, 27-28, October 1992) in which delegates from Nepal, Pakistan and

Sri Lanka participated, focused attention on the possible role of community in awareness creation, ways and means of Community involvement in rehabilitation, mobilizing community support against drug peddling and trafficking, identifying unused and under-utilized resources of the community for this purpose and exchange of information on community-based programmes in Member States.

In his inaugural address, Chairman of Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Malik pointed out that Community Mobilization placed its "faith in people and it is based on the assumption that people can develop a capacity to deal with their problems."

In his welcome address, Deputy Director of PNCB, Mr. Aurangzeb, underlined the crucial importance of Community Mobilization in the war against drugs, calling it the "bastion of all Demand Reduction Programmes."

The Concept Paper prepared by host country, Pakistan, and circulated as pre-conference document defines the objectives of the workshop against the background of close inter-relationship between Community, family and individuals in determining value systems, social behaviour and psychological attitudes. The Concept Paper brings into focus the problems confronting Community Mobilization, where drug use is sanctioned by custom and tradition.

Country reports and technical papers related to various aspects of Community Mobilization against drug abuse were presented and discussed during the workshop. The following recommendations were made by the group :

- (a) Collection and dissemination by Member States of data on drug, pattern of use and effects in respective countries.
- (b) Promotion of healthy, meaningful and creative youth activity through the active sponsorship of the community.
- (c) Training of Community leaders to sensitize them on drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation.
- (d) Training and active involvement of religious leaders and institutions in drug abuse prevention.

- (e) Promotion of cultural activities suited to local conditions on drug abuse prevention themes.
- (f) More active and positive use of print and electronic media to highlight community role in combating drug menace.
- (g) Follow-up and feed back from communities on the effectiveness and impact of media campaigns and strategies adopted.
- (h) Existing institution of family to be mobilized for active support and rehabilitation of drug addicts.
- (i) More intense training and active involvement of social and primary health workers in rehabilitation and relapse prevention.
- (j) Regular exchange of information in drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation programmes developed locally.
- (k) Developing community based counseling and advisory centres for early recognition of and intervention in respect of high risk groups and addicts.
- (l) Positive support and active encouragement of NGOs in the field of drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation.

WORKSHOP ON AGRO-INDUSTRIES

New Delhi, India : October 28-31, 1992

A Workshop on Development of Small and Medium Scale Agro-Industries, under the sector Agriculture, was held in New Delhi from 28-31 October, 1992. Participants from Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka attended this Workshop.

SYMPOSIUM ON PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE AMONG YOUTH

Dhaka, Bangladesh : October 27-29, 1992

A Symposium on Prevention of Drug Abuse Among Youth was held in Dhaka from 27-29 October, 1992 in which all Member States of SAARC

participated. Details of the Symposium will be included in the next issue of the Newsletter.

SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT

Islamabad, Pakistan : November 1-3, 1992

In pursuance of the recommendation of the First Meeting of the Committee on Environment, a Special Session of the Committee met in Islamabad on 1-3 November, 1992. The task of the Special Session was to evolve specific programmes, activities and modalities to implement the thirteen recommendations identified by the Committee at its First Meeting in Dhaka and to submit them to the 17th Session of the Standing Committee. The Meeting was inaugurated by Mr. Anwar Saifullah Khan, Minister for Environment and Urban Affairs, Government of Pakistan. In his inaugural address, Mr. Anwar Saifullah Khan, emphasized the importance of the Committee in the context of regional cooperation between SAARC member countries and hoped that this could play a pivotal role in materializing the Agenda 21 agreed in the UNCED Conference. Representatives from all Member States participated in the Meeting, Mr. Ahmed Saleem, Director, represented the SAARC Secretariat.

The Committee examined in detail the following recommendations contained in the Report of the First Meeting of the Committee on Environment held at Dhaka, Bangladesh on 17-19 February, 1992 :

- (a) Strengthening the Environment Management Infrastructure.
- (b) Programme on environmentally sound land and water use planning.
- (c) Research and Action Programme on Mountain Development in the Himalayan Region.
- (d) Coastal Zone Management Programme.
- (e) SAARC Forestry and Watershed Programme.
- (f) Programme on Energy and Environment.
- (g) Pollution Control and Hazardous Waste Management Programme.

- (h) SAARC Cooperative Programme for Biodiversity Management.
- (i) People's Participation in Resource Management.
- (j) Information Exchange on low cost and Environmentally Sound Habitat related Technologies.
- (k) Establishment of a SAARC relief and Assistance Mechanism for Disaster.
- (l) Regional Cooperation on the Development of Modern Disaster Warning Systems.

While carrying out the examination of each recommendation, the Committee deliberated in depth on the identification of measures for immediate action and decided on the modalities including the Calendar of Activities for the year 1993.

COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION (CEC)

New Delhi, India : November 2-3, 1992

The CEC held its Third Meeting in New Delhi on 2-3 November, 1992 under the Chairmanship of Mr. A. V. Ganesan, Commerce Secretary, Government of India. All Member States and a representative of the SAARC Secretariat, Mr. R. M. Roy, Director, participated. The Inaugural Session was addressed by Mr. P. J. Kurien, Union Minister of State for Commerce and Small Scale Industry, Government of India and Mr. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, SAARC Secretary-General.

The Committee considered the draft Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) which was prepared by the IGG on Trade Liberalisation. It made some minor amendments in the draft framework agreement and recommended it for approval by the Council of Ministers at its Twelfth Session in Dhaka. It was agreed that all formalities including exchange of trade concessions and ratification of the Agreement should be concluded latest by 1995.

It also discussed other agenda items such as technical assistance from UNCTAD, SAARC Fund for Regional Projects, progress in establishing SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), Regional Approach for

Standardization and work of SAARC Technical Committee on Transport. They took certain decisions for promoting cooperation among Member States in these areas.

TC ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

New Delhi, India : November 3-5, 1992

The Tenth Meeting of the Technical Committee on Science and Technology was held in New Delhi, India from 3-5 November, 1992. The Meeting attended by participants from all the SAARC Member States and chaired by D. J. Dhar, Adviser, Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, was inaugurated by Dr. P. Rama Rao, Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Science and Technology, Ocean Development and Biotechnology. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Ms. Nima Ome, Director.

On reviewing the activities of the Technical Committee since it last met in October 1991 it was observed that the activities relating to the preparation of directories, identification of National Nodal Points, preparation of State-of-the-Art Reports and Joint Research Projects are at various stages of implementation. The Meeting of the Experts on the Joint Research Project on Design and Manufacture of Food Processing Equipment was held in India on December 2-4, 1992.

The Technical Committee also considered the recommendations of the 16 seminars/workshops held since its inception till the Ninth Meeting of the Technical Committee and recommended that Member States should take into account those recommendations in developing proposals for consideration of the Technical Committee while formulating future calendar of activities.

THIRD MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR SAARC FUND FOR REGIONAL PROJECTS (CSFRP)

Colombo, Sri Lanka : November 5, 1992

The Third Meeting of the Council for SAARC Fund for Regional Projects (CSFRP) was held at Colombo, Sri Lanka on November 5, 1992.

under the Chairmanship of Mr. S. S. Nadkarni, Chairman of Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI). All SAARC countries except Bangladesh participated in the meeting. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Mr. Arif Ayub, Director.

The Council considered some of the project ideas received from Nodal Development Financial Institutions (DFIs). The Council expressed the view that some of the project ideas are worth pursuing further so that studies could be assigned for ascertaining the feasibility/viability of the identified projects. Further, the Council reiterated that the identified projects should be supported by sponsors from the beginning to ensure greater probability of success in implementation of the projects. In those cases where sponsors have been identified, the Nodal DFIs will initiate further steps to enable the Council to take a view on undertaking feasibility studies. The project ideas shortlisted by the Council for further investigation include (i) Mining and Micro Hydro Projects in Nepal and Bhutan; (ii) Mining of Dolomite of which Bhutan has large reserves. The Council decided that Bhutan, India and Pakistan will collect more details on this mineral and feasibility study could be considered after identification of suitable sponsors from within the region; (iii) Dairy project to meet the growing requirements of milk and milk products in the region; and (iv) Construction of a High-tech Regional Conference Hall near Colombo to be utilized for various national, regional and international seminars, meetings, workshops in Sri Lanka. The other projects considered by the Council included Sericulture, Integrated medicinal and herbal cultivation and processing plant, Sking project and Cut flower industry.

The Council decided that the Nodal DFIs may forward to the CSFRP Secretariat various policy decisions on industrial, trade, taxation, foreign exchange, financial and other related matters for circulation at the meeting of the Council. The next meeting of the Council will be held in Karachi in February 1993.

TC ON EDUCATION

Islamabad, Pakistan : November 10-12, 1992

The Fourth Meeting of the SAARC Technical Committee on Education was held in Islamabad from 10-12 November, 1992. All countries with the

exception of Nepal attended the proceedings. Mr. Arif Ayub, Director, represented the SAARC Secretariat.

The meeting was inaugurated by Syed Fakhar Imam, Federal Minister for Education, Government of Pakistan. In his inaugural address the Minister highlighted the fact that education was imperative for achieving the goals of national development and that country's prosperity depended on modern technology. He further stated that the challenge before the SAARC countries was not only to eradicate illiteracy but also to equip people with a minimum level of education to enable them to participate meaningfully in the process of development. He emphasised that education should be viewed as an important investment in human capital, be cost effective and permit as much innovation as possible.

Mr. Humayun Faiz Rasul, Education Secretary, Government of Pakistan delivered welcomed address. Country statements were made by country representatives. Mr. Arif Ayub, Director, SAARC Secretariat made a statement on behalf of Secretary-General SAARC.

The Technical Committee reviewed the activities since its Third Meeting. The Committee also reviewed the progress made in the SAARC Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships and made the suggestions which, inter-alia, include:

1. Substantial increase in the emoluments for the participants.
2. The system of Chairs to be replaced by a system of visiting professors undertaking assignments for 2-3. . .
3. Family members of the visiting professors may be included in the Scheme.

The Standing Committee considered the above recommendations and decided that Member States should undertake a comprehensive review of the operation of the scheme.

The country delegations presented status reports on cooperation in :

- (a) Women and Education.
- (b) Universal Primary Education.

- (c) Literacy, Post-literacy and Continuing Education.
- (d) Education Research and Training.
- (e) Science and Technical Education;
- (f) Education for Under-served Areas and Groups.
- (g) Distance Education.
- (h) Higher Education.

It identified some programmes requiring additional funding which include Workshop on Distance Education, Publication of Journal on Education, Training Workshop on Molecular Biology, Genetic Engineering and Bio-Technology, a Seminar in Pakistan on promotion of cooperation between Higher Education Institutions, Production Sector and Research Organizations and an Inter-Country Mobile Seminar of Experts in Planning and Organization of Literacy, Post-Literacy and Continuing Education in India. The Committee also prepared the Calendar of Activities for 1993.

ASSOCIATION OF SAARC SPEAKERS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS

Kathmandu, Nepal : November 15, 1992

The Speaker of Parliaments of SAARC Member States met in Kathmandu on 15 November 1992 and formally launched the "Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians." They also adopted the Charter of the Association. The objectives of the Association are to :

- (a) Strengthen people-to-people contact with a view to achieving mutual understanding, trust and friendship among the peoples of the SAARC countries.
- (b) Promote contact, coordinate and exchange experience among Parliaments and Parliamentarians of the SAARC countries.
- (c) Provide a forum for exchange of ideas and information on parliamentary practices and procedures and for making suggestions.

- (d) Support the work of SAARC and promote knowledge of its principles and activities among Parliamentarians of South Asia.
- (e) Cooperate in international forums in matters of common interest.

SAARC YOUTH VOLUNTEERS PROGRAMME (SYVOP)

India : October 20 - November 18, 1992

A total of 42 young boys and girls from Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka participated in this month-long SAARC Youth Volunteers Programme which was held in India between 20 October and 18 November, 1992. The SAARC Youth Volunteers were divided into 10 groups and were attached to the following centres :

Training, Orientation and Research Centre, Narendrapur; Training, Orientation Centre, University of Agriculture, Bhubaneswar; National Services Scheme Regional Centres in Jaipur, Bhopal, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Pune, Hyderabad, Madras and Trivandrum.

The programme consisted of orientation course in New Delhi, followed by work experience in organised camps, study tours of development projects and visits to places of cultural and historical importance. At the end of the programme, each participant was required to evaluate his/her experience and also the structure of the programme. There was consensus among the participants that the programme was extremely useful and provided them an opportunity to understand the common problems of the youth in the region.

The 1992 SYVOP Programme in India is the sixth in the series of programmes organized in pursuance of the Bangalore Summit (1986) decision to initiate such programmes to harness the idealism of youth for regional cooperative programmes by enabling them to work in the development programmes in other member countries.

Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka have offered to host SYVOP Programmes for the year 1993.

**PANEL OF EXPERTS ON SOUTH ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT FUND (SADF)**

Kathmandu, Nepal : November 20-21, 1992

The Panel of Experts on SADF held their third meeting in the SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu on 20-21 November 1992 under the Chairmanship of Lyonpo Dawa Tsering, Foreign Minister of Royal Government of Bhutan.

The Chairman gave details of the outcome of his preliminary consultations with the prospective donor countries and institutions such as World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, Kuwait, USA and UNDP. The SAARC Secretary-General, Mr. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki also briefed the Panel about his preliminary consultations with the Government of Japan. Dr. Gamani Corea, Special Adviser to the Panel presented two detailed papers outlining the scenario in the global capital market and relevant factors for establishing SADF.

The Panel deliberated on the outcome of the preliminary consultations carried out so far. They assessed various factors concerning the possibility of establishing SADF. At the end of their deliberations, they put forward certain recommendations for consideration at the Seventh SAARC Summit in Dhaka.

**TENTH MEETING OF THE SAARCE AUDIO
VISUAL EXCHANGE (SAVE) COMMITTEE**

Kathmandu, Nepal : November 20-22, 1992

The Tenth Meeting of the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange (SAVE) Committee attended by participants from all the SAARC Countries was held on 20-22 November, 1992 in Kathmandu under the chairmanship of Mr. Tapa Nath Shukla, General Manager of Nepal Television.

The Committee reviewed the progress in the implementation of decisions taken at its Ninth Meeting. It decided that the radio co-production on environment would be broadcast on 8 December 1992 in all Member States. Since the TV co-production on environment could not be completed in time, each Member State could produce individual programmes on the theme of environment and telecast from their respective networks on 8 December 1992.

to mark the SAARC Charter Day. The Committee finalized the SAARC TV Quiz and decided to telecast the programme consecutively in three parts of 25 minutes each during prim time tentatively on 6, 13, 20 October 1993. The Committee also decided that the SAVE Programme production in future should give more emphasis on developmental themes.

The schedule of the radio and TV programmes approved by the SAVE Committee for broadcast/telecast during 1993 are given below :

SAARC Audio Visual Exchange
Schedule of Radio Programmes

Produced by	Title	Date
Pakistan	Festal songs of Pakistan	15 January 1993
Sri Lanka	<i>Janasaviya</i>	15 February 1993
Bangladesh	Use of traditional Motifs/Formals or Tools in Development Communication with Unlettered Mass	15 March 1993
Bhutan	Non-Formal Education in Bhutan	15 April 1993
India	Living in Dignity	15 May 1993
Nepal	The Golden Goose	15 June 1993
Pakistan	Musical Strings	15 July 1993
Sri Lanka	Children in difficult circumstances	15 August 1993
Bangladesh	Modernization of Agriculture and its Effects on the Environment	15 September 1993
Bhutan	Environment Conservation in Bhutan.	15 October 1993
India	Percussion Instruments in Indian Music	15 November 1993

Alternate Programmes

Pakistan	Story of a String
Nepal	Melodies of Yesteryears
Nepal	Agriculture and Environment
Sri Lanka	Melodies and Rhythms of Sri Lanka

SAARC Audio Visual Exchange
Schedule of Television Programmes

Produced by	Title	Date
Bangladesh	Barnali	1 January 1993
Pakistan	Bangles - Beauty Around the Wrist	1 February 1993
Maldives	Faathun	1 March 1993
India	Let us go to the Blue Mountain	1 April 1993
Nepal	Lumbini	1 May 1993
Sri Lanka	Sengeetha Makaranda	1 June 1993
Maldives	Thodu Kuna	1 July 1993
Pakistan	Green Gold	1 August 1993
Nepal	At the Crossroads of Destiny	1 September 1993
Alternate Programme		
Pakistan	Coastline of Pakistan	

TC ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT

New Delhi, India : November 24-25, 1992

The Eleventh Meeting of the Technical Committee on Rural Development was held in New Delhi on 24-25 November, 1992.

The Meeting was chaired by Mr. Shivraj Singh, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India. All Member States participated. Shri S. Som, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India delivered the inaugural address. Mr. N. Navaratnagah, Director, SAARC Secretariat, participated in the Meeting and made a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General at the inaugural session.

The delegations of Member States which hosted the following activities during the year circulated reports and made short presentation and evaluations :

1. Workshop on Strategies for reducing urban-rural disparities, Male, (2-5 August 1992).

2. SAARC Course on Role of Voluntary Organizations in Rural Development, Hyderabad, India (17-28 August, 1992).

The Committee reviewed the progress in the implementation of the activities since the Tenth Meeting. The Committee considered networking arrangements among the institutions in SAARC Member States dealing with appropriate rural technology and decided that the SAARC Secretariat be requested to ensure, in consultation with Bhutan, the expeditious completion of the list. India would then work out the details of modalities and mechanisms for the proposed networking arrangements.

The Meeting also considered modalities and mechanisms for the establishment of a "Shelter Information Network 'SHELTERNET' contained in the working paper prepared by India. The Committee recommended that a meeting of experts be convened to formulate objectives and modalities of setting up the SHELTERNET with an indication of the financial implications involved. The expert group would decide whether existing institutions are adequate for the networking or additional topping would have to be done to strengthen the infrastructure in existing institutions.

Regarding Research Studies on Rural Housing and Transfer of Technology, the Committee recommended that the comments received from Member States be incorporated into the proposed design and scope for the research studies.

Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan presented country status papers on youth development.

The Committee also underlined the importance of continuing of formulate well planned programmes under the SAARC Youth Volunteers Programme to promote understanding and solidarity among the youth in South Asia and formulated the recommended Calendar of Activities for 1993 for the approval of the Standing Committee.

SAARC METROLOGICAL RESEARCH CENTRE (SMRC)

Dhaka , Bangladesh : November 25-26, 1992

An Expert Group Meeting on the Establishment of SMRC was held at Dhaka on 25-26 November 1992, under the Chairmanship of Mr. M.H. Khan

Chowdury, Director, Bangladesh Meteorological Department. All Member States participated in the meeting.

In his inaugural address the Chief Guest, Mr. A.K.M. Kamaluddin Chowdhury, Member, Planning Commission of Bangladesh stressed the importance of Metrology in the mitigation of the sufferings of the peoples caused by natural disasters. He hoped that the concerted efforts at this meeting of SAARC may result in an important role for the development of metrological research work and contribute to the welfare of the peoples of the member countries.

The Group of Experts discussed the revised proposal in detail and considering the cost involved towards the establishment of the Centre in the original form, the financial constraints of the member countries and the existing facilities in the region, it recommended that SMRC, as proposed by Bangladesh be established at Dhaka and should concentrate more on the research aspects of weather forecasting rather than on the operational aspects of the medium and long-range forecasting. The existing scientific and technical facilities in the region should be availed of through networking arrangements with the Centre.

The Report of the Expert Group Meeting was considered by the Twelfth Session of the Programming Committee held at Dhaka on 6 December 1992 which recommended to the Seventeenth Session of the Standing Committee the approval of the Report and early setting up of the SMRC in Dhaka.

TC ON SPORTS, ARTS AND CULTURE

Dhaka, Bangladesh : November 28-29, 1992.

The Tenth Meeting of the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture was held at Dhaka on 28 and 29 November 1992 under the Chairmanship of Mr. M. Azizul Haq, Secretary, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Government of Bangladesh. The Meeting was inaugurated by Mr. Sadeq Hossain, Minister of State for Youth and Sports of Bangladesh and attended by representatives from all Member States. Mr. Humayun A. Kamal, Director, represented the SAARC Secretariat.

The Committee reviewed the activities held since the Ninth Meeting of the Technical Committee, in the fields of sports, arts and culture, which were, *inter-alia*, the Fourth South Asian Archaeological Congress in Dhaka, Young Ambassadors (Girls) of SAARC in India and the First South Asian Festival of SAARC Countries in India.

Bangladesh was requested by the Committee to prepare a background paper on its proposal to hold the South Asian Folklore Conference.

The Dhaka Meeting discussed the desirability of establishing networking arrangements among relevant agencies/organisations in the Member States involved in the promotion of sports, arts and culture. It felt that networking arrangements could be set up in the fields of archaeology, musicology and historical studies. It also felt that Member States may consider the possibility of exchanging replicas of classical art. The Committee updated the Calendar of Activities for the year 1992 and prepared the Calendar of Activities for 1993.

MEETING OF COORDINATIONS ON THE STUDY ON GREENHOUSE EFFECT

Male', Maldives : December 1, 1992.

The Coordinators on the Regional Study on 'Greenhouse Effect and its Impact on the Region' met in Male' on 30 November to 1st December 1992, and finalized the Draft Regional Study. The Meeting was chaired by Mr. Hussain Shihab, Director, Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Planning and Environment, Male'. All Member States, except Nepal, participated in the Meeting. The SAARC Secretariat was represented by Mr. Ahmed Saleem, Director.

Recognising that environment had emerged as a major global concern and that the Fifth SAARC Summit had noted with alarm the unprecedented climate changes and sea-level-rise predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Meeting recommended that the Committee on Environment should examine as early as possible (a) the recommendations of the Study, (b) identify measures for immediate action and (c) decide on modalities for their implementation. The Study is a compilation of national studies of all Member

States completed in pursuance of the Islamabad Summit decision in 1988 and consolidated by the Secretary-General with the help of a Consultant.

It was subsequently approved by the Seventeenth Session of the Standing Committee in December 1992 at Dhaka.

SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE

Bangladesh : December 7-9, 1992

The Seventeenth Session of the Standing Committee was held on 7-9 December 1992 under the Chairmanship of the Bangladesh Foreign Secretary, Mr. Reaz Rahman.

The Standing Committee, inter-alia, reviewed the progress achieved in the implementation of the Integrated Programmes of Action and approved the reports of the Technical Committees. In its work, the Standing Committee was assisted by the Programming Committee which held its Twelfth Session on 6 December, 1992.

The Standing Committee also approved the Calendar of Activities recommended by the Programming Committee for the year 1993.

SAARC PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENT (SAPTA)

Dhaka, Bangladesh : December 7-9, 1992.

The Standing Committee at its Seventeenth Session held in Dhaka on 7-9 December 1992 recommended that the draft Agreement on SAPTA should be finalized before the Seventh SAARC Summit so that it could be signed by the Members of SAARC Councils of Ministers at that time.

The Council of Ministers at its Twelfth Session in Dhaka on 10-11 December 1992 agreed to the recommendation of the Standing Committee. It urged Member States to complete all formalities for operationalising SAPTA including the finalisation of scheduled concessions and the process of ratification before December 1995. Member States should start immediately the process of negotiating exchange of trade concessions with a view to completing it by December 1993. The Council also approved the terms of

reference of the Committee on Economic Cooperation as a permanent body within the SAARC framework.

TWELFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Dhaka, Bangladesh : December 10-11, 1992

The Twelfth Session of the Council of Ministers was held in Dhaka on 10-11 December 1992. Mr. A.S.M. Mostafizur Rahman, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, was unanimously elected the Chairman of the Council. He succeeded Mr. Harold Herath, Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, who was Chairman of the Council for Tenth and Eleventh Sessions.

Some major decisions that emerged from the Twelfth Session of the Council of Ministers were as follows:

1. Establishment of new Technical Committee on Environment, which would include within its purview the subject of Greenhouse Effect.
2. Finalisation of the Plan of Action for the "SAARC Year of Disabled Persons, 1993" for approval by the Seventh SAARC Summit.
3. Establishment of an Inter-Government Group (IGG) on the South Asian Development Fund.

Endorsement of the recommendations of the Standing Committee on draft agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) to be finalized before the Seventh SAARC Summit for signature by the Members of the Council of Ministers at that time.

- (a) Authorising the Secretary-General to sign an agreement with the Government of Japan for the establishment of the SAARC Japan Special Fund.
- (b) Authorising the Secretary-General to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNCTAD regarding Data Base on Trade Control Measures.
- (c) Approval of recommendations on advancing cooperation on Suppression of Terrorism.

- (d) Recommending the illustrative goals embodied in the Colombo Resolution on Children for approval of the Heads of State or Government at the Seventh SAARC Summit.
- (e) Contacts between recognised regional apex bodies of SAARC and ASIAN be encouraged.
- (f) The informal consultations initiated by the Chairman of its Eleventh Session with EC may be pursued further by its current Chairman with a view to precisely identifying mutually beneficial areas of cooperation, including the core economic areas, and modalities thereof. The Chairman may present a report on the outcome of his consultations to the Council at its Thirteenth Session.

The Council in addition to making recommendations to the Seventh SAARC Summit, also approved:

- (i) the Report of the Seventeenth Session of the Standing Committee;
- (ii) the Report of the Fourth Meeting of the SAARC Food Security Reserve Board.

The Council also considered the Reports of Second and Third Meetings of the Panel of Experts on the South Asian Development fund (SADF)

DHAKA - VENUE FOR THE SEVENTH SUMMIT

Dhaka, Bangladesh : December 12-14, 1992

The Seventh Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of SAARC countries will take place in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on 12-14 December, 1992 according to an announcement made by the Foreign Ministry in Dhaka.

The Summit as usual will be preceded by the Meetings of the Council of Ministers and Standing Committee comprising of Foreign Secretaries on 10-11 and 7-9 December respectively. The Programming Committee, consisting of senior foreign ministry officials, will meet before that on 6 December, 1992.

This is the second time Bangladesh is host to a SAARC Summit. The first SAARC Summit was also hosted by Bangladesh in 1985.

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE

Secretary-General, Mr. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, presented to the Seventeenth Session of the Standing Committee his Report on the Activities of the Association and the Secretariat for the year 1992.

The Report prepared in pursuance of Para 7 of Article VIII of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Secretariat, contains a survey of the entire range of activities under the SAARC framework including the Integrated Programme of Action.

In presenting his Report to the Standing Committee, the Secretary-General said that by any standards 1992 was an exceptionally productive year — a year of intense activity in which fundamental SAARC objectives were pursued vigorously.

Recalling the significant momentum given by the Colombo Summit in the crucial areas of Trade Liberalization, mobilization of regional and extra regional resources, international cooperation and people's participations, and the major initiatives taken on endorsed by the Colombo Summit in respect of Poverty Alleviation, Children, Prevention of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse, Suppression of Terrorism and Shelter, the Report details the respective mandates fulfilled and tasks accomplished within the specified time-frame.

Referring to the areas where more progress would have been desirable, the Secretary-General's Report particularly highlighted the importance of expeditious completion of ratification of SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, enactment of enabling legislation for suppression of terrorism, early convening of Expert Group Meetings on SAARC Regional Fund (SRF) and SAARC Documentation Centre (SDC), finalization of the Plan of Action for the Decade of the Girl Child and fuller utilization of SAARC Chairs, Scholarships and Fellowships.

The Report of the Secretary-General was considered by the Standing Committee and transmitted to the Twelfth Session of the Council of Ministers for its information.

NEW DIRECTORS IN THE SECRETARIAT

Mr. Humayun A. Kamal (Bangladesh) and Mr. Prabal S.J.B. Rana (Nepal), both senior career foreign service officers, joined the Secretariat as Directors in June and July 1992 respectively.

Mr. Kamal who had earlier served in Bangladesh mission in Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Ottawa and Colombo, is the second Director from his country. He succeeds Mr. Q. A. M. A. Rahim who has returned to the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry as Director-General SAARC and South Asia.

Mr. Rana, who had for many years been in the SAARC Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty's Government of Nepal before taking up the assignment at the Secretariat, had earlier served in Nepalese Missions in Rome, Islamabad, New York and London. He succeeds Mr. K.B. Shrestha, who has been appointed Joint Secretary SAARC and South Asia in the Nepalese Foreign Ministry.

SAARC YEAR OF THE DISABLED PERSONS, 1993

The Heads of State or Government at the Fifth SAARC Summit at Male', nothing that "millions of disabled persons lived in the SAARC region and immediate action was required to reduce their sufferings and to improve that quality of life," decided to observe 1993 as the "SAARC Year of Disabled Persons." In pursuance of this decision, the draft Plan of Action prepared by Pakistan, was circulated to Member States for their views.

Following recommendations of the Seventeenth Session of the Standing Committee and endorsement by the Twelfth Session of the Council of Ministers at Dhaka in December 1992, the Heads of State or Government are expected to endorse the draft Plan of Action, when the Seventh SAARC Summit takes place at Dhaka so that implementation of the Plan by Member States can commence from early 1993.

The Standing Committee noted with appreciation the offer of the Government of Pakistan to host a SAARC Ministerial Meeting on Disabled Persons in the first half of 1993 and the offer of Nepal to host a meeting of NGOs of SAARC Member States active in this field, to strengthen cooperation among them, in the first quarter of 1993.

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Chronology of Important Events

SOUTH ASIAN REGION

July to December 1992

BANGLADESH

- July 3* It was stated that Bangladesh would erect barbed wire fences around camps housing Burmese Muslim refugees try to stop fights between inmates and local residents.
- 11* Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.S.M. Mustafizur Rehman called on the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Siddique Kanju, in Islamabad. The talks between the two Foreign Ministers included a comprehensive review of bilateral relations, SAARC, regional issues and international developments.
- 16* It was stated that the President of Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Mian Habibullah told Pakistan and Bangladesh now look forward to many more joint ventures project in many areas.
- August 4* Bangladesh ousted President Hussain Mohammad Ershad, already serving a 13-year jail sentence for corruption.
- 9* Bangladesh's Parliament accepted a non-confidence motion tabled by the main opposition party trying to oust the 16-month old government.
- 9* Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia said that Pakistan and Bangladesh should pool their resources for the economic betterment of the two peoples. She was speaking at a banquet hosted in her honour by Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif at the Prime Minister House in Islamabad.
- 9* Prime Minister of Bangladesh Begum Khaleda Zia called on Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad. Matters relating to mutual and bilateral interests were discussed during the meeting.
- August 10* Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and the visiting Prime Minister of Bangladesh Begum Khaleda Zia held wide ranging talks to further expand the level of cooperation between the two countries with emphasis on

The above Chronology has been prepared by Syed Karim Haider, Research Assistant, Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore.

expansion of bilateral trade. The talks covered bilateral, regional and international issues.

- August 11* Pakistan and Bangladesh agreed to take steps to resolve the issue of division of assets and liabilities through mutual consultations for an expeditious resolution of the problem. A joint statement at the end of a three-day visit to Pakistan by Bangladesh Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia said Islamabad would begin repatriation of Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh since 1971 by December next.
- 11 Bangladesh Prime Minister, Begum Khaleda Zia had termed her visit to Pakistan as very successful which would help strengthen brotherly ties between the two nations.
- 23 Bangladesh Foreign Ministry said that India and Bangladesh had agreed to resolve long-standing disputes peacefully, including the thorny issue of sharing river water.
- 23 Talks between Bangladesh and Burma on the repatriation of more than a quarter of a million Burmese refugees camped in Bangladesh ended inconclusively at Coax's Bazar.
- 27 India and Bangladesh failed to work out a permanent plan for sharing water from common rivers, an issue that had soured relations between the two countries.
- September 15* Begum Khaleda Zia had urged the United States to put pressure on the Burmese Military Junta to take home nearly 300,000 Muslim refugees who had fled to Bangladesh.
- 19 It was reported that Bangladesh had reinforced its northwestern border to thwart attempts by India to push thousands of Bengali speakers into the country.
- 22 The repatriation of Burmese Muslim refugees started with the departure of token batch. Government officials said 47 members of 11 families, accompanied by a team of Bangladeshi officials, reached a reception camp in Burma's western state of Arakan after crossing the NAF border river.
- 25 At least five Burmese Muslim were killed in a clash with police and troops at a refugee camp in southeastern Bangladesh.
- October 2* On the appointment of a civilian to a key post in its western state of Arakan from where thousands of Muslim had fled citing persecution under military rule, a Bangladeshi official said: "We believe this is an attempt to restore confidence among the area's Muslim population."
- 4 It was reported that India occupied a piece of Bangladesh territory in the western district of Rajshahi on October 2, 1992.
- 6 Nearly 500 Indian Body Guards who crossed into Bangladesh on October 2 and occupied a perch of land returned to India.
- 15 The border officials from Bangladesh and India at the latest flag-meeting at Bhomsa Immigration Checkpoint discussed the Indian push back operation

and agreed that the problem should be resolved politically by the two countries.

- October 23* Indian Border Security Force intruded into Bangladesh territory through the northern border of Netrokona and opened fire which caused injuries to two persons.
- November 12* Sectarian riot erupted in Chittagong.
- 19* Nearly 50 people were injured when Burmese Muslim refugees fought with police trying to arrest 14 rebels in camps in south eastern Bangladesh.
- 26* A batch of 932 Burmese Muslim refugees returned home.
- December 12* Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif arrived Dhaka on a day long visit to express solidarity with the Government of Bangladesh and to the objectives of the SAARC Summit.
- 24* It was stated that Bangladesh and Russia had signed a protocol under which they would hold regular talks, ending almost a decade of poor relations.

BHUTAN

- July 18* The Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry had announced the establishment of the Seventh Import House to import products from Bangladesh.

BURMA

- July 24* It was reported that Burma's Military Junta had beefed up its arsenal with at least a dozen helicopter gunships or troop transporters from Poland.
- August 26* Burma's Military Junta, criticised by human rights groups for brutality in its wars against minority groups, had signed the Geneva Convention.
- 26* Burmese Muslim refugees in Bangladesh had bought up large quantities of stinging pepper dust in preparation for a massive protest against plans for their repatriation.

INDIA

- July 4* A Foreign Office spokesman expressed deep concern and anguish over anti-Muslim riots in the Indian city of Ahmedabad in which several people were reported to have been killed and over hundred injured. The spokesman urged Government of India to fulfil its duty to protect life, safety and honour of the Muslim minority.
- 4* Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif expressed his concern over the expansion of the Indian navy. Inaugurating a seminar on the importance of maritime power for Pakistan's development and defence, he said, "whatever be the Indian aims for such a massive naval development programme, the

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velopment and defence, he said, "whatever
sive naval development programme, the

concern of Pakistan is the reality that this entire force can be concentrated
and used against Pakistan."

July 9 Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Siddique Kanju, blamed
India's negative attitude for the lack of progress on Prime Minister
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's proposal for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.
In an interview with the Colombo daily *The Island* the Minister said
Pakistan was committed to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation in
South Asia, for which it was willing to accept any equitable and non-
discriminatory regional regime.

10 Pakistan and India have agreed to continue bilateral dialogue at all levels for
resolving all outstanding bilateral issues, including the question of Jammu
and Kashmir and nuclear non-proliferation, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs, Muhammad Siddique Kanju, said, while talking to APP on his
return from Colombo, where he held wide ranging talks with his Indian
counterpart, Eduardo Falcão.

August 17 Foreign Secretary, Shaharyar M. Khan, said, "We are not in agreement on
the interpretation of the Simla Agreement." Pakistani and Indian officials
held talks in New Delhi to try and improve strained relations, but both sides
said differences over Kashmir were unlikely to be settled soon. According
to Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan Pakistan's stand can be summarised as, "while
we remain faithful to the Simla Accord, it does not exclude our commitment
to United Nations resolutions (on Kashmir)."

18 Talks between the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India held in New
Delhi centred round reviewing draft agreements on preventing use of
chemical weapons against each other as well as certain other issues
including a hydroelectricity project in Jammu and Kashmir and commercial
shipping limits.

While speaking on an adjournment motion moved by Jamaat-i-Islami
members, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Siddique
Kanju, said: "The danger facing Babri Masjid is a matter of deep concern
for the Muslims not only in Pakistan but throughout the world." He also
expressed the hope that Indian Government would not allow the Hindu
extremist elements to resume their activities aimed at the demolition of the
Babri Masjid.

19 Foreign Secretary, Shaharyar M. Khan, expressed hope and satisfaction
after holding three rounds of talks with his counterpart J.N. Dixit in new
Delhi, on bilateral issues, including Kashmir.

19 Pakistan signed an agreement against the production, stock-piling and use
of chemical weapons, and a code of conduct on the treatment of diplomats
in the two countries. Ratification of an agreement on advance notice of
military exercises, manoeuvres, troop movements, prevention of airspace
violations and for permitting overflights and landings by military planes,
was also agreed upon. A schedule has also been reached upon for further
meetings on important matters.

- August 20 While addressing the Senate, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Siddique Kanju, said: "We welcome the forward movement in our relations in the form of a declaration on the prohibition of chemical weapons and a code of conduct for diplomats, signed by the two countries during the sixth round of Foreign Secretaries level talks which concluded in New Delhi."
- 24 Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, while in New York said that he believed that relations between India and Pakistan would improve.
- 24 In an interview with the weekly magazine, *Time*, he said: "There are just some irritants and these have to be removed."
- 27 The National Assembly adopted a resolution on the Babri Masjid and expressed deep anguish over its desecration, demanding preservation of sanctity of the historical Islamic monument.
- 27 Pakistan and India have agreed to drop their objections to the final report on the Chemical Weapons Convention. The report was prepared by the Committee on Chemical Weapons and has been forwarded to the full Conference on Disarmament.
- September 20 The Indian Consul General in Karachi, Rajiv Dogra, expressed optimism about the development of bilateral trade and economic relations between Pakistan and India. "In economy liberalisation and decontrol measures we have the benefit of learning from your experience", he said, and hoped that it would eventually lead to more interaction among the members of the business community of the two countries.
- October 18 The Government of Pakistan expressed shock and indignation at the murder of two Pakistanis by intelligence agencies in India.
- 18 A Foreign Office spokesman rejected the false and baseless allegations regarding the involvement of Pakistani nationals in the East Punjab insurgency. It was further stated that these allegations were aimed at providing a rationale for the brutal murders.
- 19 Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Siddique Khan Kanju, denied Pakistan's involvement in sponsoring terrorist activities in the Indian held Jammu and Kashmir state.
- 19 India strongly denied a Pakistani allegation that Indian intelligence agencies had cold bloodedly murdered two Pakistani nationals.
- 20 Pakistan repeated its demand to India to immediately return the bodies of two Pakistanis who were shot dead by the Indian intelligence agencies.
- 21 Tension between Islamabad and New Delhi was mounting over the recent killing of two Pakistanis by police in India.
- 21 A Foreign Office spokesperson said, "We are trying our best to defuse the tension." He also stated that the matter was being dealt between Islamabad and New Delhi on a daily basis, and much depended on Indian response to Pakistan's urgent messages.

- October 21** A Foreign Office spokesperson categorically rejected India's allegations that the two Pakistanis, brutally killed by security forces in a village in Jullundur district on 15 October, were terrorists.
- 24 Parents and relatives of the two Pakistanis killed by the Indian police in Jullundur (East Punjab) observed a 24-hour hunger strike before the offices of Indian Airlines on Davis Road.
- 29 Hafiz Rafiq who was observing a fast unto death to press for the return of the body of his nephew, Habibullah, from India died at the hunger strike camp in front of the India High Commission in Islamabad.
- November 1** Pakistan reiterated its demand for the early ex-humation and repatriation of the bodies of its two nationals who were killed by Indian authorities.
- 5 The Defence Secretaries of Pakistan and India discussed the various aspects of the Siachen glacier issue during their current sixth round of talks in New Delhi. A Foreign Office spokesman said in Islamabad that no agreement had been reached as yet but the talks were still continuing.
- 6 Indian Defence Ministry officials in New Delhi said that "some agreements in certain fields" had been reached on the Siachen issue, during their talks with Pakistani officials on 4 November. "They gave no substantive details."
- 6 One of the topics discussed was the possible joint mapping of the Line of Control stretching across Siachen and the occupied valley. The talks sparked off hope that Pakistan and India were willing to bridge their differences, however an extended session to be held the next day did not take place.
- December 6** Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif expressed a deep sense of shock and horror at the desecration and destruction of the Babri Mosque in India. "This abhorrent act of extreme fanaticism deserves to be strongly condemned by all civilised countries and especially those which oppose religious intolerance and extremism and uphold human rights", the Prime Minister said.
- 6 Pakistan lodged a strong protest with the Indian High Commissioner S.K. Lambah, who was summoned to the Foreign Office to convey Islamabad's resentment over the 'kidnapping and torture' of a Pakistan High Commission staff member Muhammad Ashfaq in New Delhi. A Foreign Office spokesman at a news briefing described the incident as a 'gross violation' of the Vienna Convention and, more importantly, the code of conduct which was agreed between the Foreign Secretaries of the two governments at their last meeting in the Indian capital in August this year.
- 7 The Indian Government declared Muhammad Ashfaq as *persona non nata*, an official of Pakistan High Commission said in New Delhi.
- 17 An official of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi, who was recently beaten up by Indian security personnel was flown back from New Delhi in a very serious condition, unable to move or speak.

- December 17* India expelled an official of the Pakistan High Commission on charges of espionage, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.
- 17* A Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman said Pakistan-India relations "at this juncture are going through very difficult period" because of India's internal events. He was replying to a question about the present state of Pakistan-India relations in the background of the destruction of Babri Mosque and a number of other recent irritants such as killing of Pakistanis.
- 17* The head of the Pakistan delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Sharifuddin Pirzada, said Pakistan had presented its principled stand on the issues of Babri Mosque, Kashmir and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the United Nations.
- 19* Pakistan and several other Muslim countries condemned in the United Nations General Assembly the demolition of Babri Mosque and demanded its immediate restoration. "The desecration and demolition of the Babri Mosque has sent a wave of grief, anguish and anger throughout the Muslim world," Pakistan's Chief delegate Sharifuddin Pirzada told the 179-Member Assembly.
- 29* Pakistan asked India to reduce the staff strength at its Consulate General in Karachi to 20 personnel. The Indian Deputy High Commissioner was called to the Foreign Office and informed of the Government's decision.

NEPAL

- July 13* The Ministry of Health said that an epidemic of gastroenteritis had killed 160 people in Nepal.
- 26* Nepali Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala told Parliament that he had fired Agriculture Minister Shailaja Acharya, his niece, for alleging there was corruption in several government ministries.
- August 7* It was reported that Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala had written a letter to the King of Bhutan in a bid to send back about 65,000 Bhutanese living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal.
- September 7* Two separate bus accidents in Nepal had left 67 people dead and 35 injured.
- 30* Nepal, stunned by two air disaster in less than two months, planned to install new warning systems on the steep and cloud-shrouded mountains crowding the southern approach to Kathmandu airport.
- October 1* Rescuers retrieved the bodies of 132 of the 167 passengers kiddled when a Pakistan International Airline (PIA) Airbus crashed on September 30, and given up the hunt for survivors.
- October 19* Indian Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, arrived Kathmandu for a three-day official visit to Nepal.

SRI LANKA

- July 4* Sri Lanka President Ranasinghe Premadasa would pay official visits to the other six member countries of SAARC.
- 16 It was stated that Sri Lanka is negotiating US \$100 million loan from the World Bank for an economic reform programme, but lending conditions could be tough.
- August 4* At least 30 suspected Tamil rebels and 14 soldiers were killed in fighting in Eastern Sri Lanka.
- September 15* It was reported that Ranasinghe Premadasa would visit six South Asian countries between September 23 to October 10.
- 24 At the end of two-day official visit of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa to Pakistan, in a joint press statement, the both sides reaffirmed their resolve to strengthen and further expand the close friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries.
- October 2* Sri Lankan Tamil rebels attacked a key northern army camp, 13 soldiers were killed and 15 wounded.
- 4 Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa arrived in Bangladesh for a three-day visit in his capacity as Chairman of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
- 7 Tamil rebels attacked a police post in east Sri Lanka.
- 11 Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa wound up a tour of South Asian countries as head of the regional grouping of SAARC with a visit to the Maldives.
- 12 Five Tamil were wounded when a bomb exploded in Eastern Sri Lanka.
- 19 Tamil guerillas launched a rocket and mortar attack on army bunkers in Northern Sri Lanka, killing six soldiers and wounding three.
- 13 Troops backed by Artillery fire destroyed three Tamil separatist bases and killed at least 10 rebels in the eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.
- 16 Sri Lanka's main parties hammered out a deal aimed at ending the Island's nine-year old war against Tamil separatists. Parties including the ruling United National Party and the main opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) reached agreement on setting up councils in the north and east where Tamils and their rebels forces are concentrated.
- December 17* A spokesman for the separatists Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) dismissed the Parliamentary Committee as a "manoeuvre by the Government to deceive the Tamils and the international community."
- 22 The visiting ten-member delegation of Sri Lanka-Pakistan Friendship Association held a meeting with Federal Minister for Health Syed Taneen Nawaz Gardezi in Islamabad.
- October 21* A Tamil Political Party withdraw from a Parliamentary Committee seeking to end Sri Lanka's Tamil separatist revolt because of war, citing a difference of views about a political settlement.

S A A R C

- July 9 Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Siddique Kanju, reaffirmed Pakistan's commitment to the objectives of SAARC and continue its efforts for strengthening and expanding mutually advantageous cooperation in all fields among the member states. Addressing the 11th Session of the SAARC Council of Ministers at Colombo the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said that "it is our earnest desire to serve as a truly effective vehicle of mutually advantageous cooperation among its member states."
- 20 Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz called for a free trade zone with a few items within SAARC. Pending the creation of such a zone, the SAARC countries can reduce the tariffs on certain goods by 10 to 20 per cent to expand their volume of trade among themselves. Mr. Sartaj Aziz told the Bangladeshi newspaper *Daily Star* in an interview.
- September 7 Leader of the Opposition in Bangladesh and President of Awami League, Sheikh Hasain Wajid, who had come to Karachi to participate in a seminar on 'The Role of Opposition in Asian Societies', while speaking at 'Meet the Press' programme of Karachi Press Club expressed the hope that the SAARC seminar would create a platform to help strengthen democratic institutions in the region.
- 9 Leaders of Opposition from the SAARC countries, in a joint declaration issued in Karachi, reaffirmed the principles of national independence, sovereignty and equality of the countries of SAARC and emphasised the need to settle disputes by peaceful means and seek political solution to the outstanding issues in the region.
- December 8 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit was postponed until next month in the wake of the destruction of Babri Mosque. Indian Foreign Minister R.L. Bhatia said in New Delhi.
- 11 Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif left for Dhaka to express solidarity with the Government of Bangladesh and to the objectives of SAARC. Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao showed his inability to attend the two-day summit which was rescheduled for 13-14 January.
- 12 Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif said that it was imperative to control and defeat the 'forces of extremism' to make South Asia a peaceful, prosperous region. He called upon India to resolve the Kashmir dispute on the basis of the right of self-determination as without settlement of the issue, "peace on the sub-continent will remain an elusive dream." The Prime Minister was speaking at a banquet hosted by his Bangladeshi counterpart, Begum Khaleida Zia. About SAARC, he said, "I believe that SAARC will only be able to achieve its objectives if all major issues between member countries are settled."

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